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INTRODUCTION
Ask for an appraisal of arbitration and you spark debate as
vigorous as arguments about religion or politics. Supporters
praise arbitration's streamlined procedures and cost-
effectiveness.' Charging the judicial system with "complete and
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633
(1984); Jessica T. Martin, Advanced Micro Devices v. Intel Corp. and Judicial Review of
Commercial Arbitration Awards: When Does a Remedy "Exceed Arbitral Power?, 46 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 1907, 1907 (1995) (commending arbitration "as a method of alternative dis-
pute resolution [that] boasts [of] the advantages of flexibility, efficiency, and finality");
Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements To Arbitrate: An Examination of the Pub.
lic Policy Defense, 2 CARnozo L. REv. 481, 482 (1981) (asserting that "arbitration is em-
braced as an effective and efficient mechanism for resolving disputes"); Cheryl
Aptowitzer, Note, Arbitration-Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards-Courts May Re-
view and Vacate an Arbitration Award Where an Arbitrator Commits Gross, Unmistaka-
ble, or Not Reasonably Debatable Errors of Law or Where the Arbitrator Manifestly Dis-
regards the Law and the Result Is Unjust-Perini Corp. v. Great Bay Hotel & Casino,
Inc., 129 N.J. 479, 610 A.2d 364 (1992), 24 SETON HALL L Rav. 998, 998-99 (1993) (not-
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absolute failure,"2 they hail arbitration as "a better way" to re-
solve disputes.3 Critics lambast arbitration as "an inferior sys-
tem of justice"4 marred by "lawlessness 5 They predict that the
deficiencies of arbitration will cause it to "burn out and
collapse"
6
However persuasive, such opinions both for and against ar-
bitration may lead to confusion. The core of arbitration is not
simplicity, though most who choose that forum seek escape from
the convolutions of the courtroom. Nor is reduced expense the
essence of arbitration, though few would quarrel with trimming
counsel fees. The central element of arbitration is the intention
of the parties as expressed in the arbitration agreement. The
agreement determines the process. Informality may flow from
the agreement, but it need not, for the parties may insist on ad-
hering to arcane rules of evidence or on wearing powdered wigs
during the hearing. Privacy may flow from the agreement, but it
need not, for the parties may broadcast the proceedings on pub-
lic access television.
ing that arbitration has gained favor because it is "an expeditious, inexpensive, and in-
formal" method of resolving claims).
2. Letter from Philip J. Hoblin, Jr., Counsel to Parker, Chapin, Flattau & Klimpl, to
Kenneth R. Davis, Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham University
Graduate School of Business Administration 1 (May 22, 1996) [hereinafter Hoblin Let-
ter) (on file with author).
3. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 ABAJ. 274, 276 (1982) [herein-
after Burger I].
4. Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Ind., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 (8th Cir. 1986); see Ed-
ward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REv.
1, 55 (1987) [hereinafter Brunet I] (warning that "[diramatic expansion of ADR [alterna-
tive dispute resolution] could harm qualitative justice in a substantive way"); Owen M.
Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985) [hereinafter Fiss I] (arguing that the
courts provide more justice than arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute reso-
lution); Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 661, 661-62 (1963)
[hereinafter Kronstein I] (criticizing arbitration for vesting unconstrained power in pri-
vate decisionmakers who are not held accountable for their abuses). But see Jethro K.
Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute Resolution Move-
ment, 53 U. Cm. L. Rav. 424, 429-31 (1986) (proposing that outcomes of alternative dis-
pute resolution methods, including arbitration, are often superior to court judgments be-
cause such alternative methods (1) allow for creative resolutions, (2) avoid prolonged
adjudicative procedures which induce unjust settlements, and (3) entrust the controversy
to decisionmakers with appropriate expertise).
5. Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government, 54
YALE L.J. 36, 66 (1944) [hereinafter Kronstein II].
6. Michael Hunter Schwartz, From Star to Supernova to Dark, Cold Neutron Star:
The Early Life, the Explosion and the Collapse of Arbitration, 22 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 2
(1994). Forecasting the imminent demise of arbitration comes prematurely. The forum
thrives in this contentious era. See infra note 28 and accompanying text (providing data
which demonstrate the popularity of arbitration).
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Once it is understood that party intent is the defining fea-
ture of arbitration, previously intractable issues become surpris-
ingly manageable. Two such issues have long perplexed the judi-
ciary. The first is arbitrability, that is, whether an issue is even
subject to arbitration. The second is scope of review, that is, the
standard a court uses when deciding whether to vacate an arbi-
tration award for errors of fact or law.
Arbitrability addresses the tension between the Federal Ar-
bitration Act (FAA) and public policy embodied in federal law
such as antitrust law, securities law, the anti-racketeering stat-
ute, and civil rights law. The FAA encourages the enforcement
of arbitration agreements. Public policy, however, balks when
parties seek to arbitrate federal statutory claims implicating so-
cietal interests. The double-vision of federal law, as expressed in
the FAA, on the one hand, and various other federal statutes, on
the other hand, simultaneously favors and disfavors the arbitra-
tion of federal law claims.
The second issue is the role of the judiciary in reviewing
and correcting erroneous arbitral awards. A narrow scope of re-
view preserves the finality of awards. Some argue that broad re-
view would rob arbitration of much of the efficiency that distin-
guishes it from litigation. Others advocate a broad scope of
review because it would help assure the legal correctness of the
outcome. Legal correctness dovetails with public policy because
misapplying or ignoring controlling law may injure society. For
example, if an arbitrator mistakenly allows a massive gasoline
price-fixing arrangement to continue, motorists around the coun-
try will suffer. Thus, the courts can vindicate public policy either
by denying arbitrability or by reviewing arbitration awards for
error.
This Article challenges the assumption that by submitting a
dispute to arbitration the parties intend to relinquish judicial
review of the award. Rather, this Article argues that contract
analysis of party intent manifested in the arbitration agreement
determines the scope of judicial review. Depending on the agree-
ment, the parties may or may not have incorporated judicial
oversight into the process. Such review, based on the agreement,
nearly always reconciles the policy of the FAA favoring enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements with the exigencies of public pol-
icy expressed in federal substantive statutory law.
Part I of this Article compares litigation with arbitration,
stressing that party intent should guide the interpretation of ar-
bitration agreements. After a discussion in Part I of the public
policy defense to arbitrability, Part III analyzes the defense.
Part IV discusses the current scope of judicial review of arbitra-
[Vol. 45
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tion awards and explains the relationship between scope of re-
view and arbitrability. Based on the intent of the parties to the
arbitration agreement, Part V proposes a new calculus for deter-
mining the scope of review of awards, a standard which to a sig-
nificant degree promotes public policy. Part VI responds to antic-
ipated arguments against the proposed standard, and the article
concludes that the proposal would enhance the arbitral process
while promoting self-determination.
I. THE CHARACTER OF ARBIrRATION
Parties generally agree to arbitrate because they wish to
avoid the expense, delay and complexities of litigation.7 Court
rules provide litigants with costly, time-consuming techniques,
which lawyers feel compelled to exploit. Following the injunction
to represent their clients zealously, lawyers have an ethical jus-
tification for transforming litigated cases into interminable sa-
gas.8 Digging just a little deeper may reveal the nugget that will
lead to victory. Furthermore, in every case one litigant inevita-
bly has a stronger position than the other. The weaker side may
stall the case, turning the proceedings into a war of attrition
where the passage of years and expenditure of a small or large
fortune may drive his adversary into an otherwise unthinkable
settlement.
A. The Litigation System
The American civil justice system aspires to procedural fair-
ness and the legally correct result. An elaborate system of rules,
constitutional, statutory and common-law, aims at achieving
7. Former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, a staunch proponent of arbitration, has
warned that judges are burdened with a "litigation explosion" Burger I, supra note 3, at
275. To alleviate the glut of litigation, he has encouraged arbitration. "If the court are to
retain public confidence," he has said, "we cannot let disputes wait two, three, or five
years to be disposed of, as is so often the situation." Id. at 276. See also Arthur R.
Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984) (sympa-
thizing with those "ensnared" in the inefficient and uneconomical American litigation
system); Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94
YALE IJ. 1643, 1644 (1985) (faulting litigation for its costs and delays which force par-
ties to "wait years for their day in court"). But see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking
American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 450-52 (1988) [hereinafter Stipanowich I] (ac-
knowledging the efficiencies of arbitration but pointing out that sometimes obstructionist
lawyers can bog down arbitration by moving for stays and by exploiting the informalities
of the process itself which countenance delay).
8. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLIY Canon 7 (1980) ("A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.).
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these goals. In litigation, rules of pleading, discovery, motion
practice, evidence, and appellate review abound. Ironically, jus-
tice often buckles under the weight of these baroque rules.9 A
plaintiff commences an action by serving a summons and com-
plaint.'0 The method of service must meet due process require-
ments,1 and the content of the complaint must satisfy formal
pleading rules, though experienced practitioners frequently
evade them. 2 If the complaint is defective, the defendant will
move to dismiss it, 3 a procedure which may delay the lawsuit
many months. If the motion is denied, discovery begins. Both
sides churn out voluminous computer-generated interrogatories
and document demands' 4 and then make motions charging the
other with abusing the discovery process. 5 Witnesses squirm
through a barrage of pointed questions at depositions. 16 Some-
where in the midst of the discovery process one party may cause
further delay by moving for summary judgment.17
A congested docket may forestall the trial.8 When the case
is finally heard, a court reporter records the testimony. Complex
rules of evidence govern admissibility and the judge must apply
9. Hoblin Letter, supra note 2, at 1 (calling the judicial system "a complete and ab-
solute failure").
10. See, eg., FED. 1R Civ. P. 4.
11. See, eg., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US. 306 (1950).
12. See, eg., FED R. Crv. P. 8 (providing general pleading standard); FED. R. Civ. P. 9
(providing heightened pleading standard for certain matters such as fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty).
13. See, eg., FED. 1R Crv. P. 12(b).
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (interrogatories); FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (document production).
15. See, eg., FED. . Cirv. P. 36(a) (motion to compel discovery). Many commentators
criticize the rampant abuse of discovery. See Lieberman and Henry, supra note 4, at 427
(remarking that discovery takes years to conduct); Miller supra note 13, at 9 (likening
discovery to "quicksand" immobilizing lawsuits); David M. Trubek, et al., The Costs of
Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Ray. 74, 74-75 n.1 (1983) (summarizing commentary
critical of discovery practice). But see Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 61 (1983) (disputing that discovery abuse is
widespread); Trubek et al. supra at 89 (arguing that discovery use is generally modest);
cf. Matthew Farley, Perspectives on Arbitration Discovery, SEcuRrrEs ARBITRATION 1995,
at 103 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Series No. 900, 1995) (criticizing the use of
computer-generated pleadings).
16. See Newman supra note 7, at 1644 (charging the litigation system with subject-
ing business executives to "days of deposition questioning that yield little to the resolu-
tion of disputes").
17. See, eg., FED. H. Civ. P. 56.
18. See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 426 (1953), over-
ruled, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(commenting that "in the City of New York... calendar congestion both in the state
courts and the federal court is notorious and results in excessive delay").
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or instruct the jury to apply principles of substantive law. An
adverse outcome spurs the loser to make motions to overturn
the result. 19
The process ends with an arduous climb up the appellate
ladder. The appellate court will reverse the trial court's decision
if the trial judge made a mistake of fact or law that may have
affected the outcome of the case. Once this process is completed,
the losing party may be entitled to, and in any event may seek,
yet another appeal. The daunting consequence of a triumphant
appeal may. be a new trial.
B. A More Economical Process
Arbitration is a process where parties voluntarily submit
their disputes to one or more nonjudicial decisionmakers for
binding resolution.2 0 It is "essentially a creature of contract in
which the parties themselves charter a private tribunal for the
resolution of their disputes."21 The parties may, within broad
bounds, structure the arbitration process as they wish.2 2 The ar-
19. FED. 1R Civ. P. 59 (motion for new trial); FED. IL Crv. P. 60(b) (motion for relief
from judgment).
20. See Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry,
17 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., 698, 699 (1952) [hereinafter Mentschikoff I] (defining arbi-
tration as having four essential elements: (1) an agreement (2) the agreement contem-
plates a decision ratherthan compromise (3) the decision-maker is unconnected to the
judicial system, and (4) the agreement provides that the decision will be binding and fi-
nal); Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 425 n.1 (characterizing arbitration as "a process
whereby parties voluntarily submit their disputes for resolution by one or more impar-
tial third persons, instead of by a judicial tribunal provided by law"); see generally 1
GABRIEL M. WnmuR, DomKm ON COMMERCiAL AanrrRATION § 1:01, at 1-2 (rev. ed. 1984)
(noting that parties may enter into the arbitration agreement before or after the dispute
arises).
21. Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 227 N.Y.S.2d 410, 402-03 (N.Y. 1962).
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (com-
menting that an international arbitral tribunal "is bound to effectuate the intention of
the parties"); United Steel Workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (holding a labor grievance arbitrable and noting that "arbitration is
a matter of contract"); Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, 4 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 1993)
(denying motion of nonparty to agreement to compel arbitration because the right to ar-
bitrate is contractual); Lipschutz v. Gutwirth, 106 N.E.2d 8, 10 (N.Y. 1952) (stating that
the "spirit of arbitration [is] the fuller effectuation of contractual rights"). See also Ed-
ward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbi-
trability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1059, 1069 (1987) (theorizing that "the legitimacy of
arbitral proceedings flows directly from a vision of private autonomy as the conceptual
basis of contract law"); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctors
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FoREsT L. Ray. 1001, 1034 (arguing that arbitra-
tion agreements should be interpreted and enforced like all other contracts).
22. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)
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bitration agreement establishes the rules under which the pro-
ceedings shall be conducted. 23
Although parties may establish whatever procedures they
desire, many prefer the structure offered by the American Arbi-
tration Association (AAA), which has adopted simplified rules of
procedure.2 Many industries, through exchanges, chambers of
commerce, and trade associations, have organized arbitral fo-
rums.25 The securities brokerage business, for example, arbi-
trates disputes at self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as
the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York
Stock Exchange. Because many brokerage houses require cus-
tomers to sign account agreements containing arbitration
clauses, controversies between brokerage firms and their cus-
tomers are routinely arbitrated at SROs. 26 The SROs have
adopted, with SEC approval, nearly identical streamlined proce-
(asserting that "[airbitration under the Act [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion,
and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit");
BERTOLD H. HOENIGER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HANDBOOK § 1.07, at 1-11 (rev. ed. 1991)
(stating that "[s]ince arbitration is a creature of contract, the possibilities for custom tai-
loring are almost endless"); THOMAs H. OEHMKE, COM=ERCIAL ARBITRATION § 6:05, at 4
(rev. ed. 1995) (suggesting that parties wishing to enter into arbitration agreements
should bargain for favorable terms in arbitration clauses, and that the party who drafts
the arbitration clause will benefit from controlling the phrasing); Mentschikoff I, supra
note 20, at 699 (pointing out that the parties can tailor the process to fit their needs and
the circumstances of the case); Stipanowich I, supra note 7, at 433 (observing that "[a]s
a creature of contract, arbitration is essentially what the parties make it").
23. OEHMKE, supra note 22, § 6:07, at 5 (suggesting that parties satisfy their needs
by deviating expressly from standard rules of arbitration associations).
24. The American Arbitration Association is a public service, not-for-profit organiza-
tion offering a wide range of dispute resolution services, including arbitration. AMmECAN
ARBITRATION AsSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULEs, Rule 1 (1996) [hereinafter
AAA RuLES].
25. See OEHMKE, supra note 22, § 20:01, at 1 (noting that, although the AAA ad-
ministers more arbitrations than any other association, specialized forums service vari-
ous industries); 1 WILNER supra note 20, § 2:01 at 13-14 (discussing institutional busi-
ness arbitration).
26. Marilyn B. Cane, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Interplay of
State and Federal Law (or a Smaller Bite of the Big Apple), 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 153, 158
(1993) (discussing the widespread use of customer account arbitration agreements); Con-
stantine N. Katsoris, SICA- The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 486 n.9
(1996) [hereinafter Katsoris I] (reporting the results of a 1988 SEC study concluding
that brokerage firms included arbitration agreements in 95% of option accounts, 94% of
margin accounts, and 39% of cash accounts). These figures probably understate the cur-
rent predominance of arbitration agreements in customer accounts. In June 1987, the
Supreme Court decided ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987), making claims under the 1934 Exchange Act arbitrable. McMahon undoubtedly
spurred brokerage house attorneys to revise account agreements to include arbitration
clauses. This trend may not have been reflected fully in the SEC figures. Also, the SEC
figures do not consider the prevalence of arbitration clauses in managed accounts.
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dural codes.27 This Article will focus on the AAA and SROs be-
cause they enjoy immense popularity.
28
Typically, a demand for arbitration is served by an ordinary
letter summarizing the claim and stating the relief sought.2 No
responsive pleading is required.30 The parties sometimes select
the arbitrators but in any case the arbitrators, whether chosen
by the parties or an association,31 have expertise in the subject
27. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of A Public Securities Dispute, 53
FoRDHAM L. REv. 279, 283-84 (1984) [hereinafter Katsoris III. The Securities Industry
Council on Arbitration (SICA), an organization comprised of representatives from SROs,
a trade organization known as the Securities Industry Association, and the public devel-
oped a Uniform Code of Arbitration which has been adopted, with minor modifications,
' by the SROs. This code has periodically undergone revision and continues to govern SRO
arbitration. Id. at 284. 'See also Katsoris I, supra note 26, at 491.
28. The popularity of the AAA is considerable. Arbitration filings at the AAA in
1995 totalled 62,423. Telephone Interview with Barbara Brady, Director of Case Admin-
istration, AAA (August 26, 1996) [hereinafter Brady Interview]. The number of AAA ar-
bitration filings jumped to 72,200 in 1996. Telephone Interview with Luis Cruz, Assis-
tant to Director of Case Administration, AAA (Feb. 27, 1997). The total number of SRO
arbitrations filed in 1995 was 7,271. Of this total, the NASD, the most popular SRO fo-
rum, received 6,055 filings and the NYSE, the second most popular SRO forum, received
810. Katsoris I, supra note 26, at 564, App. B. See also 8 SEc. ARB. COMMENTATOR 8-9
(Richard P. Ryder ed., 1996) (analyzing 1993-1995 arbitration statistics for the ten
SROs). Through November 1996, NASD arbitration filings totalled 5,114-a number rep-
resenting an 8 percent projected annual decrease. See THE NEUTRAL CORNER 7 (Thomas
F. Wynn, I ed., Dec. 1996).
29. See AAA RULES, Rule 6. When initiating a claim at an SRO, a claimant may
mail to the Director of Arbitration a Statement of Claim specifying the relevant facts
and remedies sought. UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION § 2(b) (Sec. Indus. Conf on Arbitra-
tion 1996) [hereinafter SICA CODE] (Simplified Arbitration); CODE OF ARBrmATION PROCs-
DURE 10302(b) (Natl Ass'n of Sec. Dealers 1996) [hereinafter NASD CODE] (Simplified
Arbitration); ARBITRrATION RULES, Rule 601(b) (New York Stock Exchange 1995) [hereinaf-
ter NYSE RULES] (Simplified Arbitration). See also SICA CODE § 13(a) & (b) (Initiation of
Proceedings); NASD CODE 10314(a) (Statement of Claim); NYSE RULES Rule 612(a)
(Statement of Claim).
30. AAA RULES, Rule 6. SRO rules require a responsive pleading. SICA Code § 13(c)
(Answers-Defenses, Counterclaims and/or Cross-Claims); NASD CODE 10314(b) (An-
swers-Defenses, Counterclaims and/or Cross-Claims); NYSE Rules, Rule 612(c) (An-
swers, Defenses, Counterclaims and/or Cross-Claims). See also SICA CODe § 2(b) (Simpli-
fied Arbitration); NASD CODE 10302(d) (Simplified Arbitration); NYSE RULES, Rule
601(d) (Simplified Arbitration).
31. When arbitrating at the AAA, parties participate in the selection of arbitrators.
AAA RULES, Rules 13-15 & 54. SROs designate arbitrators who will serve either alone or
in panels. SICA CODE §§ 2(f) & 9; NASD CODE 10302(f) & 10308(a) & (b); NYSE RULES,
Rules 601(f) & 607(a)(1). However, parties arbitrating at SROs have one peremptory
challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. SICA CODE § 10; NASD CODE 10311;
NYSE RULES, Rule 609. The NASD is considering a rule change that would give parties
a role in the selection process. See NASD Regulation Board Approves Task Force Initia-
tives, THE NEUTRAL CORNER 4 (Thomas F. Wynn III, ed., Dec. 1996).
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matter in controversy.3 2
Under common practice, the arbitrators acquaint them-
selves with the claims and defenses at a pre-hearing confer-
ence.33 Eager defense lawyers may request permission to move
to dismiss the complaint, but arbitrators generally deny the lib-
eral use of motions.3 4 Though it may be in their clients' interests
to expedite the proceedings, lawyers tend, in a Pavlovian-like re-
flex, to seek extensive discovery. Absent a compelling reason, ar-
bitrators ordinarily direct limited document disclosure and deny
requests for interrogatories35 and depositions.36 The hearing is
marked by informality. Rules of evidence do not apply except in
the unlikely event that the arbitrators choose to enforce them.
37
A stenographic record of the hearing is kept only if one of the
parties makes necessary arrangements.
38
One issue arising in arbitration is what law, if any, the ar-
bitrators must apply in resolving the claims. Association rules
32. AAA RULES 4 & 54; SICA CODE § 8; NASD CODE 10308; NYSE RULES, Rule 607.
See Stipanowich I, supra note 7, at 437 (suggesting that experienced arbitrators are less
susceptible to lawyer artifice than judges who lack experience in the relevant industry).
But see Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668, 683-84 (1986) (arguing that judges are experts in resolving legal is-
sues and therefore that they are better equipped than arbitrators to effectuate public
policy).
33. AAA RULES, Rule 10; SICA CODE § 20(d); NASD CODE 10321(d); NYSE RULES,
Rule 619(d). Informality colors the process. In securities arbitration, the pre-hearing con-
ference may be conducted by telephone. SICA CODE § 201(d)(1); NASD CODE 10321(d)(1);
NYSE RULES, Rule 619(d)(1).
34. See PILP J. HOBLIN, JR., SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES STRATEGIES CASES
2-4 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Hoblin Treatise]; COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990S
50-51 (Richard J. Medalie ed., 1991) ("The decision of whether to grant motions is a mat-
ter within the arbitrator's discretion."); Stipanowich I, supra note 7, at 438. The empha-
sis on informality colors the process. In securities arbitration, the pre-hearing conference
may be conducted by telephone. UNIFORM CODE OF ARBrrRATION § 13(d)(1) (1996).
35. See HOBLiN TREATISE, supra note 34, at 2-4; MEDALiE, supra note 34, at 42-45;
Stipanowich I, supra note 7, at 438.
36. See HOBLiN TREATISE, supra note 34, at 2-4; AAA RULES, Rule 10 (authorizing
the arbitrators, "[c]onsistent with the expedited nature of arbitration... [to require] the
production of relevant documents and other information"); SICA CODE § 20(d)(1) (in-
structing the presiding arbitrator to "achieve agreement among the parties on... the
exchange of information [and the] exchange and production of documents"); NASD CODE
10321(d)(1)(same); NYSE RULES, Rule 619(d)(1) (same).
37. See AAA RULES, Rule 31; SICA CODE § 21 (1996); NASD CODE 10323; NYSE
RULES, Rule 620.
38. See AAA RULES, Rule 23. But see SICA CODE § 24 (providing that a verbatim
stenographic hearing record shall be kept, but providing for transcription of the record
only upon the request of a party who must "bear the cost of such transcription unless
the arbitrators direct otherwise"); NASD CODE 10326 (same); NYSE RULES, Rule 623
(same).
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are silent on the question. Courts have held, as a general rule,
that "arbitrators need not follow otherwise applicable law when
deciding issues before them unless they are commanded to do so
by the terms of the arbitration agreement."39 This rule derives
from the fundamental principle of arbitration: the agreement
shapes the process. If the agreement requires the arbitrators to
apply particular law, they must.40 If the agreement does not
stipulate any law, the natural inference is that the parties' si-
lence frees the arbitrators to enforce their own sense of justice.
In either event, arbitrators need not,41 and typically do not, ex-
plain their decisions in written opinions.4
39. 1 WILNE, supra note 20 § 25:01, at 391 (quoting University of Alaska v. Modern
Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Alaska 1974)). Wilner adds that the arbitrator may
resolve the dispute based on his sense of justice. See also Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987) (remarking that "arbitrators are not bound by
precedent"); VWilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953),
overruled in part by, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989) (commenting that "while it may be true that arbitrators do not ordinarily
consider themselves bound to decide strictly according to legal rules, there can be no
doubt that they are so bound if the arbitration agreement so provides"); Lentine v.
Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635 (N.Y. 1972) (stating that "[aibsent provision to the con-
trary in the arbitration agreement, arbitrators are not bound by principles of substan-
tive law"); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products, Inc., 237 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y.
1968) (stating that "[a]rbitrators are not bound by rules of law"); Edward Brunet, Arbi-
tration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81, 85 (1992) [hereinafter Brunet H]
(stating that the weight of authority permits arbitrators to do justice without following
rules of law); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 CoLUM. L. Rav. 846, 867
(1961) [hereinafter Mentschikoff III (noting that arbitrators "must make their own selec-
tion of the most appropriate norms for the particular dispute"); Sterk, supra note 1, at
483 (stating that "[a]rbitrators ... are not bound by substantive private law); Note, Ju-
dicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration, 53 GEo. L.J. 1079, 1087 (1965) [hereinafter
Judicial Supervision] (commenting that arbitrators are not bound by substantive law
that would control in court).
40. Sterk, supra note 1, at 483 (suggesting that even where the agreement requires
application of substantive law, arbitrators, though bound to honor the agreement, may
not be inclined to apply the law rigorously).
41. See Sterk, supra note 1, at 483 (stating that arbitrators are not required to pro-
vide reasons for their decisions).
42. See Lynn Katzler, Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be Required in All Se-
curities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the Securities Industry, 45
AM. U. L REV. 151, 156 (1995) (observing that securities arbitrators, who generally com-
plete a standard award form, provide no rationale for their decisions); Martin, supra
note 1, at 1918 ("[Clourts resign themselves to inferring grounds for relief from the
award itself, in order to deem the award 'within the scope of the Arbitrator's authority"
because arbitrators are not required to provide explanations for their award); Peter M.
Mundheim, The Desirability of Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: Challenges
Facing the Industry Regulators in the Wake of Mastrobuono, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 197, 202
(1995) (noting that few awards in securities arbitration are accompanied by a written
opinion).
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Judicial review of arbitration awards is far narrower than
the scope of review of trial court judgments or jury verdicts.43
Most errors of fact or law are not reviewable. Unless the error is
egregious and perhaps intentional, courts will let it stand.44
Arbitrability and judicial review interrelate in that both
provide a means of preventing violations of public policy. While
limits on arbitrability prevent issues of public concern from
reaching the arbitral forum, courts on review may vacate
awards harmful to the public. Since courts determine arbi-
trability at the inception of the case, this Article will discuss
arbitrability before analyzing scope of review.
II. THE PUBLIC PoLicY DEFENSE TO ARBITRABILITY
The judiciary's attitude toward arbitration has undergone a
startling transformation. Once disdained by the courts, arbitra-
tion first gained acceptance and then won approval. The rising,
almost celebrity, status of arbitration has brought two related
consequences. First, it has assured the liberal interpretation and
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Second, it has disabled
public policy objections to the arbitration of certain statutory
claims.
A. Historical Antecedents
Beginning in the Seventeenth Century, English courts re-
fused to enforce arbitration agreements because such agree-
ments "ousted the courts of jurisdiction." Many have attacked
43. See infra Parts IV and V.
44. See id. (discussing the manifest disregard standard, the "completely irrational"
standard, the public policy grounds, and the essence of the contract test). But see Cole v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., No. 96-7042, 1997 US. LEXIS 2223 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1997).
45. In Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. K. B. 131, XCV Eng. Rep. 532 (1746), the court de-
clined to enforce an agreement to arbitrate an insurance claim because "the parties can-
not oust this Court. Id. But see Scott v. Avery, V H.L.C. 811, X Eng. Rep. 1121, 1128-30
(1856), where, although the court recognized the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine, it en-
forced a reference of an insurance claim to arbitration. The court determined that the
purpose of the arbitration was merely to fix the amount owed under the policy. The arbi-
tral decision was characterized as a condition precedent to bringing suit subsequently.
See also Vynior's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 80a, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (comparing the revocability of
an arbitration agreement to that of a will). Although the English courts would not en-
force an agreement to arbitrate, they would enforce an arbitration award. Clapham v.
Higham, 1 Bing. 86, 90, 130 Eng. Rep. 36, 37 (1922) ("It is clear that, generally speak-
ing, the submission may be revoked at any time before an award is made"); Kill v. Hol-
lister, XCV Eng. Rep. at 532 (If "a reference [were] depending, or made and determined,
it might have been at Bar"); Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Pub-
lic Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 252 (1987) ("In the past,
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this doctrine for being unprincipled, if not meaningless.4 More
cynical detractors attribute the doctrine to the greed of judges
who were paid on something of a "piecework" basis for issuing
writs and other legal process.47 While these criticisms appear to
have historical support, 8 the seemingly deplorable ouster-of-
jurisdiction doctrine raised serious public policy questions which
trouble the courts even today.49
although courts generally enforced arbitrators' awards, they refused to grant specific en-
forcement of executory agreements to arbitrate future disputes, or to stay judicial pro-
ceedings that were instituted in breach of such agreements"). 'See generally 1 WILNER,
supra note 20, § 3:01, at 21-23 (discussing the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine); Douglas R.
Davis, Note, Overextension of Arbitral Authority: Punitive Damages and Issues of Arbi-
trability-Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 65 WASH. L. REv. 695, 698
(1990) (noting history of judicial antagonism toward arbitration).
46. In Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d
Cir. 1942), the Second Circuit ridiculed the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine, suggesting
that it owed its longevity to the "hypnotic power of the phrase 'oust the jurisdiction'"
(internal citation omitted). The court quipped: "Give a bad dogma a good name and its
bite may become as bad as its bark." Id. at 984. See also United States Asphalt Ref Co.
v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (disapproving of
the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine); Kanowitz, supra note 45, at 252 (remarking that
some have regarded the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine as a "meaningless justification"
for refusing to enforce arbitration agreements).
47. See Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J.Ex. 308, 313 (H.L. 1856) (confessing that the doctrine
arose from the "scramble" of unsalaried judges for a greater share of the "spoil"); Clinton
W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and the Development of Contract
Law in Seventeenth Century England, 83 CoLux L. REv. 35, 45 (1983) (noting that in
Seventeenth Century England judges' salaries were often in arrears, providing an incen-
tive for judges to oppose arbitration); IAN R MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBRATION LAw
§ 4.2.2, at 4:9 (1995) (suggesting that financial interest may have motivated judges to
conjure up the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine).
48. Another proposed reason for the refusal of English courts to enforce arbitration
agreements was concern that the powerful would coerce their weaker adversaries into
arbitration and manipulate the process to their advantage. But see Kronstein II, supra
note 5, at 62-3, & n.134 (1944) (explaining the application of the ouster-of-jurisdiction
doctrine in Vyniors Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 597-601 (1906), under prevailing law that
allowed an obligee to collect on a bond securing a debt when the obligor revoked an arbi-
tration agreement); Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE
L.J. 595, 611 (1928) (defending the English courts' reluctance to enforce arbitration
agreements in instances where one of the parties might "be forced into an arrangement"
to arbitrate and the other party would be "able to dictate almost his own terms to the
other"); see also IAN P. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBIrrATION LAw 61 (1992) (cautioning that
history does not establish the correctness of any of the explanations offered for the
ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine).
49. See Kanowitz, supra note 45, at 252 (suggesting that the ouster-of-jurisdiction
doctrine may have been "a short-hand, if somewhat unrefined, expression of... concern[
] ... that settlement and ADR prevent judges from performing their duty to interpret
and implement the values embodied in constitutions, statutes, and other authoritative
texts"); Sayre, supra note 48, at 611 (defending the English courts' effort to prevent arbi-
tration from depriving people of fundamental rights and procedural fairness and compar-
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In Scott v. Avery50 Mr. Baron Martin explained why, in his
opinion, the law should not enforce arbitration agreements.
"There are certain contracts," he said, "which no one would con-
tend ought to be binding; for instance, suppose a man to con-
tract to commit a crime, or to become the slave of another for
life... !" He believed similarly that an arbitration agreement
deprives access to the courts and is therefore "against the lib-
erty of the law, which secures everyone the right of submitting
[claims] to the courts."52 Martin linked his objection to the lim-
ited scope of judicial review prevailing even then.53 He noted
that "[u]pon the award being made, unless the arbitrators have
been guilty of fraud, the courts have no power to inquire
whether the arbitrators have awarded rightly or wrongly, ac-
cording to law or against it"5
American courts inherited this judicial hostility toward arbi-
tration. The United States Supreme Court in Insurance Co. v.
Morse55 refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate insurance
claims. Comparing an arbitration agreement with the bartering
of life or liberty, the Court echoed the sentiments of Mr. Baron
Martin. It would not allow a person to "bind himself in advance
by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to
forfeit his right..."
56
The antipathy toward arbitration persisted until passage of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).57 Enacted in 1925, the FAA
established a national policy insuring the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements. 58 Section 2 of the FAA provides: "A written
provision in... a contract evidencing a transaction involving
ing the courts' refusal to enforce arbitration agreements to the refusal to enforce any il-
legal agreement).
50. 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1127-30 (1856).
51. Id. at 1129.
52. Id.
53. Today the English approach incorporates judicial oversight into the arbitral pro-
cess. See infra note 402 and accompanying text.
54. Id.
55. 87 U.S. 445 (1874).
56. Id. at 451. The Court adopted the English court's rhetoric that "agreements in
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction... are illegal and void." Id.
57. Ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 9 US.C. §§ 1-16 (1994)).
58. Legislative history reveals that the legacy of the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine
impelled Congress to enact the FAA. "The need for the [FAA] arises from... the jeal-
ousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction .... This jealousy survived for so
lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law
and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent
was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment... HR IP. No.
96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
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commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter aris-
ing out of such contract or transaction... shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable . . . ."59 Over the years, the courts have
redefined federal arbitration policy; originally intended to safe-
guard the right to arbitrate, federal policy now promotes the
process itself 60 This metamorphosis has eroded the public policy
defense which would reserve certain claims for court adjudica-
tion and keep those claims away from the arbitral forum.
61
B. The Evolution of Supreme Court Doctrine
A party may challenge arbitrability on public policy grounds
when the matter is submitted for arbitration.62 Such an issue
arose in Wilko v. Swan63 where the Court had to decide whether
to enforce a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims arising
under the Securities Act of 1933.64
1. Wilko v. Swan: Establishing the Public Policy Defense.
The Wilko Court saw this issue as pitting two federal policies
against each other: the policy favoring arbitration and the policy
to protect securities investors. On the one hand, the FAA affords
the right "to secure prompt, economical and adequate solution of
controversies through arbitration if the parties are willing to ac-
cept less certainty of legally correct adjustment."65 However, by
opting for the informalities of arbitration, parties do not sacri-
fice basic procedural and substantive rights guaranteed by the
1933 Securities Act which seeks "to protect the rights of inves-
tors and has forbidden a waiver of any of those rights."66
59. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The full text of this section provides: "A written provision in
any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,
or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save as upon such grounds as ex-
ist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id.
60. See infra notes 75-88 and 134-36 and accompanying text.
61. See infra Part I.B.
62. To interpose such a defense, petitioners, like Wilko, move for a stay of the pro-
ceeding under § 3 of the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994). See 'Wilko v. Swan, 346 US. 427, 429
(1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989).
63. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
64. Hereinafter referred to as "the 1933 Securities Acte or "the Securities Act
65. 346 U.S. at 438.
66. Id.
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Unable to reconcile these competing policies, the Court re-
solved the issue in favor of protecting investor rights under the
1933 Securities Act.67 Not relying on vague notions of federal se-
curities policy, the Court anchored its decision on § 14 of the
1933 Securities Act, a provision prohibiting the waiver of rights
created by the Act. The Court held that a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement constituted a waiver of an investor's right to ju-
dicial access, both at the trial and appellate level.6 Viewing
such a waiver as compromising the basic substantive rights pro-
vided in the 1933 Securities Act, 69 the Court questioned the
suitability of arbitration to resolve claims arising under the
Act.70 It noted that arbitrators, often unschooled in the law,
might be prone to commit legal error.71 Such errors are insu-
lated from judicial review because arbitration awards are typi-
cally unexplained and the proceedings infrequently tran-
scribed.72 An undetectable error is beyond correction. The Court
expressed concern that errors of law would escape judicial re-
view,7 3 commenting obtusely that only "manifest disregard" of
67. Id. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's
decision. The Second Circuit had reasoned that if parties may settle 1933 Securities Act
claims they ought to be permitted to arbitrate such claims. 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir.
1953). The circuit court explained that arbitration provides a desirable alternative to
congested courts. Id. Conceding that arbitrators are more susceptible to committing legal
error than are judges, the Second Circuit believed that an error of law would be review-
able on a motion to vacate. Id. at 444-45. Subject to judicial oversight, arbitration
awards would not undermine the federal policy to protect investors in securities.
68. 346 U.S. at 434-35.
69. Id. at 435.
70. Professor Speidel interprets Wilko to rest principally on the Court's conclusion
that arbitration was both a ineffective and inappropriate forum to decide 1933 Securities
Act claims. He cites three points on which the Court relied: (1) arbitrators lack the back-
ground to make subjective determinations on such legal issues as "good faith," (2)
awards ordinarily state no reasons, and (3) the scope of review is limited. Richard E.
Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for
Reform, 4 Omo ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 157, 180 (1989). See also Stephen L. Hayford,
Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change, 31 WAKx FoR
Fmr L Rzv. 1, 22 (1996) [hereinafter Hayford I] (noting that the Wilko Court distrusted
the competence of arbitrators to determine securities law cases, particularly since they
often did not explain their awards and since the absence of a hearing record often hin-
dered review).
71. 346 US. at 436. See Sterk, supra note 1, at 516 (rejecting this rationale on the
ground that arbitrators are no more likely to misapply securities law than they are to
misapply any other substantive law).
72. Id. See Brunet, supra note 4, at 14-15 (noting that since most arbitrators do not
author written opinions their decisions are not subject to public scrutiny); Owen M. Fiss,
The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword- The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30
(1979) [hereinafter Fiss II] (commenting that arbitrators are reluctant to write opinions).
73. 346 U.S. at 436-37.
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the law subjects an arbitration award to vacatur.74
The Wilko Court clarified the interrelationship between
arbitrability and scope of review. The Court held 1933 Securities
Act claims nonarbitrable because arbitration awards are effec-
tively unreviewable. If the law had provided meaningful judicial
review of arbitral legal errors, the Wilko rationale would have
collapsed.
After Wilko, the Court, in a series of decisions, transformed
federal arbitration policy, gradually expanding the range of arbi-
trable disputes until today virtually any federal claim may be
arbitrated.
2. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. and Beyond:
Transforming Arbitration Policy. The transformation began in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 7 5 There, the par-
ties entered into a "Consulting Agreement" containing an arbi-
tration clause.76 After a dispute arose, Prima Paint sought to en-
join arbitration arguing that Flood & Conklin had fraudulently
induced it into entering into the consulting agreement.77 Since
the arbitration clause appeared in a contract challenged for
fraud, Prima Paint argued that the courts, rather than the arbi-
trators, should decide the fraudulent inducement claim.78 The
Court rejected this argument holding the fraudulent inducement
claim arbitrable.79 It emphasized, "[W]e not only honor the plain
74. Id. Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, objected to the majority's dictum
coining the "manifest disregard" standard. Id. at 440 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justice Minton, dissented. He argued that the FAA provides a
mechanism for reviewing erroneous arbitral awards. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
However, Frankfurter did not explain whether the scope of review subsumed errors of
interpretation or merely failures to apply the law. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
75. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
76. Id. at 395.
77. Id. at 399.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 404. The Court ruled that arbitration clauses are "separable" from the re-
mainder of the contract. Id. at 402. Because Prima Paint's fraud claim attacked the en-
tire agreement, rather than the arbitration clause in particular, the FAA rendered the
fraud issue arbitrable. Id. at 402, 406-07. Writing for a three-judge dissent, Justice
Black argued that arbitrators should not determine the validity of the very agreement
that confers authority on them Id. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting). He found the 'separa-
bility" doctrine contrary to the FAA and its legislative history, both of which make the
validity of arbitration agreements subject to state law. Id. at 412-15. Turning to control-
ling New York law, Justice Black concluded that the court, not the arbitrator, should de-
cide whether fraud invalidated the entire agreement. Id. at 423-25 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HoFsTRA
L. REv. 84, 131 (1996) [hereinafter Ware I] (agreeing with Justice Black that the separa-
bility doctrine is a legal fiction since fraud in the inducement taints all the contract, in-
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meaning of the statute but also the unmistakably clear congres-
sional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by
the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and
obstruction in the courts."80
Decisions after Prima Paint fueled pro-arbitration policy. In
Moses H. Cohen Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.8' the Supreme Court ordered an arbitration to proceed de-
spite a pending parallel state-court action. The Court stressed
the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."
82
Similarly, in Southland Corp. v. Keatings8 the Court, in striking
down a California state law restricting arbitration agreements,
again declared "a national policy favoring arbitration."84
These decisions suggested that federal policy favored arbi-
tration because of that forum's efficiency. The emphasis of fed-
eral arbitration policy would soon shift from efficiency to party
intent.
3. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd: Shifting to Party In-
tent. In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,85 the issue was
whether to stay the arbitration of state law claims when related
cluding the arbitration clause, and consequently urging the Supreme Court to overrule
Prima Paint).
80. 388 U.S. at 404.
81. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
82. Id. at 24. In this case, Mercury Construction Corp. (Mercury) entered into a con-
struction contract with Moses H. Cohen Hospital (Hospital). The contract contained an
arbitration clause. When Mercury claimed that the Hospital owed it payment under the
contract, the Hospital filed an action in North Carolina state court for a declaratory
judgment arguing that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel barred arbitration of the dis-
pute. Mercury then filed a federal court action to compel arbitration under § 4 of the
FAA. The district court stayed the federal action because of the pending state-court ac-
tion which involved the identical-issue of arbitrability. Id. at 7. The Fourth Circuit re-
versed and remanded the case with instructions that the district court order arbitration
to proceed. Id. at 8. Citing the policy favoring arbitration, the Supreme Court affirmed
the order of the circuit court. Id. at 24. "The Arbitration Act" the high Court observed,
"establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitra-
ble issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like de-
fense to arbitrability. Id. at 24-25. The Supreme Court noted that § 4 of the FAA was
not clearly applicable to state courts. The Nordi Carolina court might therefore find it-
self powerless to compel the parties to proceed to arbitration. Id. at 26. Such a finding
would frustrate the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA. Id. at 27.
83. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
84. Id. at 10. Justice O'Connor dissented. Joined by Justice Rehnquist, she argued
that legislative history proved that the FAA was a procedural statute, which Congress
intended to apply only to the federal courts and not to the state courts. Id. at 25-29
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. 470 US. 213 (1985).
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securities law claims were alleged in a federal action.8 6 Although
most parties choose arbitration because of its procedural econ-
omy, Byrd revealed a curious conflict between efficiency and
party intent. Staying arbitration would promote efficiency by
preventing fragmentation of the case in two forums, which
might result in inconsistent determinations. Yet ordering arbi-
tration to proceed would honor the intent of the parties who had
entered into an arbitration agreement.87 Resolving the issue in
favor of party intent, the Court observed, 'The legislative his-
tory of the Act [FAA] establishes that the purpose behind its
passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made
agreements to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion that
the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the ex-
peditious resolution of claims."
88
Sustaining arbitrability in each of the post-Wilko cases dis-
cussed, the Court established an unmistakable trend favoring
arbitration. Yet the reach of pro-arbitration policy had not been
tested because all these cases involved state rather than federal
claims. None of these cases challenged the doctrine of Wilko,
which, at least regarding the 1933 Securities Act, placed the
policy of federal substantive law above arbitration policy. The
question remained whether an invigorated arbitration policy, as
outlined in Prima Paint and Byrd, might override federal policy
which calls for in-court adjudication of statutory rights.
Subsequent decisions, continuing to exalt arbitration policy,
foreshadowed the demise of Wilko. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, hesitated to overrule it. Rather, the Court suggested that
virtually all federal claims are arbitrable except those arising
under the 1933 Securities Act. It even held arbitrable claims
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.89 These deci-
sions so completely isolated Wilko as an anomaly that the
Court's belated decision to overrule it occasioned little surprise.
4. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler: Limiting Wilko. The first de-
cision to cast doubt on whether Wilko would survive burgeoning
arbitration policy, Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler,90 held antitrust
86. Id. at 216.
87. Id. at 219.
88. Id. See Hayford I, supra note 70, at 24 (observing that Byrd subordinated the
policy in favor of adjudicatory economy to the policy favoring the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements); Kanowitz, supra note 45, at 260 (noting that Byrd recognized the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements to be the primary goal of the FAA and the efficiency
of arbitration to be secondary).
89. Hereinafter referred to as "the Exchange Act."
90. 473 US. 614 (1984).
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claims arbitrable. Mitsubishi, a Japanese corporation and
Chrysler International, S.A. (CISA), a Swiss corporation, agreed
to sell automobiles to Soler. A Puerto Rican corporation, Soler
would act as distributor. The agreement contained a broad arbi-
tration clause.91 When a dispute arose between the parties, Mit-
subishi and CISA sued Soler in federal district court to compel
arbitration.92 Soler counterclaimed asserting that Mitsubishi and
CISA had conspired to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.
93
Soler argued that federal policy prohibited the arbitration of
antitrust claims.94 The Court rejected this argument because en-
forcing the arbitration agreement promoted "international com-
ity... and sensitivity to the need of the international commer-
cial system for predictability."95 This rationale would not seem to
91. The arbitration clause provided:
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi]
and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of this Agreement or
for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accor-
dance with the rules and regulations of the Japanese Commercial Arbitration
Association.
Id. at 617.
92. Id. at 618.
93. Id. at 619-20.
94. Id. at 628-29. In Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 237 N.E.2d 223
(1968), Tomar alleged a counterclaim against Aimcee for exacting a discriminatory price
reduction in violation of New York antitrust law. Invoking state public policy, the New
York Court of Appeals held the claim not arbitrable. Id. at 225-26. The Court explained
that if the arbitrators erroneously denied Tomar's claim, then they would be permitting
an illegal price reduction benefiting Aimcee. The result would be to weaken Aimcee's
competitive position. Conversely, if the arbitrators erroneously sustained the claim, then
Aimcee would most likely pass along the cost of satisfying the judgment to its customers.
Id. at 225. The Court said: "The evil is that, if the enforcement of antitrust policies is
left in the hands of arbitrators, erroneous decisions will have adverse consequences for
the public in general, and the guardians of the public interest, the courts, will have no
say in the results reached." Id. at 226. Critical to the courts decision was the narrow
standard of judicial review of arbitral awards. Id. at 225. If such awards were subject to
meaningful review, the rationale of Aimcee would vanish, because the reviewing court
would have an opportunity to enforce state antitrust public policy.
95. 473 U.S. at 629. The Court relied on Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1973) in which it had upheld an agreement to arbitrate a claim arising under § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act. The Scherk Court distinguished Wilko on the ground that Scherk in-
volved international rather than domestic transactions. Id. at 515-16. As a secondary
and altogether untenable rationale the Court questioned whether § 10(b) confers a "spe-
cial right" as does § 12(2), the claim involved in Wilko. Id. at 513-14. Finally, the Court
distinguished Scherk from Wilko based on the difference between the jurisdictional pro-
visions of § 12(2) and § 10(b). It suggested that since § 12(2) provides for state and fed-
eral jurisdiction whereas § 10(b) provides only for federal jurisdiction, arbitrating a
§ 12(2) claim more significantly restricts choice of forum than does arbitrating a § 10(b)
claim. Id. at 514. This distinction is a contrivance. No meaningful difference can be
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threaten the vitality of Wilko, a decision lacking international
implications. The Court, however, suggested otherwise. While
declining to determine whether domestic antitrust claims might
be arbitrated, 96 the Court nonetheless distanced itself from the
Wilko doctrine.97 The Court reaffirmed its commitment to honor
arbitration agreements, stating "as with any contract, the par-
ties' intentions control, but those intentions are generously con-
strued as to issues of arbitrability."98 It discerned "no reason to
depart from these guidelines" where the parties arbitrate
"claims founded on statutory rights."99
In reaching its decision, the Court again considered the con-
nection between arbitrability and scope of review. It observed
that a U.S. court could refuse to confirm an award violative of
public policy.100 The Court therefore concluded that the review
process, though minimal, safeguards society against harmful
awards.10 In this way the Mitsubishi decision attempted to har-
drawn between foregoing federal court jurisdiction, state court jurisdiction, or both. In
any such case the parties opt out of court.
The Court relied too on The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)
which sustained a forum-selection clause in a contract between an American Company
and a German company, although by enforcing the clause the Court denied the Ameri-
can company application of favorable American law. The Mitsubishi Court likened a fo-
rum-selection clause to an arbitration clause since in both the parties choose the tribu-
nal to resolve their disputes. 473 U.S. at 630.
96. Id.
97. The Court criticized American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. McGuire Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968), which had held Sherman Act Claims nonarbitrable. The American
Safety court arrived at this view on the ground that "[a] claim under the antitrust laws
is not merely a private matter' since a violation can "inflict staggering economic dam-
age" on society. Id. at 826. The Supreme Court found this reasoning unpersuasive. It
noted that treble damages, awardable in antitrust cases, are as remedial as they are pu-
nitive. 473 U.S. at 635. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that where the parties have
submitted statutory claims to arbitration, the arbitrator must follow their intention to
be bound by a particular statute. The Court concluded, therefore, that arbitration satis-
fies both the remedial and deterrent statutory functions. Id. at 636-37. See Speidel,
supra note 70, at 184 (noting that the Mitsubishi Court undermined American Safety by
rejecting its skepticism of an arbitrator's ability to decide antitrust matters); Hayford I,
supra note 70, at 8 (construing Mitsubishi to have confirmed the Supreme Court's
changed attitude, giving primacy to arbitration policy over substantive statutory policy).
98. 473 U.S. at 626.
99. Id. See Hayford I, supra note 70, at 23 (interpreting Mitsubishi to have created
a presumption of arbitrability placing the burden on the party resisting arbitration to
prove Congress reserved the disputed claim for the courts).
100. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards provides that a signatory country may refuse to enforce an award "contrary to
the public policy of that country." Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 US.T. 2157, 2520.
101. Justice Stevens observed, in a dissenting opinion, that antitrust law serves the
public interest by protecting free enterprise. 473 US. at 651-52. The public interest may
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monize apparently incompatible interests. It honored the par-
ties' intent to submit disputes to arbitration, while providing as-
surances that U.S. courts would not enforce violations of public
policy.
102
5. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon: Isolating
Wilko. In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,10 3 the
high Court continued the trend of limiting Wilko, holding both
§ 10(b) claims 10 4 and RICO claims'0 5 arbitrable under pre-
dispute arbitration agreements. In so holding, the McMahon
Court reiterated the strong public policy favoring the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements,106 citing Mitsubishi for the pro-
position that the "duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not
diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim
founded on statutory rights." 10 7
The McMahons asserted several arguments which, absent
the rising stature of arbitration policy, would have assured vic-
tory.08 Pointing out that the Exchange Act confers exclusive ju-
risdiction on federal district courts, 0 9 the McMahons argued
suffer as a result of arbitration, because arbitrators focus on the disputants' rights
rather than society at large. Id. at 649-50. Stevens argued that arbitral procedures do
not provide an adequate record for appellate review of statutory questions that affect
significant public interests. Id. at 648-49. Even when an adequate record is made, he
found the manifest disregard standard too narrow to permit vacatur of destructive
awards. Id. at 656-57.
102. Some would consider this solution illusory. They would argue that any errone-
ous antitrust award has consequences injuring segments of society. The impact is obvi-
ous where an award fails to stop forbidden conduct. Such an award condones a continu-
ing violation to the detriment of consumers and competitors of the violator. Even an
award incorrectly finding a violation, they would contend, hinders competition, because
it impedes otherwise legal conduct in the marketplace, again to the detriment of con-
sumers. See Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods. Inc., 237 N.E.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir.
1968). See also Sterk, supra note 1, at 506 (arguing that antitrust disputes involve the
public interest and therefore should not be arbitrable).
103. 482 US. 220 (1987).
104. Id. at 238.
105. Id. at 242.
106. Id. at 225-26.
107. Id. at 226. The Court explained that a statutory claim is presumptively arbi-
trable unless the party opposing arbitration establishes by statutory text, legislative his-
tory, or a conflict between the statute's purpose and arbitration that congress did not in-
tend such statutory claims to be arbitrable. Id. at 226-27.
108. See Hayford, supra note 70, at 26 (observing that in McMahon, a case arising
under the Exchange Act, the Court rejected all the grounds on which the Wilko Court
had relied to protect the substantive rights of parties asserting claims under the 1933
Securities Act).
109. Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides: "The district courts of the United
States... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and reg-
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that arbitrating § 10(b) claims violates § 29(a) of the Exchange
Act which forbids waiving "compliance" with any provision of
the Act." 0 The McMahon Court rejected this argument, constru-
ing the prohibition of waiving "compliance" to refer to substan-
tive rather than procedural provisions of the Exchange Act."' In
Wilko, however, a virtually identical waiver argument had pre-
vailed." 2 The McMahon Court labored to reconcile its holding
with Wilko suggesting that Wilko held § 12(2) claims nonarbitra-
ble, not because of the anti-waiver provision, but rather because
the Wilko Court found arbitration inadequate to enforce the par-
ticular rights created by § 12(2).11 As Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent showed, however, Wilko was based largely on the waiver
provision of the 1933 Securities Act." 4
If arbitration cannot be entrusted to enforce § 12(2) rights,
as the Wilko Court believed, it cannot to be entrusted to enforce
similar § 10(b) rights either. Pressing this theme, the McMahons
criticized arbitration as a forum incapable of resolving complex
statutory claims, particularly since arbitrators may be untrained
in the law they must apply.1 5 The McMahons faulted arbitral
practice: unexplained awards, incomplete records of proceedings,
ulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78 aa (1994).
110. 482'U.S. at 227. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act declares void: "Any condi-
tion, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision
of [the Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1994).
111. 482 U.S. at 228.
112. Wilko v. Swan, 346 US. 427, 430, overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). The waiver argument of Wilko was premised
on § 14 of the 1933 Securities Act which, like § 29(a) of the Exchange Act, provides:
"Any condition, stipulation or provision... of this subchapter or of the rules and regula-
tions of the Commission shall be void." 15 US.C. § 77n (1994).
113. 482 US. at 229. The Court urged unpersuasively that "any different reading" of
Wilko would be inconsistent with Scherk. The McMahon court interpreted Scherk to hold
that in international rather than domestic cases arbitration provides an adequate substi-
tute for the courtroom. Id. More than differences between international and domestic
cases, the Scherk Court stressed the need to promote "orderliness and predictability" in
international trade. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1973). All these rea-
sons mask the underlying rationale for post-Wilko decisions-the Court had embraced
arbitration.
114. 482 US. at 250-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Blackmun, writing also for Justices Brennan and Marshall, noted that Wilko was
based not only on distrust of arbitration but also on the congressional intent, evidenced
by the statutory non-waiver provision, to deny the arbitration of § 12(2) claims. Id. at
250-53. Because McMahon could not be distinguished from Wilko, Justice Blackmun
would not have enforced the arbitration agreement in McMahon. Id. at 256-57.
115. Id. at 237.
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and the narrow scope of judicial review.116 Unsympathetic to this
argument, the Court scorned suspicion of arbitration. 1 7 It noted,
as had the Mitsubishi Court, that, although limited, the scope of
judicial review enables a court "to ensure that arbitrators com-
ply with the requirements of the statute."1 8
Disagreeing with the majority's ruling that § 10(b) claims
are arbitrable, Justice Blackmun distrusted arbitration of secur-
ities law claims. Although conceding that the climate of securi-
ties arbitration had improved since Wilko, he cautioned that
most of the flawed pre-Wilko procedures were still in place.119
He charged that securities arbitration favored brokerage houses
to the detriment of investors, the very class the securities law
seeks to protect. 120 Persuasive in the days of Wilko, Justice
Blackmun's arguments no longer reflected the Court's
thinking.' 21
Although Justice Blackmun's arguments applied equally to
RICO claims, he did not raise them or even oppose the arbi-
trability of such claims, and the Court unanimously disposed of
the McMahon's challenge to RICO's arbitrability.m22 It discerned
nothing in the text of the statute or the legislative history hint-
ing at a congressional intent to preclude arbitration.'2- Nor did
it find that meeting the purpose of RICO required court adjudi-
cation. The Court reasoned that if complex antitrust claims fall
116. Id. at 231-33.
117. It cited previous cases, beginning with Scherk and ending with Mitsubishi, to
support this conclusion. Id. at 232. To justify its abandonment of the skepticism of arbi-
tration expressed in Wilko, it described the post-Wilko development of SROs, such as the
NASD, the NYSE and the American Stock Exchange. These organizations had adopted
procedures to insure fairness in arbitration. The SEC's statutory oversight of SRO proce-
dures assuaged the Court's doubts as to the adequacy of SRO-run arbitration. Id. at 233-
34.
118. Id. at 232. This statement and the remark in Mitsubishi recognizing a judicial
remedy when an arbitrator 'fail[s] to take cognizance of the statutory cause of action,"
473 U.S. at 633-34 n.19, suggests that "manifest disregard of the law" means the failure
to apply correctly the relevant statute, regardless of whether that failure was intentional
or inadvertent. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 US. 220, 232 (1996) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 n.19
(1985)).
119. McMahon, 482 US. at 259 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 260-61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun questioned the effi-
cacy of the SEC's oversight function, noting that the SEC does not even pretend to have
sweeping regulatory authority over SROs. Id. at 265. To bolster his position, he cited the
frequency of brokerage house abuses. Id. at 265-67.
121. See Hayford I, supra note 70, at 27 (arguing that McMahon effectively over-
ruled Wilko).
122. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1986).
123. Id. at 238.
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within the competence of arbitrators, as Mitsubishi held, so too
do less complicated RICO claims.' 2 '
Finally, the Court addressed the argument that the public
interest requires the courts, not arbitrators, to decide RICO
cases. 25 This argument posits that mobsters may corrupt the ar-
bitration process, resorting if necessary to extortion, to avoid lia-
bility. In addition, civil plaintiffs function as private attorneys
general when alleging RICO claims. Victorious RICO litigation
deters future violations. Arbitration arguably dilutes RICO's de-
terrence of racketeering since arbitration awards have no prece-
dential effect and arbitrators are not bound by the law.326 Unim-
pressed by these arguments, the Court stated that RICO's aim
was as much remedial as deterrent,27 and cited data showing
that few civil RICO claims are directed against organized crime,
a refutation, in the Court's view, of the significance of the pri-
vate attorney general role of RICOY8
The Court's foray into statistics obscured the issue. The con-
sequences of a statute to the public welfare cannot be assessed
by percentages or standard deviations. It is irrelevant that one
civil RICO case in ten involves organized crime. Rather, the ten
percent is the concern. If organized crime rigged every arbitra-
tion in the ten percent of RICO cases directed against it, civil
RICO would perish as a deterrent to racketeering.
6. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.: Overruling Wilko. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearsoni
American Express, Inc.129 the Court finally ended the precarious
reign of Wilko. 130 The five-justice Rodriguez de Quijas majority
denounced Wilko for perpetuating outmoded judicial hostility to-
ward arbitration. 31 In Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court reversed
124. Id. at 239. The McMahon's noted that the civil provisions of RICO overlap with
the criminal provisions of RICO. Because only courts may decide criminal matters, the
McMahons argued that arbitration is inappropriate to resolve any RICO dispute. Id. at
239. The Court responded that antitrust claims, arbitrable under Mitsubishi, also have
criminal overtones. Id.
125. Id. at 240.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 240-41.
128. Id. at 242. Only 9% of civil RICO claims are brought against organized crime.
Id.
129. Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAm. Express Inc., 490 US. 477 (1989).
130. See Katsoris I, supra note 26, at 486-87 (tracing the evolution of the arbi-
trability of securities law claims from Wilko to Rodriguez de Quijas).
131. Id. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 US. at 480. See Jean Rowley Robertson, Note,
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.: The Enforceability of Predispute
Arbitration Clauses in Brokerage Firm Contracts, 5 J. DisP. Rus. 159, 159 (1989) (prais-
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itself on virtually every position it had taken in Wilko. Shedding
the predisposition against arbitration, the Court saw no basis to
construe § 14 of the Exchange Act, the anti-waiver provision, as
forbidding arbitration. The Rodriguez de Quijas majority cor-
rectly found McMahon controlling, the language of § 14 of the
1933 Securities Act mirroring the language of § 29(a) of the Ex-
change Act.1 32 Like McMahon, it read the anti-waiver provision
to prohibit relinquishing substantive rather than procedural
rights and characterized the right to litigate in court as a mat-
ter of mere procedure.13 McMahon, as explained above, had me-
ticulously if unconvincingly attempted to distinguish Wilko. The
Court had finally abandoned pretense.
Turning to the broader policy issue, the Court repeated its
enthusiasm for arbitration.1 34 It dismissed without serious dis-
cussion the argument that public policy requires securities
claims to be adjudicated in court. In support of its conclusion,
the majority asserted that arbitrators are competent to decide
securities law claims, an assertion which, although unsubstanti-
ated in Rodriguez de Quijas, is undoubtedly true under current
training procedures.13 5 In any event, the Court's confidence in
the arbitration of securities claims was to be expected consider-
ing that Mitsubishi had found arbitrators capable of resolving
intricate antitrust claims.
136
7. Gilmer v. Interstate]Johnson Lane Corp.: Following the
Trend. The trend begun in Prima Paint had overwhelmed public
policy objections to the arbitration of federal antitrust, racke-
teering and securities law claims. No one should have been sur-
prised when the Supreme Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate]Johnson
Lane Corp.,137 enforced an agreement to arbitrate claims brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Gil-
ing the Supreme Court for eliminating another legal "taboo").
132. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 482 (1989). Writing for the dissent, Justice
Stevens charged the majority with indefensible judicial activism. Wilko had gained,
through its 3Y2 decades of longevity, the imprimatur of Congress. Only Congress, there-
fore, could properly overrule it. Id. at 486-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Hayford I,
supra note 70, at 28-29 (agreeing with Justice Stevens).
133. Katsoris I, supra note 26, at 482.
134. The Court mentioned in passing the role of the SEC in regulating securities ar-
bitration. Id. at 483.
135. See infra notes 459-60 and accompanying text (describing screening and train-
ing procedures in use at SROs).
136. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (1989). The Court found no support in the
record for petitioner's argument that the arbitration agreement was an unenforceable
contract of adhesion. Id. at 484.
137. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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mer, a sixty-two-year-old financial manager, sued Interstate, his
former employer, for discriminatory discharge based on age. Re-
lying on an arbitration agreement in Gilmer's registration appli-
cation, Interstate filed a motion to compel arbitration. Gilmer
opposed the motion, arguing that arbitration conflicts with the
purposes of the ADEA, which seeks to promote civil rights pol-
icy.138 The Court rejected this argument. It cited the decisions in
which it had approved of arbitration to resolve claims arising
from other statutes that advance important goals of society, and
it could see no reason to apply a different rule to discrimination
claims.13
9
Gilmer argued that arbitrating discrimination claims would
undermine the role of the EEOC. 14° The Court disagreed for sev-
eral reasons. First, even if bound by an arbitration agreement, a
claimant may nevertheless file charges with the agency.'4 ' Sec-
ond, the EEOC may investigate suspected violations without a
formal filing.'4 Third, the ADEA does not contemplate EEOC
involvement in all discrimination cases.'4 Finally, the SEC's
role in enforcing securities law is comparable to the EEOC's role
in enforcing civil rights law, and yet the Court had repeatedly
expressed its support of securities arbitration.
144
Exaggerated attacks on arbitral procedure fared no better in
Gilmer than in McMahon or Rodriguez de Quijas.1  Nor did the
138. Id. at 26-27. Gilmer conceded that neither the text nor the legislative history of
the ADEA precluded arbitration. Id. at 26.
139. Id. at 28. The Court glossed over the argument that judges are more likely to
enforce the law than arbitrators. It merely quoted Mitsubishi for the proposition that
any forum, whether judicial or arbitral, may vindicate statutory rights and serve both




143. Id. This reasoning seems specious. Of course, some matters will settle without
EEOC involvement, as the Court suggests. Id. Fewer cases, however, will reach the
EEOC if agreements to arbitrate discrimination cases are enforced. The industry-wide
practice requiring registered securities representatives to sign arbitration agreements
may eviscerate the EEOC's role. See Ware I, supra note 79, at 145 (discussing the prac-
tice requiring all registered securities representatives to sign arbitration agreements as
a condition of employment). The courts should refuse to enforce coerced agreements. No-
tably, Gilmer argued that brokerage firms force arbitration agreements on employees.
Id. at 32-33. Reminding Gilmer that he is an experienced businessman capable of pro-
tecting his interests, the Court was unreceptive to this argument. Id. at 33.
144. Id. at 28-29. Similar to arguments rejected in McMahon and Rodriguez de
Quijas, Gilmer contended that the ADEA guarantees claimants a judicial forum. Id. at
29. The Court found to the contrary that the ADEA fosters flexibility, including access to
alternative methods of dispute resolution such as arbitration. Id.
145. Id. at 30-32. Gilmer cited a line of cases holding that workers, who arbitrate
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more serious accusation that brokerage firms, in an industry-
wide practice, force employees into arbitration agreements. 146
The Court had decided Gilmer years before. Hearing the case
was a mere formality.
III. ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC PoLIcY ARGUmENTS AGAINST
ARBRATION
Unless the agreement directs arbitrators to apply particular
law, the arbitrators may resolve the dispute as they deem ap-
propriate, regardless of prevailing legal norms.147 Such unen-
cumbered power may be beneficial because it replaces inflexibil-
ity with discretion. In litigation, both sides marshal the facts to
support their legal positions and the court or jury finds in favor
of one of the two sides. One side wins and the other loses; no
compromise is possible. This dualistic approach to decisionmak-
ing is a blunt instrument for resolving disputes which inevitably
involve nuance and countervailing equities.
Arbitrators may reach compromise solutions that the strict
application of legal rules would not permit.'4 For example, as-
sume that a homeowner hires a contractor to install bathroom
tile. An honest misunderstanding results in the installation of a
grade of tile more expensive than the grade the homeowner de-
sired. Because the homeowner will pay only for the less expen-
sive tile, the contractor sues. The factfinder, whether a court or
jury, would listen to both parties testify and, after weighing
their credibility, find in favor of one or the other. Even if the
factfinder believed that both sides had acted reasonably and in
good faith, one side must prevail. An arbitrator, however, may
approach the case with greater flexibility. If he finds the parties
equally credible, he might reach a compromise solution such as
grievances under collective bargaining agreements, may sue thereafter for Title VIH vio-
lations from the same grievances. Id. at 33-35. The Court distinguished these cases, not-
ing that (1) the workers had not agreed to arbitrate statutory claims and thus the arbi-
trators had not addressed or resolved these claims, (2) the arbitration clause was the
product of collective bargaining, which should not jeopardize the statutory rights of
union members, and (3) labor cases are not subject to the pro-arbitration policy of the
FAA. Id. at 35.
146. Id. at 33. See supra note 7.
147. See Brunet I, supra note 4, at 13 (describing most methods of alternative dis-
pute resolution as emphasizing procedure over substance).
148. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 4, at 429 (arguing that arbitration out-
comes are superior to litigation outcomes because arbitration avoids rigid "winner-take-
all' principles). But see Brunet I, supra note 4, at 15-16 (disagreeing with proponents of
alternative dispute resolution who fault substantive law for frustrating creative solu-
tions by dictating "winner-take-all" outcomes).
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awarding the contractor half the difference in cost between the
more expensive and less expensive tile.
Though lauded by some, the flexibility of arbitration alarms
others. The power of arbitrators to enforce their own sense of
justice may breed abuse. 149 Even when the arbitration agree-
ment specifies what law governs, the narrow scope of judicial re-
view immunizes all but the most flagrant errors from judicial
correction. Many, therefore, charge that "lawlessness" corrupts
the arbitral process. 10 Their criticisms fall into three tiers of
broadening significance. 151 First, arbitration provides no assur-
ances that it will reach the "correct" legal result between the
parties. Second, arbitration does not protect the interests of un-
represented third parties affected by the case. Third, arbitration
does not protect the interests of society at large.
A. The "Correct" Result Between the Parties
Legal rules represent the will of society, its judgment as to
how legal disputes, under various factual circumstances, should
be resolved.152 Though some charge that law perpetuates the en-
trenched power structure, 53 others view legal norms as undergo-
ing continuous improvement, essential for protecting personal
rights. 54 Because the law embodies societal values, opponents of
arbitration argue that the law should not permit its own circum-
vention. 155 Yet disputing parties relinquish their rights and
149. Kronstein I, supra note 4, at 661-62 (accusing trade associations of imposing
unfair legal rules on nonmembers pressured into arbitration).
150. See Kronstein H, supra note 5, at 66 (blasting arbitration as a lawless form of
"private government").
151. See Brunet I, supra note 4, at 8.
152. See Edwards, supra note 32, at 679 (stating that lawmakers choose among va-
rious alternatives in establishing public values); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L. J. 1073, 1085 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss HI (noting that the public participates in
the political process leading to the development of law which promotes public values).
153. See Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv.
561, 585 (1983) ("Law and constitution are now to be seen as just the reverse of what
.prerevolutionary theory demanded. They become the denial rather than the reaffirma-
tion of the plan of social division and hierarchy. The ideal aim of the system of rights,
taken as a whole and in each of its branches, is to serve as a counter program to the
maintenance or reemergence of any scheme of division and hierarchy that can become
effectively insulated against the ordinary available forms of challenge.")
154. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Rav. 1359, 1360 (arguing that
strict enforcement of legal norms protects against raced-based bias in dispute resolu-
tion); Edwards, supra note 32, at 679 (suggesting that law develops to the benefit of the
underprivileged).
155. See MACNEiL Er AL., supra note 47, § 40.7.2, at 40:94 (commenting that "aban-
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shirk their legal obligations when they submit to arbitration. 156
This problem, critics of arbitration argue, is aggravated
when basic rights are at stake. For example, they would contend
that the right of a minority worker to equal employment oppor-
tunity should not be left to an arbitrator's sense of fairness. Di-
verted with the exigencies of resolving the dispute under consid-
eration, arbitrators, who are not bound by law and largely free
of judicial oversight, may not heed the injunction of Title VII
against discrimination in employment. In such cases compro-
mise solutions frustrate social policy.l
57
Unequal bargaining power between the parties exacerbates
this problem.1SS For example, since the McMahon decision, bro-
kerage houses have steamrolled clients into arbitration agree-
ments.159 Although SROs strive for impartiality in arbitration,
they cannot assure that arbitrators, in customer disputes, will
apply the securities laws enacted to protect investors. The mini-
mal scope of review coupled with unexplained awards may re-
sult in the denial of investor rights.
One response to the argument that arbitration may not re-
sult in the legally correct outcome is that litigation is so ponder-
ous and costly that it may drive the party with the legally supe-
donment of law enforcement to private arbitrators is a central theme of critics of
arbitration").
156. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing objections to arbitra-
tion raised in the Wilko case).
157. See Fiss III, supra note 152, at 1085 (arguing that the settlement of a racial
discrimination case, while ending the dispute, may not achieve justice).
158. Professor Fiss argues that parties lacking resources are at a disadvantage in
settlement negotiations because they (1) are unable to evaluate the strength of their
cases, (2) need cash immediately and therefore cannot hold out for what they deserve,
(3) cannot finance protracted litigation. Id. at 1076. He concedes that the same imbal-
ances of power apply to court actions, but maintains that sensitive judges can mitigate
these inequities. Id. at 1077. This criticism appears inapplicable to arbitration. First, an
arbitrator may prove to be as receptive as a judge to the plight of a financially dis-
tressed party. More important, the distressed party can complete the arbitral process
more quickly than he can complete the litigation process, thereby avoiding the need to
settle for an inadequate sum.
159. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1986). See Constantine N.
Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Tower of Babel Revisited, 18
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 573, 578 n.25 (1991) [hereinafter Katsoris II] (commenting on the in-
dustry-wide practice of inserting arbitration clauses in margin and option accounts);
Theodore Kresbach, New York Stock Exchange Symposium on Arbitration in the Securi-
ties Industry, 63 FORHAM L. RFv. 1505, 1513 (1995) (asserting that brokerage houses
force pre-dispute arbitration clauses on the public). But see Hoblin Letter, supra note 2,
(contending that most customer account agreements do not contain arbitration
agreements).
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rior position into an undesirable settlement. 160 By pouring
resources into an otherwise doomed case, aggressive litigants
force impatient or impoverished adversaries into submission.
For those unwilling or unable to endure the litigation process,
the legally correct result is an elusive ideal. In contrast, arbitra-
tion moves more quickly toward resolution. Parties with weak
cases have less leverage to delay the proceedings. Although the
arbitrator is essentially free of legal strictures, the weaker
party, even if armed with inexhaustible resources, will fear an
adverse determination. This fear may lead to a settlement re-
flecting the merits of the case.
Some argue, to the contrary, that the limited discovery in
arbitration may sometimes impede fair settlement, because par-
ties will not volunteer information harmful to their cases.161 Set-
tlements may therefore rest on inadequate information and may
be misguided. Arbitrators, however, generally allow sufficient
discovery to avoid surprise. Much discovery beyond this point is
cumulative and marginally useful; such requests harass more
than they inform.162 Occasionally lawyers, seeking massive dis-
covery, may stumble into critical information, but one may ques-
tion whether cases should turn on the sheer luck that a blind,
shotgun request happened to strike an unseen target.
163
Another response to the argument that arbitration may not
result in the legally correct outcome is that the parties have
bargained for that possibility. They have exercised their freedom
of contract and the courts should respect that decision. Preserv-
ing freedom of contract is itself a public policy of enormous im-
portance. By agreeing to arbitrate, parties waive certain proce-
dural and substantive rights, even basic rights created by
statute. Freedom of contract, however, has limits. The limits
that contradt law places on freedom of contract generally apply
equally to arbitration agreements. 64 For example, empowering
160. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 4, at 430-31 (noting that prolonged litiga-
tion reduces the present value of a case diminishing settlement value and that a party
with a meritorious claim might simply lack the funds to persist through the discovery
process).
161. See Brunet I, supra note 4, at 34 (supporting litigation-style compulsory discov-
ery because disputes cannot be resolved sensibly without the broad exchange of informa-
tion); Stipanowich I, supra note 7 at 443-44 (noting that limited discovery and abbrevi-
ated pleadings threaten to relegate arbitration to trial by ambush).
162. Farley, supra note 15, at 103.
163. Id.
164. See infra note 440 and accompanying text (discussing unconscionability). Con-
versely, the law may not impose unique limitations on arbitration agreements. See Doc-
tor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1996) (invalidating a Montana
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an arbitrator to imprison the losing party is an impermissible
exercise of freedom of contract just as any agreement to submit
to such privately imposed punishment violates public policy.
Similarly, neither party may coerce the other into an arbitration
agreement. The courts should vitiate arbitration agreements
that are unconscionable or illegal.165 Other arbitration agree-
ments should stand.
B. The Interests of Unrepresented Third Parties
Some disputes affect only the parties to the arbitration
agreement. Other controversies, opponents of arbitration point
out, impinge directly on third parties who did not agree to arbi-
trate and who are therefore unrepresented at the proceedings. 166
Whether the arbitrator blesses a negligent drug manufacturing
process, an anticompetitive monopoly, or misleading advertising,
critics of arbitration argue the public will suffer. Assume that a
factory spews pollution from its smokestacks in violation of fed-
eral regulations. An injured adjacent landowner may bring suit
under federal law and common law nuisance. By litigating his
claims, the landowner acts as a "private attorney general" pro-
tecting the rights of others.167 Applying rules of substantive law,
a court may enjoin the factory from polluting or the court may
award damages to the plaintiff, a deterrent to further wrongdo-
ing, for the polluter knows that if he continues to disregard the
law, others may sue and secure similar relief. Enforcement of
substantive law therefore protects others who would otherwise
have been harmed by the pollution. 168 Assume, however, that
the factory and plaintiff agree to arbitrate their dispute. The ar-
bitrator might not apply substantive environmental law, and the
polluter might escape without liability. He might continue to
notice requirement which applied only to arbitration agreements).
165. See Woodward v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 640 . Supp. 760, 767
(S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding arbitration clause in securities account agreement unconsciona-
ble because the investor was inexperienced).
166. See Kronstein II, supra note 5, at 39 (suggesting that most commercial trans-
actions affect third parties in unforeseen ways); Speidel, supra note 70, at 161 (com-
menting that judges, unlike arbitrators, are concerned with the effects of their decisions
on third parties not represented at the proceedings).
167. See Fiss I, supra note 152, at 1086 (stating that suits by private attorneys
general attain social justice).
168. See Brunet I, supra note 4, at 17 (arguing that a polluter would prefer a medi-
ated settlement to a punitive judgment rendered under substantive law); Edwards,
supra note 32, at 677-78 (urging that the settlement of an environmental dispute should
not compromise government standards and therefore that regulators should participate
in the negotiations).
[Vol. 45
Winter 1997] REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 81
contaminate the air. By sidestepping the law, arbitrators may
defeat public policy and encourage further violation and injury.
The nettlesome question is how to identify claims vitally af-
fecting the public welfare. One means is to analyze the objective
of the law on which a claim is based. Some suggest that if the
aim of the law is merely to adjust the rights of the parties to
the dispute, arbitration is appropriate. 169 If, however, the law
promotes objectives that reach beyond the interests of the par-
ties, arbitration is impermissible.170 According to this view, anti-
trust claims should not be arbitrable, because the punitive na-
ture of antitrust law, including imposition of treble damages,
seeks to protect free competition, a matter affecting vast num-
bers, more than it seeks to do justice between the parties. 171
Thus, arbitrators, who are concerned primarily with dispute res-
olution rather than with public interest, cannot be entrusted to
enforce antitrust policy. 72
One commentator believes that securities law claims are
properly arbitrable because such claims do not involve the pub-
lic interest. Rather, they involve only the interests of the buyer
and seller of the security in question. 73 Confusingly, another
writer comes to the contrary conclusion because securities law
protects "the collective interest of market participants."7 4 Al-
though such bright-line rules are appealing, they may sweep too
broadly. A single instance where an otherwise diligent account
executive inadvertently places a client into an unsuitable invest-
169. See Morgan, supra note 21, at 1074 (characterizing arbitrable disputes in
Kantian terms as those affecting only the parties' autonomy). See also Sterk, supra note
1, at 483.
170. Sterk, supra note 1, at 486. Professor Sterk argues also that claims should not
be arbitrable where one of the parties to the arbitration belongs to a class subject to "im-
position" by the class to which the other party belongs. Id. See also Morgan, supra note
21, at 1078-79.
171. Sterk, supra note 1, at 503-04; Morgan, supra note 21, at 1079.
172. Sterk, supra note 1, at 503-04.
173. Id. at 521. Professor Sterk considers and rejects several arguments for refusing
to allow the arbitration of securities law claims. He is undisturbed by the possibility
that arbitrators may misapply the law because that possibility inheres when arbitrators
decide any issue. Id. at 516. He also rejects the argument that court enforcement of the
federal securities law is necessary to promote public confidence in the securities mar-
kets, because arbitration can achieve that purpose as effectively as litigation. He distin-
guishes between antitrust policy and securities law policy on the ground that antitrust
law imposes penalties on wrongdoers while securities law does not. Id. at 519. This dis-
tinction, however, seems flimsy because securities law cases sometimes have widespread
repercussions.
174. Morgan, supra note 21, at 1079. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (announcing that a flndamental purpose of federal securities
law is "to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry").
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ment may not implicate serious public policy concerns. If, how-
ever, a corporation, with intent to defraud, issues materially
misleading press releases touting its stock, the outcome of a sin-
gle investor's case may affect whether the fraudulent scheme
continues. Even a case not ostensibly affecting anyone but the
participants may affect third parties indirectly. An unscrupulous
broker, who churns accounts, may persist in his illegal activities
until securities law penalizes him for his misconduct. Though
individual churning cases appear isolated, third parties may fall
prey unless the pattern of wrongdoing ends.
Although the arguments to protect unrepresented third par-
ties deserve consideration, several counterarguments allay these
concerns, and render academic the daunting task of identifying
public policies requiring court protection. Third parties need not
rely on the lawsuits of others. Regulators, at all levels of govern-
ment, enforce the laws under their jurisdiction. Private parties
may bring violations to the attention of such regulators. If regu-
lators are remiss in performing their duties, the answer is to
stiffen their enforcement functions, not to restrict the right to
arbitrate.
Third parties may protect their own interests. They may
commence lawsuits, enter into arbitration agreements, or settle
their disputes. One might protest that some third parties lack
the financial resources to litigate. This objection is undoubtedly
true, but it argues against the excesses of litigation rather than
the economy of arbitration. Furthermore, one's inability to ad-
vance his rights, for whatever reason, does not oblige others to
litigate as his surrogate. Regardless of the circumstances, par-
ties are never required to commence lawsuits. They may choose
to do nothing. If inaction is permissible, it would be anomalous
to forbid arbitration.
Overburdened courts have long encouraged settlement, a
method of alternative dispute resolution which .plays a salutary
role in commercial and even interpersonal relationships. All re-
lationships depend on the willingness to settle potential dis-
putes. Stubbornly asserting one's legal rights, although in vogue,
intensifies conflict and fractures relationships. Resort to the
courts should be discouraged until reasonable efforts at settle-
ment have failed. Sometimes litigation becomes necessary, but
necessity should not be confused with preference. 175 If one favors
175. But see Fiss HI, supra note 152, at 1076 (opposing the institutionalization of
settlements because affluent parties assume a superior bargaining position).
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settlement, which does not safeguard the rights of unrepre-
sented parties, he cannot sensibly condemn arbitration.
C. The Interests of Society at Large
The broadest objection to arbitration warns against the ero-
sion of the rule of law and underlying values. All laws, from
traffic codes to tax regulations, are enacted to further articul-
able public values. The judicial system puts those laws into op-
eration. Its success depends on the public's respect for the law,
the judicial system, and the government in general. Geared to
arouse a sense of majesty, courtrooms are panelled in carved
wood and have vaulted ceilings. Judges wear black robes and
are accorded almost as much respect as athletes and rock
stars.176 All this pomp heightens our deference to the law.
Whether appointed or elected, judges are government officials
acting as public trustees.177 Always under public scrutiny, they
are held accountable for their judicial conduct. 78 They must fol-
low the law and explain their decisions which have precedential
effect. They also interpret the law, transforming abstract princi-
ples into practical rules of conduct.179 Enforcement of legal
norms orders society and may ultimately instill legal norms into
public consciousness. 10
When parties arbitrate, they are interested in the speedy
and fair resolution of their dispute.181 They entrust the arbitra-
tor to achieve their self-interested goal. True to his task, the ar-
bitrator is not committed to enforcing legal norms established
by lawmakers. Some argue that ignoring law diminishes respect
for legal norms. 82 Parties enter into arbitration agreements,
176. See Brunet I, supra note 4, at 44 (arguing that judges serve as publicly se-
lected authority figures and that their presence in the courtroom adds credibility to
cases involving public interest); Schwartz, supra note 6, at 19-20 (suggesting that the
majesty of the courtroom atmosphere fosters deference to ideals of justice and fairness).
177. See Fiss I, supra note 4, at 1673 (favoring adjudication over arbitration and
other "contrivances" of alternative dispute resolution because judges, unlike arbitrators
or mediators, are entrusted with enforcing legal norms).
178. Id. (noting that judges are "highly visible" and "committed to reason").
179. See Fiss m, supra note 152, at 1085 (arguing that settlement frustrates the ju-
dicial function of explicating the law).
180. See Brunet I, supra note 4, at 17 (commenting on scholars who believe that lit-
igation inculcates the public with desirable values); Fiss H, supra note 72, at 31 (differ-
entiating between judges who enforce and define norms and arbitrators who merely re-
solve individual disputes).
181. See Fiss H, supra note 72, at 31 (noting that the job of an arbitrator, unlike a
judge, is simply to resolve the dispute rather than to enforce and restructure the law).
182. See Brunet I, supra note 4, at 18 (arguing that arbitration "send[s] the false
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knowing that if they or their employees act irresponsibly the ar-
bitrators may not hold them to the standards of substantive law.
Brokerage firms, for example, may require customers to enter
into arbitration agreements, not only to avail themselves of arbi-
tration's economy, but also because they find arbitrators more
lax than judges in applying securities law.83
Critics of arbitration argue that to the extent that arbitra-
tors do not apply substantive law, they remove the incentive to
abide by it. Widespread use of arbitration may therefore result
in an upsurge of disputes.' 8 ' Judges issue written opinions shap-
ing the law and lending predictability to it. People who under-
stand the law can avert disputes. Since arbitrators often do not
write opinions and since their decisions have no precedential ef-
fect, arbitration undermines the predictability of the law.185
There are several responses to these arguments. Arbitration
is essential from a practical point of view. Public resources are
too scant to support the appetite of the voraciously litigious. 18 6
Converting every building into a courthouse would not provide
venues sufficient to accommodate the torrent of litigation if
every potential claim went to court. Fortunately, parties engage
in alternative dispute resolution far more often than they liti-
gate. 87 To reverse this trend would cripple the judicial system.
Nor would the channeling of disputes into the courtroom in-
vigorate legal norms. The vitality of a legal norm does not re-
quire a raging flood of litigation. As long as plaintiffs bring
cases and judges apply the law, legal norms retain their efficacy.
The arbitration (or settlement) of matters involving repetitive,
insular issues, such as what sum of maintenance to award in a
divorce or whether one car or the other was speeding, do not
signal to the community that the outcomes dictated by substantive law are unworthy of
enforcemen"); Edwards, supra note 32, at 676-77 (voicing the concern that alternative
dispute resolution will undermine legal norms); Kronstein H, supra note 5, at 66 (charg-
ing that arbitration obstructs "social coordination" and spawns dissolution).
183. See Brunet I, supra note 4, at 18-19 (asserting that the arbitration between
brokers and customers undermines federal securities law).
184. See id. at 19.
185. See id.; Kronstein I, supra note 4, at 662 (stressing the unpredictability that
arbitration injects into antitrust law).
186. Fiss disagrees arguing that "[aidjudication American-style is not a reflection of
our combativeness but rather a tribute to our inventiveness and perhaps even to our
commitment" Fiss III, supra note 152, at 1090.
187. See Edwards, supra note 32, at 670 (reporting that approximately ninety per-
cent of all state and federal cases are settled before adjudication); Kanowitz, supra note
45, at 242 (observing that the overwhelming majority of cases, both civil and criminal,
are settled).
[Vol. 45
REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
threaten the survival of our values.188 If alternative dispute res-
olution threatened our legal norms, the historic prevalence of
settlement, mediation, and arbitration would have emasculated
the law long ago.
Objections to arbitration might be persuasive if court dock-
ets were dwindling. But the deluge of litigation continues. The
courtroom is not destined to become a lonely place. The rush to
court does not evidence public uncertainty over prevailing legal
norms. People seem more aware of their rights today than ever
before, and they seem more poised than ever, even at the slight-
est provocation, to have their day in court.
This discussion does not derogate concerns about public pol-
icy. It suggests only that advocates of the public policy defense
may overstate the case against arbitration. Arbitration awards
that violate public policy concededly may harm innocent third
parties, but the benefits of arbitration outweigh its dangers.
More important, arbitration, when viewed properly, is equipped
to satisfy public policy. The answer is in the arbitration agree-
ment itself Many such agreements provide implicitly for judicial
correction of legal errors.189 Unfortunately, the prevailing limited
scope of review ignores the intent of the parties; the court may
correct only the most extreme errors of law. 90
IV. THE TRADITIONAL SCOPE OF REVIEW
One might argue that the limited scope of review of arbitra-
tion awards flows from the private nature of arbitration. By ar-
bitrating, parties have chosen an alternative to the courts. Court
intervention should therefore be minimal. A correlative is that
parties select arbitration to benefit from its streamlined proce-
dures, a stark contrast from the expense and delay of litigation.
A key component of arbitrations simplified procedures, the nar-
row scope of review preserves the economy of arbitration by sup-
porting the finality of awards.
These reasons explain why the FAA restricts the statutory
grounds for vacating an arbitration award essentially to partial-
ity and procedural unfairness, matters not directly involving the
legal correctness of the award. Although not venturing far from
the FAA, most courts have adopted nonstatutory grounds for va-
188. See Lieberman and Henry, supra note 4, at 433 (arguing that the vast majority
of cases, involving car accidents, divorce and breaches of contract, do not touch substan-
tially upon norms).
189. See infra Part IV
190. See infra Part IV.
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catur, recognizing that arbitrators must be answerable, to some
extent, for the substance of their decisions.191 Even the court-
adopted grounds, however, defer to arbitrators, permitting vaca-
tur of awards only under limited circumstances.
92
A. Statutory Grounds for Review: Procedural Misconduct
Section 10 of the FAA provides that a district court may va-
cate an award procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. A
related basis for vacatur is "evident partiality" of an arbitrator.
In addition to arbitrator intentional wrongdoing, section 10 con-
demns serious procedural errors. Thus, any misbehavior com-
mitted by an arbitrator, that prejudices the rights of a party re-
quires vacatiir. Finally, the court must vacate an award when
191. This Article considers substantive grounds of review, which include the mani-
fest disregard standard, the irrationality standard, the public policy ground, and the es-
sence of the contract test, as nonstatutory, because most courts do so. E.g., Cole v. Burns
Int'l Security Servs., No. 96-7042, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 2223, at *68 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11,
1997) (noting that the grounds of appeal in the FAA "are not exclusive," and citing pub-
lic policy and manifest disregard as two nonstatutory grounds of review, id. at *68-70);
Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that courts may review
awards for substantive error, exclusive of grounds set forth in the FAA); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing the
manifest disregard test as judicially-created). These grounds, however, fit handily into 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994) of the FAA, which requires the vacatur of awards when the arbi-
trators "exceed their powers." Only the Third and Tenth Circuits have recognized this
subsection of the FAA as the repository of the substantive grounds otherwise deemed
nonstatutory. See, e.g., Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. v. Norad Reinsurance, 868
E2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the "completely irrational" standard derives from
subsection 10(d)); Jenkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 847 F.2d 631,
633-34 (10th Cir. 1988) (commenting that subsection 10(d) opens awards to an abuse of
discretion standard). See also Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards
for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 816-17 (1996) [herein-
after Hayford III (interpreting "manifest disregard" to mean an intentional error of law,
a ground of review permitted under subsection 10(d)(3) which forbids improper conduct
by arbitrators); MAcNEiL ET AL, supra note 47, § 40.5.1.3 at 40:37 (wondering why courts
have not used subsection 10(d) as the wellspring for the recognized substantive grounds
of review). But see Brad A. Galbraith, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Fed-
eral Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law
Standard, 27 INn. L. REV. 240, 248 (1993) (concluding that the FAA provides no grounds
for review on the merits). See generally Michael R O'Mullan, Seeking Consistency in Ju-
dicial Review of Securities Arbitration: An Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of the Law
Standard, 64 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1121, 1136-37 (1995) (discussing the judicial debate over
whether to construe the FAA to include substantive grounds of review).
192. See generally Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman III, Selected Topics
in Securities Arbitration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class
Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 65 TuL
L. REV. 1547, 1603-28 (1991) (reviewing the statutory and nonstatutory grounds for re-
viewing arbitration awards).
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the arbitrators exceed their powers or fail to resolve the submit-
ted dispute definitively.193
Most of these grounds for vacatur attempt to ferret out bias
or procedural unfairness.' 9' Only § 10(a)(4)-the "exceeding their
powers" provision-relates arguably to errors of substantive law.
Most courts have construed this subsection narrowly, holding
that it applies when arbitrators decide issues not presented to
them 95 or grant relief not authorized in the arbitration
agreement.
196
One might argue nevertheless that, when an arbitrator mis-
interprets law or. inadvertently overlooks controlling law, he ex-
ceeds his power. This argument posits that arbitrating parties
do not empower arbitrators to commit legal error. 97 Consistent
193. Section 10 of the FAA provides that a district court, upon motion, may vacate
an award:
(1) Where an award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in arbitrators, or ei-
ther of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence mate-
rial and pertinent to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them so that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter sub-
mitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
194. See Forsythe International, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Ci.
1990) (reversing district court's vacatur of arbitration award on the ground that arbitra-
tion was conducted in fundamentally fair manner as required by section 10 of the FAA);
R. M. Perez & Assoc., Inc v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 1992) (commenting that
the requirement of fundamental fairness in arbitral proceedings arises from section 10 of
the FAA); see also George H. Friedman, Correcting Arbitrator Error: The Limited Scope
of Judicial Review, 33 ARB. J. 9, 13 (1978) (concluding that the state and federal courts
will vacate a "fundamentally unfair, award); O7Mullan, supra note 182, at 1123 (inter-
preting the FAA to limit review to issues of procedural unfairness and to bar review of
substantive issues); Speidel, supra note 70, at 195 (interpreting the FAA to guarantee a
fundamentally fair hearing).
195. See, eg., Fabnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that arbitrators did not exceed their authority by deciding defamation claim); Wal-
lace v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 755 F.2d 861, 865 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument in
labor dispute that the arbitrators had decided claims not presented to them).
196. Compare Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir.
1991) (vacating arbitral award of punitive damages on the ground that the arbitrators
exceeded their authority) with Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d
1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that arbitrators did not exceed their powers by
awarding punitive damages).
197. This argument is particularly apt when arbitrators deny parties due process.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that the predominant view is that due process does not
apply to arbitration because private arbitration lacks state action. Davis v. Prudential
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with their predilection to defer to arbitrators, most courts have
been unsympathetic to this argument. In Davis v. Chevy Chase
Financial Ltd.,198 the court accorded "'the narrowest of readings'
to the excess-of-authority provision of section 10[(a)(4)]" refusing
to use that provision "to substitute a judicial resolution of a dis-
pute for an arbitral one" 199 Similarly, in Federated Department
Stores v. JV.B. Industries,200 the court rejected the argument
that, by misinterpreting a contract, the arbitrators had exceeded
their powers.2 0 1 The court explained that "[a]rbitrators do not
exceed their authority unless they display a manifest disregard
of the law. A misinterpretation of the contracts will not, in itself,
vitiate the award."
202
B. Nonstatutory Grounds for Review: Substantive Errors
To subject arbitration awards to limited substantive review,
courts have fashioned four nonstatutory grounds for vacatur: the
manifest disregard standard, the "completely irrational" stan-
Securities, Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191-92 (11th Cir 1995) (holding that the court's role in
confirming arbitration awards does not constitute state action); Kenneth R. Davis, Due
Process Right to Judicial Review of Arbitral Punitive Damages Awards, 32 Af. Bus. L.J.
583, 612-13 (1995) [hereinafter Davis I] (asserting that the private nature of commercial
arbitration removes it from the ambit of state action); Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Dam-
ages in Arbitration: Contracting out of Government's Role in Punishment and Federal
Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. Ray. 529, 559 (1994) [hereinafter Ware III)
(concluding that commercial arbitration lacks state action, id. at 559, and that in any
event arbitrating parties waive due process, id. at 567-71). But see Brunet 11, supra note
39, at 114-17 (arguing that the FAA confers due process rights on arbitrating parties);
contra Mundheim, supra note 42, at 235-36 (arguing that SRO securities arbitration in-
volves state action because the government compels brokerage firms to join SROs and
because imposing punishment is traditionally an exclusive state function). Assuming for
the sake of argument, however, that due process applies to arbitration, one may argue
that when an arbitrator renders an award denying a party due process, the arbitrator
has exceeded his authority because the arbitration agreement may not be construed rea-
sonably to license the arbitrators to deny the parties fundamental rights. Therefore, the
reviewing court should vacate the award. Davis I, supra, at 622-23. Cf. Glennon v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132 (6th Cin 1996) (assuming without deciding that due
process applies to NASD-conducted securities arbitration and holding that the manifest
disregard standard satisfies constitutional requirements).
198. 667 F2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
199. 667 F.2d at 165 (quoting Andros Compania Maritima, SA v. Marc Rich & Co.,
579 F.2d 691, 703 (2d Cir. 1978)); accord Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949
F.2d 1175, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See Hayford II, supra note 191, at 752-55 (stating that
the "exceeded powers" ground refers to the legal issues decided and remedies awarded
but not to substantive legal error).
200. 894 F2d 862 (6th Cir. 1990).
201. Id. at 866.
202. Id. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1915 (noting that under California arbitration
law arbitrators do not "exceed their authority" by committing legal error).
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dard, the public policy ground, and the essence of the contract
test. Nearly all courts that apply these standards require more
than mere legal error. Misapplying law is not a ground for va-
cating an award.
1. Manifest Disregard of the Law. The manifest disregard
test illustrates two warring forces within the judicial mind. Af-
ter centuries of antagonism toward arbitration, judges have em-
braced the national policy favoring agreements to arbitrate, if
not a policy promoting arbitration itself. In the hope of fostering
a just yet efficient system, this policy substantially removes ar-
bitration from the oversight of the judiciary. Yet judges are torn.
By training and temperament, they seem unable to relinquish
some role in reviewing arbitration awards for error. Ambiguous
Supreme Court dictum provided the unlikely basis for an ambiv-
alent judiciary to fashion a limited, if not illusory, standard of
review.
a. The Advent and Development of the Manifest Disregard
Standard. Perhaps unwittingly, the Supreme Court in Wilko v.
Swan2 3 created the manifest disregard test.20 Not directly in-
volving the standard of review, Wilko, as already discussed, ad-
dressed whether a claim brought under § 12(2) of the 1933 Se-
curities Act was arbitrable.2 0 5 The Court held such claims
nonarbitrable on public policy grounds. 206 The manifest disre-
gard test emerged from dictum in which the Court attempted to
justify its misgivings with the arbitration of 1933 Securities Act
claims. Questioning the competence of arbitrators to tackle com-
plex issues raised in such cases, the Court feared that informal
arbitration procedures would hamstring meaningful review.207
Unexplained awards and untranscribed proceedings shielded er-
ror from judicial scrutiny.208 After noting that the [p]ower to va-
cate is limited,"20 9 the Court slipped into ambiguous dictum
which led to the formulation of the controversial manifest disre-
gard doctrine:2 10
203. 346 US. 427 (1953).
204. Id. at 436.
205. Id. at 430.
206. Id. at 438.
207. Id. at 436.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Marta B. Varela, Arbitration and the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard, 49
DIsp. REsoL. J. 64, 66 (June 1994) (concluding that the Court used the term "manifest
disregard" casually not intending the phrase to launch a new standard of review).
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While it may be true, as the Court of Appeals thought, that a failure of
the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Secur-
ity Act would "constitute grounds for vacating the award ... " that fail-
ure would need be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submissions,
such as the present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of
the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not sub-
ject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error of interpretation.21'
Two interpretations follow from the Court's suggestion that
vacatur would be appropriate where the arbitrators fail "to de-
cide in accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act." The
first is that any error in applying the Securities Act should be
reviewable. The second is that only a failure to apply the Act,
rather than a mere misapplication, is reviewable.
The court of appeals decision to which the Supreme Court
refers approvingly supports the position that any error in inter-
preting the Act is reviewable. In response to the argument that
arbitrators are not bound to apply the provisions of the Securi-
ties Act, the court of appeals asserted that arbitrators must de-
cide "strictly according to legal rules" when the arbitration
agreement so provides.212 Noting that the customer agreement
in Wilko provided that all transactions were "subject to" the Se-
curities Act, the court concluded that failure of the arbitrators
to decide according to the Act would "constitute grounds for va-
cating the award."2
13
Unfortunately, the high Court confuses the issue when it re-
marks that "interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in con-
trast to manifest disregard are not subject" to judicial review.
This quote supports the view that only when an arbitrator fails
even to apply the Act will a court vacate the award. "Disregard"
denotes ignoring the law, that is, failing even to apply it.
The Court's use of the word "manifest" does not help the in-
quiry. There is only one persuasive interpretation of "manifest."
It denotes a clearly discernible error as opposed to one obscured
by an unexplained award. Construing "manifest" in this way
finds support in a preceding part of the excerpt quoted from
Wilko. The Court said that to facilitate review the "failure [to
decide in accordance with the Act] would need to be made
211. 346 US. at 436-37 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953)).
212. 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd, 346 US. 427 (1953).
213. Id. at 444-45. The Court's statement that transactions under the agreement
were "subject to" the Securities Act was not strictly true. Paragraph 3 of the subject
margin agreement provided that all transactions between the parties were "subject to"
the Exchange Act. The agreement did not mention the 1933 Securities Act. Id. at 443.
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clearly to appear," 14 reminding us that conclusory awards im-
pede meaningful review. Not gleaned from supposition, a "mani-
fest" error appears plainly from the language of the award. The
word "manifest," however, does not clarify whether the error
may be one of misapplication, rather than one of non-
application. Either sort of error may be "manifest."
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions fail to clarify this
point. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
Inc., 215 the Supreme Court suggested that manifest disregard
means failure to apply governing law, rather than commission of
an error of law. Thus, it noted that, even under "minimal" re-
view of arbitration awards, the courts could "ascertain that the
tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually de-
cided them."216 Confusingly, in Shearson American/Express Inc.
v. McMahon217 the Court said that limited" review "is sufficient
to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the
statute [section 10(b)]."218 This statement suggests that an error
of law constitutes manifest disregard.
One might have expected the lower courts to have left the
Supreme Court's murky ruminations buried in Wilko. They have
not.219 Rather, all but three of the circuits courts have elevated
the problematic dictum to law.220 Eluded by reason, the courts
214. 346 U.S. at 436.
215. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
216. Id. at 638.
217. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
218. Id. at 232 (citing Mitsubishi for the proposition that judicial review assures
that the arbitrators "take cognizance" of the statutory cause of action).
219. Varela, supra note 210, at 65 (denigrating the manifest disregard standard for
being "a repository for all sorts of outlandish theories of arbitral misconduct").
220. See, eg., Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp.,
103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing district court's vacatur of award); A-G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F2d 1401, 1402 (9th Cir. 1992). (reversing district court's
vacatur of award); Health Services Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267
(7th Cir. 1992) (sustaining award); Eichleay Corp. v. International Ass'n Bridge, Struc-
tural and Ornamental Iron Workers, 944 F.2d 1047, 1056 (3d Cir. 1991) (confusing mani-
fest disregard with test requiring award to have support in the record); Fabnestock &
Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1991) (sustaining award); Kanuth v. Pres-
cott, Ball & Turbin, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (sustaining award); Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060-65 (9th Cir. 1991) (sustaining
award); Upshur Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991)
(reversing district court's vacatur of award); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st
Cir. 1990) (upholding award because the correct legal interpretation was not glaringly
obvious, even if the arbitrators committed legal error); Federated Department Stores,
Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., 894 F.2d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that errors in interpreta-
tion do not constitute manifest disregard); Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local 1269, United
Mine Workers, 896 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing district court's vacatur of
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have twisted the Supreme Court's words into an unworkable
standard which has spawned unremitting criticism.
221
Though recognizing that Wilko's "manifest disregard" lan-
guage was "probably" dictum, the Ninth Circuit in San Martine
Compania De Navagacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd.222
extracted from that language a novel standard of review. The ar-
bitrators in this case awarded San Martine damages, based on
legal conclusions which, in the court's judgment, were "open to
serious question."22 After quoting Wilko, the court observed that
ordinary legal error is not reviewable.2 4 Thus, even if the award
contained legal error the court could not vacate it. The court
could have confirmed on this basis and ended the discussion.
Unfortunately, the elusive Wilko dictum tempted the court to go
further. The court surmised that the Wilko Court, in its discus-
sion of "manifest disregard," intended to establish a narrow
award); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) (sus-
taining award); French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th
Cir. 1986) (reversing district court's vacatur of award); Koch Oil, S.A. v. Transocean Gulf
Oil Co., 751 F.2d 551, 552 (2d Cir. 1985) (sustaining award); Swift Indus. v. Botany In-
dus., 466 F.2d 1125, 1133-34 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that the arbitrator "manifestly disre-
garded" the law in awarding a surety bond, though the court reasoned that the arbitra-
tor had exceeded his authority rather than manifestly disregarded the law); The
Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Term. R.R. Co. v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd., No. 93-C-3519,
1997 US. Dist. LEXIS 1114, at *31 (N.D. IM1. Jan. 29, 1997) (stating that the manifest
disregard standard requires a deliberate refusal to apply known law); Clemons v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 62, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (expressing uncertainty as to
the boundaries of the manifest disregard test, but following Bobker and finding that the
arbitrators did not deliberately ignore governing Kentucky blue sky law); McLaughlin,
Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 55, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (sustaining award), aff'd
862 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1988); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Caporale, 664 F. Supp. 72, 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (sustaining award); Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp., 322 F.
Supp. 278, 282 (E.D. La. 1971) (sustaining award).
221. See O'Mullan, supra note 191, at 1125 (attacking the manifest disregard stan-
dard as leading to "uneven and unpredictable application"); see also infra Part IV.B.I.b.
222. 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961).
223. Id. at 800. In this case, Saguenay chartered a vessel, the Santa Ana, from San
Martine. The charter party contained a provision allowing cancellation of the contract if
hostilities arose involving Canada, the United States or Great Britain leading to the req-
uisition of their merchant marine. The assault on the Suez Canal prompted San Martine
to invoke the cancellation provision. Saguenay disputed the propriety of the termination,
and, according to maritime law, seized the Santa Ana to obtain security for its damages.
The parties ultimately proceeded to arbitration, and Saguenay agreed to provide San
Martine with a substitute vessel, the Linda, for a year. The arbitrators held that San
Martine was within its rights when it invoked the cancellation provision. Id. at 798. In
addition, they ordered Saguenay to pay San Martine (1) damages arising from the
seizure of the Santa Ana, though a necessary element, malice, was apparently absent
and (2) the profit it had made from operating the Linda, though it had done so with San
Martine's consent. Id.
224. Id. at 801.
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standard of review which "might be present when arbitrators
understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard
the same."225 Not finding such misconduct, the court sustained
the award.2
6
A leading case in the area, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. Bobker27 provides a more comprehensive definition of
"manifest disregard."228 The issue in Bobker was whether the ar-
bitration panel manifestly disregarded the law in its interpreta-
tion of a complex SEC rule.229 Upholding the award,2 30 the Sec-
225. Id.
226. Id. The court suggested that manifest disregard might be a recasting of "undue
means" and "partiality," statutory grounds for vacatur prescribed in FAA §§ 10(a) and
(b). Id.
227. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
228. Numerous courts have interpreted the manifest disregard test to require the
deliberate disregard of controlling law. E.g., Flexible Mffg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prod-
ucts Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring the deliberate disregard of law
known to the arbitrator for a court to vacate an award); Health Services Management
Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1992) (asserting that an award will be vacated
when the arbitrator intentionally disregards governing law); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball &
Turbin, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (commenting that manifest disregard
"may be found, for example, if the panel understood and correctly stated the law but
then proceeded to ignore it"); Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local 1269, United Mine Workers,
896 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that an unintentional error of law is not mani-
fest disregard); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988)
(noting that manifest disregard "deals mainly with willful inattentiveness to governing
law"); The Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Term. R. Co. v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd., No.
93-C-3519, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1114, at *31 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1997) (stating that "an
award may be set aside if the arbitor deliberately disregards what the arbitor knows to
be the law in arriving at the decision"); Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp.,
322 F. Supp. 278, 282 (E.D. La. 1971) (explaining that an arbitrator manifestly disregard
that law when he "understand[s] and correctly state[s] the law but proceed[s] to disre-
gard it").
229. The case concerned Rule 1Ob-4, which requires that a shareholder responding
to a tender offer, have a "net long" position on the date the security is tendered and on
the date the offer expires. 808 F.2d at 932. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1996). In response to a
tender offer for Phillips Petroleum common stock, Bobker tendered 4,000 shares. Three
days later in a second transaction, he instructed his broker Merrill Lynch to sell short
2,000 shares of Phillips Petroleum. Merrill Lynch refused to execute the sale, asserting
that such a sale would violate the "net long" requirement of Rule 10b-4. Bobker sued for
lost profits he would have made from the short sale. The arbitration panel found for
Bobker, rejecting Merrill Lynch's argument that the short sale would have violated Rule
10b-4. Id. at 933.
230. In reaching its decision, the court analyzed in detail Rule 10b-4, the applicable
regulation. Id. at 934-36. Judge Meskill chastised the court for engaging in this pro-
tracted analysis. Id. at 937-38 (Meskill, J., concurring). Since the record disclosed the ar-
bitrators' confusion over the meaning of the rule, Judge Meskill felt that no further in-
quiry was appropriate, because not understanding the rule, the arbitrators could not
have intentionally misapplied it. In Judge Meskill's view, the court defeated the very
purpose of the narrow scope of review by analyzing the merits. Id. (Meskill, J.,
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ond Circuit ventured that "manifest disregard" implies more
than an error of law. 1 Rather, "[t]he error must have been obvi-
ous and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the
average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator." 2 The court
did not disclose how familiar "the average" arbitrator is with the
law. Nor did it guide us as to what such a mythical person
might "instantly perceive."f 3 More important, the Bobker court,
in construing "manifest" to apply to errors obvious to the aver-
age arbitrator, departed from how the Supreme Court used the
word in Wilko, where "manifest" signals errors in the award ob-
vious to (as opposed to hidden from) the reviewing court.
To compound its faulty reading of Wilko, the Bobker court,
similar to the San Martine court, misapprehended the Supreme
Court's use of "disregard It construed the word to mean "that
the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing le-
gal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it."234
By adopting this improbable interpretation of the infamous
Wilko dictum, the Bobker court manifestly disregarded what the
Supreme Court had said.
Manifest disregard, as defined in Bobker and most circuit
court decisions, is nearly impossible to prove because, even in
the rare case where an arbitrator deliberately ignores control-
ling law, the arbitrator will not announce his misconduct. 235 He
will exercise the prerogative not to explain the award. Short of
hiring a soothsayer, the court will have no means of divining
whether the arbitrator erred intentionally.
In Johnston Lemon & Co. v. Smith,26 the district court in-
terpreted the "manifest disregard" standard to require arbitra-
tors to appreciate and "expressly" ignore governing law.237 The
court denied the motion to vacate because the arbitration panel
concurring).
231. Id. at 933.
232. Id.
233. Id. See also O'Mullan, supra note 191, at 1128 (pondering what, if any, legal
errors would be obvious to the average qualified arbitrator).
234. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933. See also O'Mullan, supra note 191, at 1131 (reading
the Bobker standard to exempt negligent errors from review, regardless of how egregious
those errors may be).
235. See infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text. Only one of the cases cited
above, Swift Indus. v. Botany Indus., 466 F2d 1125, 1133-34 (3d Cir. 1972), held that an
award violated the manifest disregard standard. Swift Industries, however, misapplied
the manifest disregard test. It vacated the award of a six million dollar surety bond,
which the arbitrator required Botany to post, because such an award exceeded the au-
thority the arbitration agreement conferred on the arbitrator.
236. 886 F. Supp. 54 (D.D.C. 1995).
237. Id. at 56.
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had not specified the law it had applied, insulating itself from
review23 Even more restrictive than the Bobker rule, the John-
ston Lemon formulation requires confirmation of an award
where an arbitrator states the law correctly and proceeds to ig-
nore it, unless the arbitrator, in a fit of inexplicable perversity,
declares his defiance of the law.
2 39
A more liberal approach finds manifest disregard when con-
trolling law is commonly understood and the arbitrators, who
presumptively know the law, ignore it. In Advest, Inc. v. McCar-
thy,240 the First Circuit adopted this standard. It granted that
"[i]n certain circumstances, the governing law may have such
widespread familiarity, pristine clarity, and irrefutable applica-
bility that a court could assume the arbitrators knew the rule
and, notwithstanding, swept it under the rug."241 Advest argued
that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the appropriate
measure of damages, but the court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that Advest had failed to demonstrate that the arbitrators
"inevitably must have recognized" the applicable damage rule.M
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros,243 estab-
lished an even more liberal version of manifest disregard. The
arbitration panel sustained an investor's securities law claims,
rejecting the broker's argument that the claims were time-
barred.2" Applying the manifest disregard standard, the Sixth
Circuit confirmed the award because it found "a conceivable ra-
tional basis supporting the decision."24
238. Id. The court added that the panel was not obligated to so specify. Id.
239. The distinction between the Bobker standard and the Johnston Lemon stan-
dard is largely academic. Only under the rarest circumstances will either standard per-
mit vacatur.
240. 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990).
241. Id. at 10.
242. Id. This approach follows the Bobker test by requiring that controlling law be
apparent, but diverges from the Bobker test by not requiring that the error be deliber-
ate. See Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.2d
9 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court's vacatur because the law was not "so clear
and obvious that there was an error that an average person qualified to serve as an ar-
bitrator should have instantaneously perceived and corrected.").
243. 70 F3d 418 (6th Cir. 1995).
244. Id. at 420. Jaros alleged that Merrill Lynch, in handling his account, had vio-
lated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and had committed common law fraud, negligent mis-
representation and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 420.
245. Id. at 422. This formulation of the manifest disregard standard implies that
clear-cut legal error will result in vacatur. The court noted, however, that manifest dis-
regard means more than "[a] mere error in interpretation or application." Id. at 421.
This confusion lessens if one views the Jaros case as applying the rational basis test
rather than the manifest disregard test. The decision rested on whether the award had a
rational factual basis rather than on whether the arbitrators misinterpreted the law. See
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Recently in Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 4 the D.C. Circuit
adopted the broadest possible definition of manifest disregard-
plenary review of legal errors arising out of statutory claims. A
security guard who had been discharged from employment, Cole
sought to overturn an order of the district court compelling arbi-
tration of his claims arising under Title VII.247 He attacked the
order on the ground that the limited scope of judicial review af-
fords inadequate assurance of enforcement of Title VII's anti-
discrimination policy.248 The court rejected this argument be-
cause "in this statutory context, the 'manifest disregard of the
law' standard must be defined in light of the bases underlying
the Court's decisions in Gilmer-type cases."249 It emphasized that
by agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims a party does not forego
rights afforded by the statute and that judicial review must pro-
tect such rights.250 To achieve that end, courts must "ensure that
arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory
law."25' A departure from how other courts have defined mani-
fest disregard, the standard adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Cole
conforms to the Wilko dictum and honors the probable intent of
parties to an arbitration agreement. Such parties, whether sub-
infra notes 301-06 (discussing the overlap between errors of fact and errors of law).
246. No. 96-7042, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2223 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1997).
247. Id. at *2. The D.C. Circuit, in affirming the order of the district court, held
that the exemption in § 1 of the FAA, which applies "to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, and any other class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce" (9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)), does not exempt all employment contracts. Rather,
the exemption applies only to workers "actually engaged in the transportation of goods
in commerce Id. at *13. Since Cole was a security guard, the exemption did not cover
him. Id.
248. Id. at *67.
249. Id. at *70. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991)
(enforcing an agreement to arbitrate a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act). See supra Part l.B.7.
250. Cole, 1997 US. Lexis 2223, at *71. The court cited Gilmer, McMahon, and Mit-
subishi for the proposition that submission to arbitration of federal statutory claims does
not imply the waiver of any rights arising under such statutes. Similarly, it cited Gilmer
and McMahon for the proposition that judicial review must safeguard compliance with
the provisions of such statutes. Id.
251. Id. The court's expanded definition of manifest disregard affects its review only
of determinations of law, not fact. Id. at *71-72. To deflect criticism that plenary review
of legal determinations would undermine the finality of arbitration, the court noted that
the vast majority of discrimination cases, eighty-four percent according to a study done
in the 1980s, turns on questions of fact rather than issues of law. Id. The customary
scope of limited review would therefore apply in most employment discrimination cases.
The percentage of cases reversed would presumably be far less than fourteen percent.
One suspects that most securities arbitrations similarly involve fact-intensive claims
such as churning and unsuitable investments. Applying the Cole standard of review to
such cases would not likely require substantial court intervention.
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mitting a statutory claim to arbitration or defending against
such a claim, would not expect a court to confirm a legally erro-
neous award.
252
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the manifest
disregard standard. 253 The Eighth Circuit has expressed reserva-
tions about adopting it.254 These courts have advanced two
grounds against the manifest disregard standard. The first is
that it violates the FAA and the second is that it is unworkable.
The Fifth Circuit in R.M. Perez & Associates, Ina v. Welch 25
declined to adopt the manifest disregard standard. It held that
'judicial review of a commercial arbitration award is limited to
Sections 10 and 11256 of the Federal Arbitration Act" 25 7 Since
252. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the proper standard of review of awards when
a claim is arbitrated under designated law, regardless of whether the law is state, fed-
eral, statutory or court-created).
253. See &.M. Perez & Associates, Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1992); Rai-
ford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 903 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1990). See also
infra notes 255-61 (discussing the positions of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits).
254. See Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1991). See also infra
notes 262-65 and accompanying text (discussing the position of the Eighth Circuit).
255. 960 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1992).
256. Section 11 of the FAA provides that a district court may modify or correct an
award:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an ev-
ident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property re-
ferred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the
matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits
of the controversy.
9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994).
257. Id. at 539-40 (quoting Forsythe Int'l, SAL v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d
1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990)); Wall Street Assoc., L.P. v. Becker Paribas Inc., 27 F.3d 845,
849 (2d Cir. 1994) (limiting the grounds to vacate an award to those prescribed in § 10
of the FAA). But see Forsythe Intl, Anderman/Smith Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.,
918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying the "essence of the contract" standard of
review in commercial arbitration). Inconsistent decisions within circuit courts are com-
monplace on the issue whether the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur of
commercial arbitration awards. Compare Chameleon Dental Products, Inc. v. Jackson,
925 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to adopt the manifest disregard standard be-
cause "the exclusive grounds for vacating or modifying a commercial arbitration award
are found in §§ 10 and 11 of the Arbitration Act" (citing Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook
& Weeden v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1988)) and Lafarge Conseils et Etudes,
S A v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the "federal Arbitration Act provides the exclusive grounds for challenging an arbi-
tration award") (citing Corey v. New York Stock Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1212 (6th Cir.
1982) with Eljer Manu., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994) (rec-
ognizing manifest disregard standard) and Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Inc.,
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the FAA provides the exclusive grounds of review, a district
court "has no authority" to institute the nonstatutory manifest
disregard test.5 In Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith259 , the Eleventh Circuit questioned a standard "that
would likely never be met when the arbitrator provides no rea-
sons for its award (which is typically the case)."260 The Eleventh
Circuit's skepticism of the manifest disregard test led to out-
right rejection in Robbins v. Day.
261
In Marshall v. Green Giant Co.,262 the Eighth Circuit re-
frained from deciding whether to adopt the manifest disregard
test.263 It nevertheless addressed Green Giant's argument that
the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law when he had
applied offensive collateral estoppel.26 Although the court con-
ceded that the arbitrator may have erred, it concluded that the
test was not met, because the error, apparently inadvertent
rather than intentional, did not satisfy the manifest disregard
test.
265
b. Criticisms of the Manifest Disregard Standard. Wrung
out of ambiguous Supreme Court dictum, the manifest disregard
standard has incited a rash of disapproval.266 A self-defeating
943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that manifest disregard is a nonstatu-
tory standard of review). See also Remmey v. Painewebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th
Cir. 1994) (limiting the grounds to vacate an award to those prescribed in § 10 of the
FAA but later recognizing the manifest disregard standard, id. at 149). See generally
Galbraith, supra note 191, at 263 (advocating rejection of nonstatutory substantive
grounds for vacatur); Hayford H, supra note 191, at 764 (concluding that only the Fourth
Circuit has categorically rejected nonstatutory grounds of review); 0Mullan, supra note
191, at 1139 (arguing that Congress intended no judicial review of the merits of commer-
cial arbitration awards).
258. Id. at 540 (quoting Forsythe Int'l, SA v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017
(5th Cir. 1990)).
259. 903 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1990).
260. Id. at 1413. The court went on to note that even were it to adopt the manifest
disregard test, the test was not met in Raiford because the arbitrators did not explain
the reasons for the award. Id.
261. 954 F.2d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1992).
262. 942 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1991).
263. Id. at 550.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See Brunet I, supra note 4, at 28 (lamenting that the narrow manifest disre-
gard standard "has a minor role in arbitration outcomes"); Galbraith, supra note 191, at
259 (disapproving of the manifest disregard test because it spurs lengthy and costly ap-
peals); O'Mullan, supra note 191, at 1135 (arguing that the manifest disregard standard
encourages futile motions to vacate, injecting cost and delay into the proceedings);
Varela, supra note 210 at 67 (opposing the manifest disregard standard because it
threatens the expeditiousness, inexpensiveness and finality of arbitration); Bret F. Ran-
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standard, it works only when arbitrators trumpet their mischief.
Arbitrators are not obliged to explain their awards.267 The mani-
fest disregard rule,2 68 along with prevalent arbitration prac-
tice, 2 69 encourages arbitrators into silence to avoid judicial con-
tradiction.270 This tactic stymies even the modicum of
accountability the test provides. A rule requiring arbitrators to
explain their awards would not remedy this problem.271 Arbitra-
tors who impose an idiosyncratic formulation of makeshift jus-
tice will surely be cunning enough to write an opinion conceal-
ing their transgressions.
Aside from being unworkable, manifest disregard fails as a
standard of review because it does not achieve its objective. The
purpose of the test is to provide some measure of review of sub-
stantive error in arbitration awards. As a means of correcting
error, the standard might reasonably consider the magnitude,
quality and consequence of the error under review, rather than
the arbitrator's state of mind, a matter of irrelevance.2 72
dall, Comment, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards
of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 759, 768 n.51 (1992) (suggesting
that manifest disregard is superfluous because statutory grounds, including "corruption,
fraud," and "evident partiality," cover situations of demonstrably intentional error); Spei-
del, supra note 70, at 198 (criticizing the manifest disregard standard because it is too
narrow and because without written opinions arbitrator errors are indeterminable); Let-
ter from Richard E. Speidel, Professor Northwestern University School of Law, to Ken-
neth R. Davis, Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham University
Graduate School of Business Administration May 24, 1996) (on file with author) (calling
the manifest disregard test "simply awful").
267. See 0'Mullan, supra note 191, at 1129 (pointing out that under self-regulatory
organization (SRO) rules an arbitrator in securities matters need not make findings of
fact or state conclusions of law).
268. See ROBERT CoULsoN, BusiNEsS ARBrrRATION-WHAT You NEED To KNow 29
(1986) (warning that "[w]ritten opinions can be dangerous because they identify targets
for the losing party to attack").
269. See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987)
(noting that arbitrators "are actually discouraged by their associations from giving rea-
sons for a decision"); Mentschikoff 11, supra note 39, at 866 (stating that the AAA pres-
sures arbitrators not to write opinions); Stipanowich I, supra note 7, at 439 (remarking
that "the AAA encourages its commercial arbitrators to limit their award to a statement
of relief given and to avoid a lengthy explanation").
270. Varela, supra note 210, at 67 (mocking a standard which assumes that an arbi-
trator who "blatantly flouts" the law will "invite criticism"); Randall, supra note 266, at
768 (lambasting a standard of review that allows arbitrators to avoid accountability by
refraining from giving reasons for their awards).
271. See Galbraith, supra note 191, at 260-61 (objecting to the institution of a re-
quirement that arbitrators make formal findings because such a requirement would
complicate arbitration and advocating instead procedures permitting the parties to de-
mand opinions).
272. MAcN~iR ET AL, supra note 47, § 40.7.2.5, at 40:92 (criticizing the manifest dis-
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First, an appropriate standard of review might consider the
error's magnitude, that is, how far the arbitrator strayed from
governing law. Ignoring the law altogether evinces an error
more serious than misinterpreting it. When an arbitrator blun-
ders in interpreting law, the magnitude of the mistake varies
along a continuum. The most extreme errors reveal irrationality;
such errors are wholly insupportable under any reasonable view
of the law. A less flagrant error adopts an interpretation that is
sensible though clearly incorrect under settled law. The most be-
nign error adopts an arguable interpretation of unsettled law
which the court ultimately rejects on review.
Second, the standard of review might reasonably take into
account the quality of the error. If the arbitrator displaces gov-
erning law with an equally sensible alternative, the case for va-
catur would be weak. If the arbitrator imposes an objectionable
rule, the award is suspect.
27 3
Third, the standard of review might consider the conse-
quence of the error. If the error denied victory to the party that
should have prevailed under governing law, the court should va-
cate the award. Harmless error does not require vacatur.
The manifest disregard standard, as generally applied, con-
siders neither the magnitude, the quality, nor the consequence
of the error. Rather, the test fastens on the mental state of the
arbitrator. If the arbitrator demonstrably knew the law and pro-
ceeded to ignore it, the court will vacate. What the arbitrator
knew, however, should be immaterial. Review should concen-
trate on what the arbitrator did. By focusing on the arbitrators
state of mind, the manifest disregard standard leads to a para-
dox. If the court somehow determines that an eminently sensi-
ble decision was based on a deliberate error the court will va-
cate the award. If the court determines that a paroxysm of
sheer stupidity afflicted the arbitrator at the moment of deci-
sion, the court will confirm.
One might criticize the test also for ignoring public policy.
Any dispute, particularly one arising from statutory claims, may
implicate matters of broad concern, eclipsing the interests of the
regard test because it focuses on the arbitrator's knowledge of the law rather than on
the seriousness of the misapplication of law).
273. See MACNEIL ET Aj., supra note 47, § 40.7.2.6, at 40:95 (proposing that the test
be modified so that an award will be confirmed unless manifest (dearly discernible) er-
ror "would result in significant injustice, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, including powers of arbitrators to judge norms appropriate to the relations between
the parties"); Randall, supra note 266, at 783 (suggesting that the courts eliminate the
requirement that arbitrator intent to disregard the law be shown expressly on the
record).
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parties. Intent on adjusting the rights of the parties to the dis-
pute, arbitrators might fail to consider the effect of their deci-
sions on those not represented at the proceedings.274 An errone-
ous decision might tacitly approve of violations of legal norms
diluting their deterrent functions.2 7 5 Or worse, an error might
perpetuate a continuing statutory violation harming a signifi-
cant segment of the population. Unless an arbitrator, in the pro-
cess of violating public policy, intentionally ignores controlling
law, the manifest disregard standard will allow such an award
to stand.
Most significantly, the manifest disregard test contradicts
the implicit intent of the parties to submit to a more exacting
standard of review. Since the essence of arbitration lies in con-
tract, the agreement should govern.27 6 Though one may argue
that the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for review,2 7 adop-
tion of manifest disregard, a judicially-created standard, refutes
the argument's practical effect.27 The overarching federal policy
of arbitration calls for the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments as written. A manufactured standard of review, manifest
disregard does not even consider the cornerstone of arbitration
policy-the intent of the parties to the arbitration agreement.
2. The "Completely Irrational" Standard. Despite narrow
statutory review, many courts have recognized the need to hold
arbitrators to the standard of rationality. Such a minimal re-
quirement does not inflict judicial intermeddling into the arbi-
tral process. Rather, it promotes the fundamental policy of arbi-
tration: honoring the contractual intent of the parties to the
arbitration agreement. Any party agreeing to arbitrate disputes
with another implicitly expects the arbitrator to resolve the con-
flict reasonably. Such a party may bargain for simplicity and in-
274. See Randall, supra note 266, at 768 (deploring the manifest disregard standard
because it erodes public trust in arbitration which, in turn, diminishes the use of arbi-
tration and consequently adds to court congestion).
275. See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 47, § 40.7.2.5, at 40:94 (suggesting that
[c]urrent manifest disregard doctrine confers arbitrary powers on arbitrators that
should not be tolerated in a society based on the rule of law").
276. See MAcNEIL ET AL, supra note 47, at § 40.7.2.5, at 40:93 (arguing that the un-
sophisticated may not be aware of the draconian manifest disregard test which is there-
fore unfair as applied to them); Galbraith, supra note 191, at 259 (asserting that non-
statutory grounds of appeal, such as the manifest disregard standard, frustrate the
intent of the parties who bargained for the expeditious system of arbitration).
277. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 191 (discussing both the majority view that substantive review
of arbitration awards is nonstatutory and the minority position that such review derives
from § 10(a)(4) of the FAA).
Winter 1997]
102 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
formality, but no one bargains for the abdication of reason.
When entering into an arbitration agreement, were such a party
asked if an irrational award should stand regardless of who pre-
vailed, the party would surely respond "no." Anyone, at the out-
set, would welcome judicial intervention to correct an arbitra-
tor's lapse into irrationality.
Assuming numerous guises, this standard has called for va-
catur of arbitration awards that are "irrational,"279 "completely
irrational,"20 "fundamentally irrational,"28' "arbitrary and capri-
cious,"282 and unsupported in the record. 28 3 These variations
279. Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 920, 923 (D.D.C.
1987) (remanding case where award provided no basis for conclusions); Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc. v. Caporale, 664 F. Supp. 72, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (confirming award not found
irrational).
280. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991)
(finding no irrationality in arbitral award); McLaughlin, Inc. v. Gross, 699 F Supp. 55,
58 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (confirming arbitrator's award when the purported grounds for vaca-
tur merely raised factual contention rather than irrationality); see Jenkins v. Prudential-
Bache Securities, Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) (equating the "completely irra-
tional" standard and "rational basis" standard with the Enterprise Wheel analysis, which
says that an arbitrator's award must "draw[] its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement"); Industrial Mut. Ass'n v. Amalgamated Workers Union, 725 F.2d 406, 412
(6th Cir. 1984) (refusing to enforce a portion of labor arbitration award lacking rational
basis for the cancellation of certain debts); French v. Merrill Lynch, 784 F.2d 902, 906
(9th Cir. 1986) (confirming arbitration award under "completely irrational" standard);
Swift Indus. v. Botany Indus., 466 F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1972) (vacating award for "its
complete lack of rationality"); Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635 (N.Y. 1972) (hold-
ing that under New York law "an [arbitration] award may be vacated ... where the
construction of the document is 'completely irrational'" (citing National Cash Register
Co. v. Wilson, 171 N.E.2d 302, 305 (N.Y. 1960))); see Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6,
10 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990) (confusing the distinction between manifest disregard and
irrationality).
281. Swift Indus. v. Botany Indus., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (comparing
"Tundamental irrationality" with "complete irrationality"); Health Services Management
Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.
v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.C. IM. 1980), aff'd, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that an award may not be vacated for a mere error in interpretation of law)).
282. United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775,
778 (11th Cir. 1988) (vacating arbitration award which arbitrarily held incurable a pro-
cedural due process error allegedly made in a disciplinary proceeding against a postal
employee); Teamsters Local Union 657 v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 735 F.2d 903, 905 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding that an arbitration award may not be "arbitrary or capricious" and
"must have a foundation in reason or fact" (citing International Ass'n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. Modem air Transport, Inc., 495 F.2d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir. 1974)).
283. Eichleay Corp. v. International Ass'n of Iron Workers, 944 F.2d 1047, 1056 (3d
Cir. 1991) (stating that an arbitration award in a labor case must have "some support in
the record"); Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union 1269, 896 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that arbitral findings of fact must merely have "some support in the record");
Local 1445, United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l v. Stop & Shop Cos., 776 F.2d 19,
21 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Bettencourt v. Boston Edison Co., 560 F.2d 1045, 1050 (1st Cir.
REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
seem to establish one standard requiring an award to have a ba-
sis in reason. One might quibble with any other interpretation
which would extract from these terms degrees of irrationality
ranging from the "ordinarily irrational" to the "completely irra-
tional." Rationality is like pregnancy. An award is either ra-
tional or it is not.
Those formulations, not alluding specifically to "rationality,"
represent equivalent standards. The term "arbitrary and capri-
cious" denotes a flight from reason, particularly as that term
has evolved in administrative law; one cannot distinguish the
"rational basis" test from the "arbitrary and capricious" test.
284
Similarly, an award lacking support in the record is "irrational"
since it has no rational basis in the record. The arbitration
agreement presumably directs the arbitrator to determine the
facts based on a hearing. By ignoring the will of the parties, the
arbitrator is acting unreasonably.
The rational basis standard applies primarily to findings of
fact. A narrow standard of review, it does not permit the court
to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. The ques-
tion "is not whether [the] findings were supported by the weight
of the evidence or whether they were clearly erroneous." 285 All
the test requires is support in the record.286
The court in Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Caporale28
7
applied the rational basis test to review an arbitration award.
1977) for the standard requiring vacatur when an arbitrator's award was "(1) unfounded
in reason and fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of
judges, ever could conceivably have made such a ruling;, or (3) mistakenly based on a
crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact"); Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 920, 922 (D.D.C. 1987) (stating that award must be vacated
where the "arbitrator reveals no support whatever for his determinations").
284. United States v. Doherty, 27 F. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1886) ("[Alnd notwithstand-
ing the words of the commission give authority to the commissioners to do according to
their discretions, yet their proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the rule of
reason and law") (quoting Rooke's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 209, 210 ((Coke, J.))); Pell v. Board
of Educ., 313 N.E.2d 321, 325 (N.Y. 1974) ("Rationality is what is reviewed under both
the substantial evidence rule and the arbitrary and capricious standard); ALFRED C.
AMAN. JR. & WnmAm T. MAYrON, AnDSmmRaATivE LAw 453 (1993) ("[T]he arbitrary and
capricious standard of review usually results in the judicial application of a relatively
deferential rational basis test. .. ."); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADmNISTTE LAw 654 (3d
ed. 1991) ("Abuse of discretion occurs when the power has been exercised in a manner
that is, in the traditional phrase, arbitrary or capricious. The test is once again a test of
reasonableness.").
285. Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local 1269, United Mine Workers, 896 F.2d 745, 748 (3d
Cir. 1990) (reinstating arbitration award because it had factual support in the record
and did not evidence manifest disregard of the law).
286. Id.
287. 664 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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To lure Caporale, a securities account executive, away from a
competitor, Prudential-Bache lent him $50,000. The parties also
entered into an employment agreement which provided for com-
mission-based compensation and "additional compensation" in
three annual installments equal to the amounts due on the
$50,000 note. The employment agreement contained inconsistent
provisions regarding the effect of termination of employment on
"additional compensation." One provided for the forfeiture of
"additional compensation" in the event of Caporale's termina-
tion, regardless of the cause. The second provided for the accel-
eration of "additional compensation" in the event of Caporale's
termination unless he was discharged for cause.
When a dispute arose over Caporale's discharge from em-
ployment, the parties submitted to arbitration. The arbitrators
awarded Prudential-Bache approximately $34,000 and Caporale
approximately $216,000. Prudential-Bache argued that the un-
explained award was self-contradictory, necessarily implying
findings that Caporale was discharged with and without
cause.m The court agreed in theory that "an arbitration award
finding that an employee was terminated both wrongfully and
for cause would be sufficiently irrational to require a reviewing
court to vacate the award."2 9 Given the ambiguity in the em-
ployment agreement, however, the court disagreed that the arbi-
trators had slipped into irrationality. The court conjectured that
the arbitrators might have interpreted the employment agree-
ment to disallow "additional compensation" after termination.
2 90
Since the court had found a plausible explanation for the award,
though the arbitrators had not articulated that or any explana-
288. Id. at 74. Prudential-Bache argued that holding Caporale liable under the note,
as the arbitrators apparently had done, meant that they had found discharge for cause.
Yet the arbitrators simultaneously awarded Caporale $216,000, which Prudential-Bache
reckoned represented $200,000 in annuslized income for the two years remaining on the
employment contract plus interest at 8%. Prudential-Bache inferred from this part of the
award a finding of wrongful discharge. Prudential-Bache argued, further, that by failing
to award Caporale "additional compensation" under the employment contract, the arbi-
trators contradicted their finding of wrongful termination. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 75. The court recognized that such an interpretation of the employment
agreement would be inconsistent with the other provision requiring acceleration of "addi-
tional compensation" upon termination, unless the termination were for cause. Attribu-
table to the sloppy employment agreement, such an inconsistency did not mar the
award. Id. at 75 n.3. The court also surmised that the $216,000 award might have in-
cluded a rough estimate of "additional compensation. Under this calculation the award
provided $200,000 for annualized income and $16,000 for "additional compensation,"
which would have amounted exactly to $16,707. Id. at 75.
104 [Vol. 45
REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
tion, the court denied the motion to vacate.291
Sometimes the record will not suggest any rational explana-
tion for a summary award. Although arbitrators are not obliged
to explain their awards, several courts have remanded such
cases to the arbitration panel for clarification.292 For example, in
Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,293 Sargent had
a securities account with Paine Webber in which he had Coleco
stock and options. To minimize the effects of a decline in the
price of Coleco stock, Sargent instructed the broker to follow a
"price-averaging" plan. Paine Webber failed to follow Sargent's
instructions increasing his losses by an alleged $256,000. The
parties went to arbitration. After conducting proceedings where
no record was kept, the panel awarded the Sargents only
$46,000.294 Complaining that the award offered no findings of
fact or conclusions of law to justify the shrunken damages, 295 the
Sargents moved to vacate.
29 6
Faithful to its limited role in reviewing arbitration awards
for errors of fact, the court noted that it must vacate an award
only if the record "reveals no support whatever" for the deci-
sion.297 However, the failure of the arbitrators to explain how
they had calculated damages blocked judicial review. 298 The
court, therefore, remanded the case, directing the panel to ex-
plain the award. 299 "This method," the court said, "avoids any ju-
dicial guessing as to the rationale behind the award. Remands
do not constitute judicial invasions of the arbitrators' province
but rather serve to give the parties what they bargained for-a
291. Id. at 75.
292. E.g., Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 920, 923
(D.D.C. 1987) (remanding securities law case to arbitrators for explanation of how dam-
ages were calculated); Clemons v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 62, 64
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (remanding for the same reason); see Federated Dep't Stores, v. J.V.B. In-
dus., 894 F2d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 1990) (Martin, J., concurring) (urging that courts rou-
tinely remand cases with unexplained and unsupported awards rather than engaging in
"a judicial snipe hunt"); cf. Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d
Cir. 1980) (remanding breach of contract case to arbitrators for explanation so that court
could determine whether award violated public policy); Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass
Co., 397 F2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1968) (afrming remand of breach of contract case to ar-
bitrators for explanation as to whether arbitrators considered contractual payment
clause, raised as defense).
293. 674 F Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1987).
294. Id. at 921.
295. Id. at 921-22.
296. Id. at 922.
297. Id. (citing NF & M Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 524 F.2d 756, 760
(3d Cir. 1975)).
298. Id. at 922.
299. Id. at 923.
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clear decision from the arbitrators."300
Some cases blur the distinction between errors of fact and
law. Where an arbitrator, deciding a claim under particular law,
renders a factually unsupported decision, it may be futile to at-
tempt to characterize the error. For example, in Clemons v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc.301 Clemons and Hazcoal, two investors who
had accounts with Dean Witter, alleged that Jablin, their bro-
ker, had failed to register under governing Kentucky Blue Sky
Law. This violation, they argued, entitled them to rescind trans-
actions accounting for $900,000 of losses.30 2 Although neither
Dean Witter nor Jablin proposed an alternative damage figure,
the arbitrators, after finding for Clemons and Hazcoal, awarded
them only $25,000 each.0 3 The error was obvious, but the unex-
plained award masked whether the error was one of fact or law.
The question was whether the error justified vacatur. Re-
jecting the argument that the award violated the manifest disre-
gard standard, the court noted that the proper result under
Kentucky law was not altogether clear and that in any event
nothing in the record showed intentional disregard of the law.
30 4
The $50,000 award troubled the court nevertheless because no
facts in the record supported that sum. To facilitate review, the
court remanded the case to the arbitrators for an explanation of
how the damages were calculated.30 5
Suppose, on remand, the arbitrators reconsidered and ad-
hered to the original award. Suppose too that complying with
the court's instruction, the arbitrators wrote an opinion which
revealed an untenable misunderstanding of the measure of dam-
ages under Kentucky law. On a renewed motion to vacate the
award, the court would be confronted with an irrational inter-
pretation of controlling law.306 One suspects that the court would
apply the standard of "irrationality" to vacate the award, even
though the arbitrators did not intentionally disregard the law.
Thus, the rational basis test would provide a broader standard
for review on the merits than does the manifest disregard test.
When applied properly to correct errors of law, the rational
basis test, like the manifest disregard standard, does not permit
300. Id.
301. 708 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
302. Id. at 63.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 64.
306. If, on remand, the arbitrators became aware of the error and chose not to cor-
rect it, a subsequent motion to vacate should prevail under the manifest disregard
standard.
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vacatur for a mere error in legal interpretation. Rather, the ra-
tional basis test vacates an award evincing an irrational inter-
pretation. Defining how extreme an error must be to trespass
into "irrationality" poses a problem. A legal error committed by
a lawyer might be irrational, whereas the identical error com-
mitted by a layperson might not.
There is a workable alternative definition of "irrationality."
The term might be defined as the application of an irrational le-
gal principle. Under this standard, misinterpreting controlling
law or even applying the wrong principle of decision would not
alone lead to a finding of irrationality. Even if the arbitrator did
not apply governing law, the award might nevertheless be ra-
tional. The rationality of the award would depend on what prin-
ciple of decision the arbitrator did apply. If the arbitrator ap-
plied a reasonable principle of decision, the award would have a
rational basis. For example, assume that a securities customer
accuses a brokerage house of deceptive practices in peddling a
new issue. An arbitrator could rationally find liability based on
a negligent misrepresentation, even though the applicable sec-
tion 10(b) claim would have required proof of scienter. Assume,
however, that the arbitrator finds no negligence. He neverthe-
less holds for the complainant because he believes brokerage
firms should insure all customer losses, regardless of fault. Such
an award would be irrational.
The irrationality standard operates most effectively when
the arbitrator reveals his reasoning process. Effective use of the
irrationality standard therefore requires remanding questiona-
ble cases to arbitrators for explanation, as the court did in the
Clemons case. A more comprehensive solution would compel ar-
bitrators, however briefly, to explain their awards.
A sensible standard of review, the rational basis test im-
proves on the manifest disregard test by considering the magni-
tude and quality of the error rather than the state of mind of
the arbitrator. Focusing on the magnitude (and to a lesser ex-
tent on the quality)30 7 of the error satisfies the intent of the ar-
bitrating parties who would not condone irrational applications
of the very law they instructed the arbitrators to follow. Since
the fundamental purpose of the FAA is to respect party intent,
the rational basis test comports too with federal arbitration pol-
icy. If the courts are inclined to adopt nonstatutory standards of
substantive review (or to interpret § 10(a)(4) of the FAA
307. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text (defining the "magnitude" and
"quality" of errors in arbitration awards).
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broadly),30 8 they should replace the ineffectual manifest disre-
gard standard with the rational basis test.
3. The Public Policy Ground. If an arbitrator sentenced the
losing party to death, a court, one presumes, would refuse to en-
force the award because the arbitrator would have violated pub-
lic policy. Courts vacate awards on public policy grounds, even
when the arbitrators do not go to such draconian extremes. To
draw the contours of such public policy requires circumspection.
All law advances one public policy or another, but the public
policy ground does not subject any arbitrator's error of law to
correction.3 9 If the public policy ground swept so broadly, it
would displace the manifest disregard test.3 10
In Revere Copper and Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv.
Corp.,311 the court held that an error in interpreting a contract
did not constitute a public policy violation supporting vacatur.
312
The Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC) insured Revere
against the expropriation of its property in Jamaica. When Re-
vere incurred such a loss and sought payment, OPIC denied the
claim. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration. Al-
though finding for Revere, the arbitrators adopted OPIC's con-
struction of the insurance contract, awarding Revere only a
small part of the damages it sought. Revere moved to vacate the
award, arguing that the arbitrators had violated public policy by
failing to interpret the insurance contract according to the appli-
cable rule of construction.3 3 Without agreeing that the arbitra-
tors had misapplied contract law, the court denied that the al-
leged error of law, even if established, might justify vacatur on
308. E.g., Mutual Fire Marine & Inland Ins. v. Norad Reinsurance, 868 F2d 52, 56
(3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that the completely irrational test is used to determine
whether arbitrators have exceeded their powers under § 10(d)).
309. See United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 US. 29, 36 (1987) (not-
ing, in the context of labor arbitration, that "[tihe courts are not authorized to reconsider
the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on er-
rors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract')
310. See Jonathan Yarowsky, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Contin-
uing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 UCLA L. REv. 936, 959 (1976) (cautioning
judges against using the public policy ground as a excuse to substitute their determina-
tions for those of the arbitrator).
311. 628 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
312. Id. at 83.
313. Id. at 82. This principle of contract construction is known as "contra proferen-
turn." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNTRACT § 206 (1979) ("In drafting a contract, a party
will be more attentive to protecting his own interests than those of his counterpart. If
the agreement lends itself to two reasonable interpretations, the one less favorable to
the drafting party is preferred"). Id.
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the public policy ground.314 The court held that the public policy
ground "is not available for every party who manages to find
some generally accepted principle which is transgressed by the
award. Rather, the award must be so misconceived that it 'com-
pels the violation of law or conduct contrary to accepted public
policy.' "315
Although no simple definition of the public policy standard
of review is possible, case law illustrates the kinds of public pol-
icy violations supporting vacatur of awards.316 Courts will not
enforce an award jeopardizing matters of public concern such as
health or safety. Nor will courts confirm awards enforcing rights
derived from an illegal contract. This facet of the public policy
ground relates to the more general doctrine that courts will not
enforce an award directing the performance of an illegal act. Fi-
nally, courts may not enforce awards granting relief reserved to
the courts.317 Under the law of New York and several other
states, punitive damages awards fall into this category.
31 8
As the "death sentence" example shows, there is a relation-
ship between the public policy ground and the "exceeding au-
thority" ground prescribed in the FAA. The arbitrating parties
may not grant the arbitrator authority to violate public policy.
Whenever arbitrators issue an award violating public policy,
they necessarily exceed their authority. Rather than a nonstatu-
tory basis for vacatur, the public policy ground, like the other
substantive grounds of review, may therefore be seen as an off-
shoot of the "exceeding authority" ground.31 9 The contrary argu-
ment is that the "exceeding authority" ground refers only to the
authority granted in the arbitration agreement; it does not refer
to restrictions imposed by law.3 20 For example, if the arbitration
314. Revere Copper, 628 F.2d at 83. The court neglected to explain why the arbitra-
tors were obliged to apply any common law principles of contract law.
315. Id. (citing Union Employers Div. of Printing Indus. v. Columbia Typographical
Union, 353 F. Supp. 1348, 1349 (D.D.C. 1973), affd mem., 492 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
316. See infra Part lV.B.3.
317. See Kanowitz, supra note 45, at 250 (noting that courts will vacate arbitral
awards that grant remedies, such as punitive damages, forbidden by public policy).
318. See infra Part IV.B.3.C.
319. See John T. Brady & Co. v. Form-Eze Sys., Inc., 623 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir.
1980) (characterizing an award violating public policy as exceeding the arbitrators' au-
thority); MACNEIL ET AL, supra note 47, § 40.8.1.2 at 40:97 (preferring to characterize the
public policy ground as an adjunct to the 'exceeding their powers" standard); Yarowsky,
supra note 310, at 958 (asserting that an award requiring the performance of an illegal
act violates public policy and, in making such awards, arbitrators exceed their
authority).
320. See Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980)
(stating that arbitration awards should be vacated if they compel illegal acts or offend
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agreement ostensibly empowered the arbitrator to order the los-
ing party to relinquish his freedom of speech, public policy
would intervene, although the arbitrator did not exceed his au-
thority under the agreement.3 21
Whether arising from precedent, statute or otherwise, a
public policy justifying vacatur must be well-settled. A judge
may not dignify his view of the public interest, no matter how
appealing, by dubbing it "public policy" and vacating an award
that offends his sensibilities.
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 259, International Union of
United Rubber Workers322 and United Paperworkers Interna-
tional Union v. Misco, Inc.,323 the U.S. Supreme Court estab-
lished a narrow standard for reviewing labor arbitration awards
for violations of public policy. Labor policy is driven by forces
different from those which underlie federal arbitration policy.324
The Misco court instructed that "t]he reasons for insulating ar-
bitral decisions from judicial review are grounded in the federal
statutes regulating labor-management relations. These statutes
reflect a decided preference for private settlement of labor dis-
putes without the intervention of government...s 32 5 Neverthe-
less, labor arbitrations narrow standard of review for public pol-
icy violations works equally well in commercial arbitration, and
judges, reviewing commercial awards, sometimes borrow the la-
bor standard.326
'well accepted and deeply rooted public policy," although this ground for vacatur is not
in the FAA).
321. This argument is theoretical. No practical consequences flow from whether the
public policy ground is viewed as arising from statute or common law.
322. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
323. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
324. See infra notes 373-74 and accompanying text (contrasting labor policy with
federal arbitration policy).
325. Misco, 484 US. at 37. Section 173(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act
provides: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared
to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the applica-
tion or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement" 29 US.C. § 173(d)
(1994).
326. E.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., No. 96-7042, 1997 US. App. LEXIS
2223, *68 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1997) (quoting Misco and concluding that the scope of the
public policy ground of review in the commercial context is at least as broad as such re-
view in the labor context); Board of County Comm'rs of Lawrence County v. L. Robert
Kimball and Assoc., 860 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting W.R. Grace and Misco as
establishing the standard for review on public policy grounds); Northrop Corp. v. Triad
Fin. Establishment, 593 F. Supp. 928, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (citing W.R. Grace for the
principle that courts will not enforce awards violating law or public policy), rev'd, 811
F.2d 1265 (1987).
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To avert charges of discrimination, W.R. Grace entered into.
a conciliation order with the EEOC. Following judicial entry of
this order, W.R. Grace laid off employees, who in turn filed
grievances and sought arbitration under their collective bargain-
ing agreement. W.R. Grace conceded that its discharge of the
employees violated the collective bargaining agreement, but ar-
gued that the agreement was contrary to public policy because it
created rights inconsistent with the conciliation order.
327
The Court acknowledged that "a court may not enforce a
collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public pol-
icy,"32 but stressed that such a public policy must be "well de-
fined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the
laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations
of supposed public interests." 329 Although "obedience to judicial
orders is an important public policy,"330 the court sustained the
arbitration award because the arbitration award did not violate
the conciliation order, merely granting backpay, rather than re-
quiring reinstatement.3 1
In Misco, 332 Cooper, a Misco employee who operated danger-
ous machinery, received two reprimands for deficient perform-
ance. After learning that Cooper had been arrested for posses-
sion of marijuana and later had been in possession of marijuana
in the company parking lot, Misco fired him. Cooper responded
by filing for arbitration, alleging wrongful discharge under his
collective bargaining agreement. 333 The arbitrator ordered
Cooper's reinstatement, and Misco sought vacatur on the ground
that the award violated public policy. The circuit court granted
Misco's motion.
327. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
328. Id.
329. Id. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945). Although "pub-
lic policy" evades precise definition, the public policy ground is not a license to circum-
vent the limited standard of review for arbitration awards. Windell v. Wolf, 43 F.3d 1150,
1151 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting as frivolous the argument that an investor violated public
policy by failing to monitor the trading abuses of his broker).
330. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766. The Court added that "Ivoluntary compliance
with Title VII also is an important public policy." Id. at 770. It concluded, however, that
enforcing the arbitration award did "not inappropriately affect this public policy." Id. at
771. Because the union had not participated in the conciliation process, it would be im-
proper to curtail union rights on the basis of the conciliation agreement. Id.
331. Id. at 768-69. The court noted that the company's dilemma, facing a violation
either of the conciliation agreement or the collective bargaining agreement, was of its
own making. Id. at 767.
332. 484 US. 29 (1987).
333. Id. at 33.
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The Supreme Court cautioned, as it had in W.R. Grace, that
an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment will be vacated only when the contract as interpreted
would violate an "explicit," "well-defined and dominant" public
policy.33 Though rooted in common sense, the circuit court's self-
proclaimed public policy was not grounded in legally settled
principles. 35 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the cir-
cuit court's order.33
6
a. Awards Endangering the Public. In Iowa Electric Light
& Power Co. v. Local Union 204,337 Schott worked in the secon-
dary containment area of a nuclear power plant. This area pro-
vided a buffer zone to arrest radiation leaks. To get an early
start at lunch, Schott compromised the interlock system of the
secondary containment area. When his supervisor learned of
this deliberate safety violation, Schott was fired. Schott thereaf-
ter sought reinstatement by arbitrating under the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The arbitrator ordered Schott's
reinstatement.
After summarizing federal law regulating nuclear power
plants, the court emphasized that "[n]othing could be plainer
than the public interest in the safe operation of nuclear power
plants ... "3 8 The court found that, though Schott's dereliction
had not caused harm, he had deliberately jeopardized the public
and might do so again.33 9 It therefore vacated the award of
reinstatement.3 40 .
334. Id. at 43.
335. Id. at 44. The Court also disagreed with the circuit court's finding that because
Cooper had kept marijuana in his car that he would necessarily use the drug while
working. Id.
336. Id. at 48.
337. 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
338. Id. at 1428.
339. Id. at 1429.
340. Id. at 1430. Courts have vacated awards where employees, in other factual set-
tings, have endangered the public. S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers' Int'l Union,
815 F2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987) (drug possession by operator of potentially dangerous equip-
ment) vacated, 484 U.S. 983 (1987); Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local Union 540 v.
Great W, Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983) (excessive drinking by truck driver).
However, where a breach of public policy does not threaten public health or safety, the
courts will confirm an award of reinstatement. Local 453, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v.
Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 US. 946 (1963) (gambling at
work); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8-9
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (dishonest mailman). But see United States Postal Serv. v. American Pos-
tal Workers Union, 736 E2d 822, 825 (1st Cir. 1984) (vacating reinstatement of embez-
zling mailman though public health and safety not threatened).
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b. Awards Compelling Illegal Acts. A prime example of
such an unenforceable award is one compelling a violation of
federal antitrust law.341 In Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba,
Ltd., 2 Diapulse, the manufacturer of an innovative medical de-
vice, commenced arbitration against its distributor, Carba, for
violating a non-competition agreement. Sustaining the claim,
the arbitrators enjoined Carba, in vague and arguably overbroad
terms, from competing with Diapulse. 4 Carba opposed confir-
mation of the injunction on the ground that it imposed an un-
reasonable restraint of trade in violation of federal antitrust
law. 44 Specifically, Carba objected to the injunction because it
appeared permanent and worldwide. 345 Carba argued also that
the award swept too broadly by prohibiting the manufacture and
sale of products "similar" to the Diapulse device.
346
The vagueness of the award stymied the court's efforts to
determine whether the injunction violated public policy. Invok-
ing its power to vacate an indefinite award under section
10(a)(4) of the FAA, the court remanded the case to the arbitra-
tors for clarification. 347 The remand suggested that the court
would vacate an award imposing unbridled restraints on Carba.
c. Issues Excluded From Arbitration. One public policy is-
sue has stirred unrelenting controversy. Courts have wrestled
341. Another example is an award violating the law of a foreign government. In
Northrop Corp. v. Triad Fin. Establishment, 593 F. Supp. 928, 940 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd
811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1987), the court vacated in part an arbitration award because it
directed an arms supplier to pay commissions to its foreign sales representative in viola-
tion of Saudi Arabian law. The Ninth Circuit reversed the order of the district court
holding that the parties agreed to be governed by California law, which permitted such
commissions, rather than Saudi Law. Furthermore, awards condoning, as opposed to
compelling, illegal acts are also held unenforceable. Cf. Osceola County Rural Water
Sys., Inc. v. Subsurfco, Inc., 914 F.2d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that court
would not confirm an arbitration award in favor of a contractor if charges of falsifying
the results of pressure testing on sections of water line were substantiated); John T.
Brady & Co. v. Form-Eze Sys., Inc., 623 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1980) (implying that court
would not confirm an arbitration award enforcing a contractual forfeiture clause). But
see Board of Comm'rs of Lawrence Co. v. L. Robert Kimball & Assoc., 860 F.2d 683 (6th
Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that contracts for indefinite period between county and
engineering firm violated public policy).
342. 626 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1980).
343. Id. at 1110. In addition, the arbitrators awarded Diapulse $350,000 and or-
dered Carba to pay the costs of the arbitration proceeding. When Diapulse moved to con-
firm the award, Carba cross-moved to vacate the injunction. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1111.
346. Id. at 1110.
347. Id. at 1111.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
with whether public policy bars arbitrators from awarding puni-
tive damages. 34 This issue highlights the interrelationship be-
tween arbitrability and reviewability. If public policy prohibits
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages, claims for such re-
lief are not arbitrable. When an arbitrator defies this limitation
of authority and renders such an award, the reviewing court
will not confirm it. Thus, courts may weed out claims for puni-
tive damages either before arbitration because such claims are
not arbitrable349 or after arbitration because such an award of-
fends public policy.
The New York State Court of Appeals announced the public
policy against arbitral awards of punitive damages in Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc.350 There, an author commenced arbitration
against her publisher for the malicious refusal to pay royalties.
The arbitration panel awarded the author compensatory and pu-
nitive damages. 5 1 The publisher opposed confirmation of the pu-
nitive part of the award, arguing that public policy forbids arbi-
trators from awarding such relief.352 Judge Breitel, writing for a
four-judge majority, agreed. He observed that punitive damages,
rather than a private remedy, serve the social objectives of pun-
ishment and deterrence.3 53 The imposition of such sanctions is
therefore reserved to the state.354 Judge Breitel warned that the
party in the superior bargaining position might control the se-
lection of the arbitrator.355 Because of circumscribed judicial re-
view, he foresaw that the arbitration of claims for punitive dam-
ages could pose a "trap for the unwary."5 6 To avoid abuse, the
state alone must remain "the engine for imposing social sanc-
348. See MACNEiL Er AL., supra note 47, § 40.8.2 at 40:98 (noting that the propriety
of arbitral punitive awards ranks as the most frequently litigated public policy issue).
Another issue sometimes excluded from arbitration on public policy grounds is the avail-
ability of attorneys fees. See generally Kenneth R. Davis, Protected Right or Sacred Rite:
The Paradox of Federal Arbitration Policy, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 65, 85-89 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Davis II] (discussing public policy issues).
349. The party seeking to preclude the claim could move to stay arbitration. 9
U.S.C. § 3 (1994). Challenges to remedies such as punitive damages and counsel fees,
however, arise most frequently on appeal rather than on stay motions, because one can-
not anticipate if arbitrators will award such relief
350. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
351. Id. at 794.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 795. Judge Breitel pointed out that punitive damages are not available
even in court for a breach of contract unless a public right is involved. Id.
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tion."57 Thus, an arbitrator may not award punitive damages,
even with consent of the parties.358
Confronted with numerous challenges to arbitral punitive
awards, most federal courts found the Garrity rule inimical to
the federal policy favoring arbitration. 359 In Mastrobuono v.
357. Id. Judge Gabrielli filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that arbitra-
tors should be permitted, in accordance with an arbitration agreement, to award puni-
tive damages. Id. at 799 (Gabrielli, J. dissenting). He cited Matter of Associated General
Contractors v. Savin Brothers, 335 N.E.2d 859 (N.Y. 1975), which upheld an arbitral
award of treble liquidated damages, and he could see no meaningful distinction between
that award and the award challenged in Garrity. Condemning the misconduct of Lyle
Stuart, he would have confirmed the punitive award because it was neither "irrational
nor unjust." Id. at 798-800 (Gabrielli, J. dissenting).
358. Id. at 797. Several jurisdictions have adopted the Garrity rule. E.g., CoO. REv.
STAT. § 13-21-102(5) (1987); McLeroy v. Waller, 731 S.W2d 789, 792 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding, under state statute, that parties may not authorize arbitrators to award puni-
tive damages); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (ruling punitive damages unavailable in arbitration); Shaw v.
Kulnel & Assocs., 698 P.2d 880, 882 (N.M. 1985) (expressly following Garrity). See gen-
erally Kenneth R. Davis, A Proposed Framework for Reviewing Punitive Damages
Awards of Commercial Arbitrators, 58 ALB. L. REv. 55, 64, 65 (1994) [hereinafter Davis
HI (discussing the support the Garrity rule has enlisted). Some jurisdictions will permit
arbitrators to award punitive damages if the arbitration award so provides. E.g., Com-
plete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan, 558 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an
arbitrator may award punitive damages only if the agreement expressly confers such au-
thority). Other even more liberal jurisdictions will permit arbitrators to award punitive
damages unless the agreement provides otherwise. E.g., Starkenstein v. Merrill Lynch
Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 189, 191-92 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that ar-
bitrators may award punitive damages under Florida law unless the arbitration agree-
ment provides to the contrary); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726, 734
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (sustaining arbitral award of punitive damages where arbitration
agreement was silent on availability of punitive damages); Grissom v. Greener & Sum-
ner Constr., Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (reinstating arbitral award of
punitive damages); See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitra-
tion: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv. 953, 959 (1986) (hereinaf-
ter Stipanowich II) (deploring the Garrity rule as 'an anomaly, frustrating the goals of
fairness and finality that are the essence of arbitration and undermining the valuable
role that punitive damages play in deterring fraudulent and malicious conduct").
359. See, ag., Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 887 (8th Cir. 1993) (confirming punitive
award in securities fraud case, despite Minnesota law arguably following Garrity, where
applicable AAA (American Arbitration Association) rule granted arbitrators broad reme-
dial powers); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (9th
Cir. 1991) (sustaining punitive award in breach of contract and fraud case under same
AAA rule, despite New York choice-of-law clause); Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business
Sys. Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Ci. 1989) (confirming punitive award in breach of exclusive
dealership case under same AAA rule, despite California law arguably following Gar-
rity); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cin 1988) (uphold-
ing punitive award in securities fraud case under same AAA rule, despite New York
choice-of-law clause); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc. 598 F. Supp.
353, 357 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affd per curiam, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985) (sustaining pu-
nitive award in construction case under same AAA rule, despite Alabama law arguably
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Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,360 the United States Supreme
Court tacitly agreed.361 It held that an NASD arbitration panel
could award punitive damages, despite the parties' agreement to
submit to New York law, which includes the Garrity rule. 62 Al-
though the court sought to justify its decision with a tortured
analysis of the arbitration agreement,36 3 it betrayed a predispo-
sition to reject any implicit limitation on arbitral authority.6
4
Mastrobuono may foretell the end of public policy limitations on
the power of arbitrators to decide issues ostensibly reserved for
the courts.
365
following Garrity). See also Ware I, supra note 197, at 548 (arguing that federal policy
preempts Garrity because Garrity denies the freedom to enter into an agreement to arbi-
trate a claim for punitive damages). But see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 20 F3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995) (vacating punitive
award in securities fraud case arbitrated under New York law and NASD rules); Barbier
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (vacating punitive
award in securities fraud case, where parties agreed to application of New York law);
Falmesteck & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1991) (vacating punitive award
in broker-dealer arbitration governed by NYSE rules, where Garrity applied through
Erie doctrine). But see also Davis I, supra note 358, at 94 (arguing that Garrity is com-
patible with federal arbitration policy, which favors the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments as written, but takes no position on the availability of punitive remedies).
360. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
361. But see Mundheim, supra note 42, at 213 (lamenting the Supreme Court's si-
lence "on the broader public policy issue whether arbitrators in securities cases ought to
be permitted to award punitive damages"); Victor Williams, Punitive Damages in Arbi-
tration: Mastrobuono and the Need for Creation of a National Court of Commercial Ap-
peals, 100 Con. LJ. 281, 310-11 (1995) (criticizing Mastrobuono for failing to settle the
scope of preemption).
362. Id. at 1218.
363. Id. at 1216-17 n.2. After pointing out that the parties had agreed to be gov-
erned by NASD rules of arbitration, the Court interpreted NASD rule 3741(e) to permit
punitive awards. Id. at 1218. This rule, however, merely directs the arbitrator to sum-
marize the relief granted. See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE T 3741(e) (1993).
The Court relied too on an arbitrators' manual, which instructs arbitrators that they
may award punitive damages. SECURITY INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARITRATION, THE AR.
BrrRATOR'S MANUAL 26-27 (1992). Never official adopted by the NASD, this manual was
not incorporated into the arbitration agreement. See generally Davis II, supra note 348,
at 81-83 (discussing the specious contract analysis employed by the Mastrobuono Court,
and particularly criticizing the Courts failure to honor the parties' selection of New York
law).
364. Justice Thomas dissented. He found Mastrobuono indistinguishable from Volt
Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 US. 468
(1989). In Volt the parties entered into a broad arbitration agreement. They also agreed
to be governed by California law. A California statute provided that arbitration may be
stayed during a pending, related litigation. The issue was whether such a stay violated
federal arbitration policy. The Supreme Court saw no conflict between the California
statute and the FAA. Volt, 489 US. at 475.
365. See Mulder v. Donaldson, Luikin & Jenrette, 224 A-D.2d 125 (N.Y.App.Div.
1996) (commenting that punitive damages are available in arbitration unless the arbi-
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4. The Essence of the Contract Test. The Supreme Court es-
tablished the essence of the contract test for reviewing labor ar-
bitration awards. In United Steel Workers of America v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 66 a group of employees were fired for
leaving their jobs in protest over the discharge of a co-worker.
They filed a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement
and the dispute went to arbitration. The workers won an award
of backpay and reinstatement. The company challenged the
award, arguing that, contrary to the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the arbitrator had granted relief continuing beyond the
expiration date of the agreement.
The Court acknowledged that arbitrators must have flexibil-
ity to fashion awards, but cautioned that an arbitrator "does not
sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice."367 An award
is "legitimate only if it draws its essence from the collective bar-gaining agreement."368 Though conceding that the arbitrator's
reading of the collective bargaining agreement in Enterprise
Wheel might have overlooked accepted principles of contract in-
terpretation, the Court concluded that the arbitrator could rea-
sonably have read the agreement to permit the relief granted.36 9
It therefore upheld the award.370
In United Paperwork Int'l Union v. Misco Inc.,3 71 the Court
explained that the essence of the contract test does not license
courts to substitute their judgment for that of arbitrators. The
tration agreement clearly provides otherwise); Dominic Bencivenga, Securities Arbitra-
tion 'Garrity' Rejected in Punitive Damages Ruling, N.Y. L.J., at 5, col. 3 (Oct. 17, 1996)
(speculating that Garrity may not survive after Mastrobuono). But see Carroll E.
Neesemann, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Still Not a Sure Thing, N.Y. L.J., at 1, col.
2 (Jan. 30, 1997) (questioning whether the New York Court of Appeals will refuse to en-
force punitive arbitration awards). See generally Davis H, supra note 348, at 93 (arguing
that the rule of Mastrobuono may "swallow virtually any state law infringement on an
arbitrator's authority").
366. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
367. Id. at 597.
368. Id. The Court explained: "When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and
apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear
in order to reach a fair solution of the problem. This is especially true when it comes to
formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situa-
tions. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should be
awarded to meet a particular contingency. Nevertheless, the arbitrator is confined to in-
terpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to
dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement" Id.
369. Id. at 598.
370. Id. at 599.
371. 484 US. 29 (1987).
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Court instructed that "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope
of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious
error does not suffice to overturn his decision."372
Labor arbitrators resolve disputes arising under collective
bargaining agreements.373 Their job is essentially one of inter-
pretation. One scholar has therefore described them as "contract
readers" 3 74 The essence of the contract test sets modest limits
on the power of labor arbitrators to interpret collective bargain-
ing agreements. Commercial arbitrators, on the other hand,
make factual findings, and apply the facts to the law. To say, as
did the Enterprise Wheel Court, that the award "must draw its
essence from the agreement," does not guide commercial arbitra-
tors who are not engaged in contract interpretation.
Sometimes, however, commercial arbitrators do interpret
agreements.37 5 One such case is Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache
. ' 6
372. Id. at 38.
373. Courts should be circumspect before applying principles of labor arbitration to
commercial arbitration. In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363
U.S. 574, 578 (1959), the Supreme Court stressed that federal policy promotes "indus-
trial stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement." Arbitration promotes
this policy by assisting the continuous collective bargaining process. See Kronstein I,
supra note 4, at 687. As the Enterprise Wheel court observed, "national labor policy fa-
vors settling disputes by arbitration." 363 US. at 596. Judicial intervention might under-
mine the cooperative atmosphere necessary for successful collective bargaining. Yet,
sometimes courts monitor labor awards which jeopardize union management relations.
Although the FAA favors enforcing commercial arbitration agreements, it does not ad-
vance a policy analogous to national labor policy. See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 47,
§ 40.5.2, at 40:52-40:53 (questioning the transfer of labor arbitration grounds of vacatur
to commercial arbitration because the forces influencing judicial oversight of labor
awards do not arise in the commercial sphere); Hayford H, supra note 191, at 194-98
(asserting that the courts should not apply the essence of the contract standard to com-
mercial arbitration); Douglas E. Ray, Court Review of Labor Awards Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 32 Vnu. L. REV. 57, 67 (1987) (concluding that the FAA does not apply to
labor arbitration).
374. Theodore St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1997) (asserting
that the labor arbitrator "is the parties' officially designated 'reader' of the contract. He
(or she) is their joint alter ego for the purpose of striking whatever supplementary bar-
gain is necessary" to effect the collective bargaining agreement).
375. E.g., Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 831 (9th Cir.
1995) (insurance policy); Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1325-26 (5th
Cir. 1994) (stock or asset purchase agreement); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1481, 1487 (9th Cir. 1991) (reinsurance agreements); Osce-
ola County Rural Water Sys., Inc. v. Subsurfco, Inc., 914 F.2d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 1990)
(construction subcontract). Sometimes courts misapply the essence of the contract test
when the issue, rather than one of contract interpretation, is one of law. See Seymour v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1025 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying the essence of the
contract test to determine whether an amendment to an insurance policy complied with
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Jenkins and Hodges were account executives who signed em-
ployment agreements to work for four years at the Provo branch
of Prudential-Bache.3  During the contractual term, Prudential-
Bache closed its Provo office. It offered Jenkins and Hodges jobs
in Salt Lake City, but they declined and commenced arbitration
alleging breach of the employment agreements. 378 They argued
that contractual language referring to them as "Account Execu-
tives at the Prudential-Bache office in Provo" guaranteed that
they would not be relocated.37 9 Applying the essence of the con-
tract test, the court confirmed an award for Prudential-Bache
because the arbitrators, even if incorrect, had adopted an argua-
ble interpretation.380
Even in cases such as Jenkins, the essence of the agreement
test is superfluous. First, as the court in Anderman/Smith Co.
v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.381 recognized, the test hinges on
rationality38 2 The rational basis test, which provides a theory for
rejecting unreasonable contract interpretations, disposes of the
need to transplant theories developed in the labor context. Sec-
ond, an arbitrator arguably exceeds his power when he ignores
plain contractual language. The Eighth Circuit in Intercity Gas
Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp.383 came to this conclusion. If
§ 10(a)(4) of the FAA provides grounds for vacatur, the essence
of the contract test slips into redundancy.
law).
376. 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988).
377. Prudential-Bache lent Jenkins and Hodges $60,000 each, the loans to be for-
given over the four-year terms of employment. Id. at 632.
378. Jenkins suffered from multiple sclerosis. Confined to a wheelchair, he could not
have commuted easily to Salt Lake City. He and Hodge had established a partnership
which they decided to continue after the Provo office dosed. Id. at 633.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 635.
381. 928 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1990).
382. See id. at 1219 (upholding arbitral award because it was rational and therefore
drew its essence from the agreement); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.
1990) (suggesting that the essence of the agreement test is interchangeable with the
manifest disregard standard and the irrationality standard); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany
Indus. Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (characterizing the essence of the agree-
ment test as a standard of rationality).
383. 845 F.2d 184, 189 (8th Cin 1988) (vacating award to natural gas supplier be-
cause the arbitrator exceeded his authority by failing to follow plain language of contract
permitting price adjustment); see Enterprise Wheel, 500 US. at 597 (noting that if the




V. THE PROPER SCOPE OF REVIEw
The lack of judicial oversight of arbitration has stirred de-
bate among commentators. Some support current practice,3
84
while others champion expanded review.385
A. The Debate
Advocates of limited review commend arbitration for its
speed, simplicity, and cost-savings, believing that these three
features of arbitration depend on the finality of awards. Once
the award is rendered, the court, except under extraordinary cir-
cumstances, may not displace the decision of the arbitrators. To
expand the scope of review, in the view of these commentators,
would remove a fundamental distinction between arbitration
and litigation, the very system which proponents of arbitration
criticize for its inefficiency.38 6 Arbitration would merely be a
prelude to protracted litigation that would begin with the filing
of the appeal.3 8
7
The opponents of expanded review emphasize that parties
often select arbitrators for their expertise and familiarity with
the relevant industry.388 Unlike judges who are bound by rigid
legal principles, arbitrators tend to be flexible, considering busi-
ness ethics, the relation of the parties and other nonlegal fac-
tors389 in reaching innovative decisions. 390 Judicial intrusion,
they believe, would dissuade parties from arbitrating and would
bloat court calendars.39'
Many who support limited review favor the status quo,392
while others take the more extreme position that the courts
384. See infra notes 386-95 and accompanying text.
385. See infra notes 396-409 and accompanying text.
386. Alan H. Katz, Note, Commercial Arbitration-Scope of Review of Error of Law
or Fact, 52 TUL. L. Rav. 862, 869 (1978); Judicial Supervision, supra note 39, at 681
(summarizing arguments against judicial review of arbitration awards).
387. Judicial Supervision, supra note 39, at 681.
388. Katz, supra note 386, at 869.
389. Judicial Supervision, supra note 39, at 681.
390. Aptowitzer, supra note 1, at 1030 (noting that arbitration is often at cross-
purposes with the judicial system).
391. Id.
392. Hayford II, supra note 191, at 838-39 (advocating review limited to the
grounds prescribed in the FAA, which include manifest (intentional) disregard of the law
under subsection 1O(a)(3), and a nonstatutory public policy ground permitting vacatur
where awards direct the performance of an illegal act); Katz, supra note 386, at 869 (ar-
guing that review be restricted to the statutory grounds in the FAA and the "grossly ir-
rational" standard).
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should abandon all substantive review.3 93 One commentator, for
example, joins those who disdain the manifest disregard stan-
dard, characterizing it as "a repository for all sorts of outlandish
theories of arbitral misconduct."3 94 She would eliminate it, re-
stricting review to the procedural grounds in the FAA. 95
Many friends of arbitration believe that expanded review
would improve the process. One such commentator argues that
courts should vacate "outrageous" awards because the enforce-
ment of such awards shakes confidence in the arbitral process
and therefore undermines arbitration policy.3 96 Others invoke a
process-related argument. They question the competence of arbi-
trators, who are often untrained in the law, to decide complex
statutory and constitutional issues, particularly when large
sums are at stake.3 97
Some argue, on a more basic level, that judicial review
would simply protect the parties from unfair awards.3 98 These
writers suggest specific alternative standards of review. Dissatis-
fied with the narrow procedural grounds for review prescribed
in the FAA, one scholar condemns the prevailing nonstatutory,
substantive standard of review, the manifest disregard test, as
"simply awful."399 He would modify the test to require vacatur
where an award clearly violates law and would work significant
injustice. 40 Others who challenge the "sanctity" of erroneous
393. Francis E. Jones, Jr., Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards-Common-Law Con-
fusion and Statutory Clarification, 31 S. CA L. REv. 1, 37 (1957) (asserting that "the
very best kind of judicial review for most awards, whether statutory or common law, is
no review at all").
394. Varela, supra note 210, at 65.
395. Id. at 75 (arguing that the FAA provides a mechanism to safeguard against
egregious arbitral misconduct).
396. Martin, supra note 1, at 1938 (suggesting that mandatory procedures should
require arbitrators to provide the reviewing court with written findings to facilitate re-
view, although the court should preserve the flexibility of arbitration by vacating only
"outrageous" awards).
397. C. Evan Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appeal: An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79
Ky. L.J. 347, 368 (1991) (focusing on securities law arbitration); Anthony J. Basincki,
Comment, Commercial Arbitration Under the Federal Act: Expanding the Scope of Judi-
cial Review, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 799, 801 (1974) (observing that claims involving ques-
tions of fact, such as whether a seller of goods made timely delivery, are most suitable
for arbitration).
398. See Judicial Supervision, supra note 39, at 681; Philip G. Phillips, Note, Rules
of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590, 599-600 (1934)
(stating that arbitration is suitable for resolving questions of fact but that it is suspect
for deciding issues of law).
399. Speidel Letter, supra note 266.
400. See MAcNEm ET Ar,, supra note 47, § 40.7.2.6, at 40:95 (expressing the belief
that a more comprehensive change in the standard of review would require amendment
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awards4°1 have advanced more ambitious proposals ranging from
adopting the English system, which requires vacatur of an
award showing error on its face,402 to instituting plenary judicial
review for legal error.
403
In an odd alignment of conflicting allegiances, some who
support expanded review are avowed enemies of arbitration.
Their arguments against expanded review recall the public pol-
icy objections to arbitrability.4 4 Noting that corporations arbi-
trate multi-million dollar claims, they stress that the conse-
quences of arbitral decisions extend far beyond the quarreling
parties.4 5 They believe that courts fail in their traditional role
of developing and applying norms promoting social values when
they confirm legally erroneous awards.4 6 Chagrined by Supreme
Court decisions beginning with Prima Paint and culminating
with McMahon, Rodriguez de Quijas, and Gilmer, these support-
ers of expanded review seek to regain ground lost on the arbi-
trability issue by introducing a fortified version of judicial
scrutiny.
Most proponents of expanded review contend that the courts
lack the power to overhaul the process; Congress, they believe,
would have to amend the FAA- 4°7 Because the current practice
to the FAA).
401. Frances T. Freeman Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Atti-
tude, 45 CouNELL L.Q. 519, 556 (1960) ('There is no value in protecting a poor award or
an erroneous one any more than there is in protecting an erroneous decision .... Sharp
judicial scrutiny of both makes for better judgments").
402. Basincki, supra note 397, at 814; Phillips, supra note 398, at 611-13 (praising
the English system which provides for some judicial supervision of arbitration by al-
lowing arbitrators, on their own initiative or at the behest of a party, to submit legal
questions to the court during the arbitration proceedings).
403. Ian M. Comisky & Marvin Comisky, Commercial Arbitration-Panacea or
Nightmare, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 457, 507 (1974) (proposing sensibly that arbitration awards
should be reviewed for errors of law but that only one appeal should be permitted);
Stewart, supra note 397, at 368 (noting that many procedural distinctions between arbi-
tration and litigation have blurred, and that the scope of review of awards, which re-
mains far narrower than the review of judgments, should be broadened).
404. See supra Part II. See also Kronstein II, supra note 5, at 68 (advocating the
fill right to appeal arbitration awards affecting the public interest).
405. Basincki, supra note 397, at 814.
406. Judicial Supervision, supra note 39, at 681 & n.3 (summarizing and question-
ing the public policy arguments favoring expanded review). See Phillips, supra note 398,
at 617 (claiming arbitration, under the current system of limited review, weakens the
stability and predictability of law). See also Basincki, supra note 397, at 814
407. MACm ELr A, supra note 47, § 40:7.2.6, at 40:96. See Stipanowich I, supra
note 7, at 486 (questioning whether amendment of association rules to expand the scope
of review would be effective since the limits of the scope of review are established in the
FAA).
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of unexplained awards thwarts meaningful review, some argue
that any proposed standard, to be effective, should require arbi-
trators to justify their awards in writing.
4°8
Both sides of the debate raise noteworthy policy and practi-
cal considerations. Determining the proper scope of review, how-
ever, rests, not in hypothesis or prediction, but rather on the ar-
bitration agreement itself 40 9
B. The Answer in the Arbitration Agreement
To determine the proper scope of judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards, one must return to the principles fundamental to
arbitration theory. Arbitration derives its characteristics from
the arbitration agreement. As long as the agreement is volun-
tary and legal, as any enforceable contract must be, its provi-
sions establish the substance and procedures that the parties
and the arbitrators must follow. 410 Arbitration agreements char-
acteristically provide for simplicity and speed. The agreement
achieves these ends by dispensing with the formality associated
with judicial proceedings. When so tailored, arbitration is a pri-
vate method of dispute resolution stripped of many of the com-
plexities of litigation: copious discovery, combative motion prac-
tice, exacting evidentiary rules. But these elements of economy
owe their existence to the terms of the agreement. Nothing in-
herent in the nature of arbitration requires parties to adopt
simplified procedures; they choose to do so.
Nor is the circumscribed review of arbitration awards a nec-
essary condition of the process. The scope of review, like all as-
pects of the arbitral process, flows from the agreement. Analysis
of the agreement reveals the scope of review that the parties
intend.
Before one may ascertain the scope of review established in
the agreement, a preliminary question must be answered. One
must determine whether the agreement binds the arbitrators to
apply particular substantive law.
408. See Katzler, supra note 42, at 157 (proposing that SRO rules be amended to re-
quire written opinions in securities arbitration but that the courts continue to apply the
current standard of review, id. at 174); Basincki, supra note 397, at 815 (proposing, in
the alternative, that meaningful review could be achieved under the manifest disregard
test by requiring written opinions explaining the award).
409. See infra Part V.B.
410. See Nathan Isaacs, Note, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration, 40 HARv. L.
REv. 929, 934 (1927) (suggesting that if arbitrators are viewed as agents, review should
be limited, but if arbitrators are viewed as judges, review should be broader).
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1. The Rule When the Agreement Does Not Stipulate Gov-
erning Law. Where the parties, without stipulating applicable
law, agree to submit a dispute to arbitration, the arbitrators are
not constrained by any particular legal norms. The arbitrators
may draw on state law, federal law, or natural law. If so in-
clined, they may borrow from French civil law. Or, they may
simply enforce their own sense of justice. The only limitation is
that they apply a fair and reasonable rule of decision.
In such cases, where the agreement does not stipulate ap-
plicable law, the award should not be subject to judicial review
for legal error, because the arbitrators, unbound by law, cannot
commit such error.411 By using a reasonable and fair rule of deci-
sion, they have discharged their responsibilities in accordance
with the arbitration agreement which establishes the limits of
their authority. If, however, the arbitrators fail to apply a fair
and reasonable rule of decision, the court, on motion, should va-
cate the award. Vacatur is warranted because the parties could
not conceivably have intended to surrender their fate to unfair-
ness or irrationality. Implicit in every arbitration agreement is
the requirement that arbitrators decide fairly and reasonably.41 2
An agreement expressly providing otherwise would be void
under general principles of contract law.
Though not eliminated, public policy concerns diminish
when the agreement does not prescribe applicable law. Since the
arbitration agreement does not require the application of identi-
fiable federal or state doctrine, the award cannot violate statute
or precedent. Any potential damage to existing law is therefore
minimal.
2. The Rule When the Agreement Stipulates Governing
Law. A separate analysis is necessary to determine the scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards for claims arising under
state or federal statute. Again, the analysis begins with focusing
on what law, if any, the arbitrators must apply. Arbitration of
any statutory claim, whether arising under securities law, anti-
trust law, RICO, civil rights law, or otherwise, requires applica-
411. See Sterk, supra note 1, at 483 n.8 (observing that "it is somewhat misleading
to speak of an arbitrator's 'error' of law when he is not required to decide in accordance
with law"). One might define an error of law as arising when an arbitrator, free of con-
tractual constraints, elects to follow particular legal principles, but misapplies them.
Such an error should not be troubling as long as the award is rational.
412. The arbitrator has an implicit contractual obligation to the parties-an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing-to decide fairly and reasonably. See CORBIN,
supra note 165, § 541, at 513-14 (finding that the courts imply an obligation for con-
tracting parties to perform in good faith and to deal fairly with each other).
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tion of the appropriate statute. As the Supreme Court said in
Wilko, which involved a claim under section 12(2) of the 1933
Securities Act, "the provisions of the Securities Act" control.
413
The Court reaffirmed this rule in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,414 where it said that U.S. courts
when asked to confirm an international antitrust award may en-
sure that "enforcement of the antitrust laws has been ad-
dressed."415 Again, in Shearson American/Express Ina v. McMa-
hon,416 a section 10(b) case, the Court noted that even limited
review is sufficient "to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute."
417
The reason .for this rule is straight forward. In a statutory
matter, as always, arbitrators derive their authority from the
arbitration agreement. By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, the parties direct the arbitrators to apply the statute in
question. The arbitrators must follow this directive. Such a
charge carries the expectation that the arbitrators will not only
apply the law but will also apply it correctly. It would defy com-
mon sense to conclude that the parties, having chosen particular
law, would. accept the arbitrators' ignoring it. If the arbitrators
disobey their charge, by not applying the requisite law, whether
deliberately or not, they have failed to satisfy the intent of the
contracting parties who bargained for the resolution of a partic-
ular statutory claim, not submission to renegade deci-
sionmakers. Similarly, if the arbitrators misapply the law, even
in good faith, they have failed to effect the will of the parties.
By submitting a particular statutory claim to the arbitrators,
the parties did not bargain for an erroneous outcome. Their im-
plicit instruction to the arbitrators, by virtue of the agreement,
413. 346 U.S. at 434-35. See Aptowitzer, supra note 1, at 1009-10 (stating that
Wilko requires arbitrators to follow statutory law even when the arbitration agreement
does not so specify). The Second Circuit opinion in Wilko noted that "[i]n England, even
without such an express provision in the arbitration agreement, the arbitrators must de-
cide 'according to the legal right of the parties!" 201 F.2d at 445 n.9 (quoting Jager v.
Tolme, 1 KB. 939, 953 (1916)); see also Stotesbury v. Turner, KB. 370 (1943); Czarnikow
v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., 2 KB. 478, 484 (1922). See supra note 402 and accompanying
text (discussing review under English arbitration law).
414. 473 US. 614 (1985).
415. Id. at 638. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 US. 20, 26 (1991)
("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute.") (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 US. at 628)).
416. 482 US. 220 (1986). See Stewart, supra note 397, at 352 (noting that the Su-
preme Court requires arbitrators to follow applicable controlling law).




was to reach the legally correct result.418 At the beginning of an
arbitration, the parties, given the choice, would surely desire ju-
dicial correction rather than enforcement of awards violating the
rule of decision that they instructed the arbitrator to apply.
Vindicating party intent helps assure justice, for when the
parties choose particular law to govern, they establish their ex-
pectation of the "just" outcome of the dispute. Their agreement
indicates that the only correct result and therefore the only just
result must conform to chosen law.
If the arbitrators err, either by failing to apply the statute
or by misapplying it, the court, on motion, should vacate the
award. Judicial correction of such errors assures that the law
chosen by the disputing parties in their arbitration agreement
will be properly applied. The Second Circuit in Wilko recognized
the reviewability of such errors. It stated, "[flailure to do so [de-
cide in accordance with a chosen federal statute] would, in our
opinion, constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to
section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act."419 Reaching the same
conclusion, the D.C. Circuit in Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Servs.
instructed that the manifest disregard standard "is sufficiently
rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted
and applied statutory law."4 0
If, for example, the parties submit a RICO claim to arbitra-
tion, they expect the arbitrators to apply RICO correctly. It
would be absurd to submit a claim expecting the wrong party to
prevail. The parties would not countenance an erroneous deci-
sion without any mechanism of correction. If the arbitrators find
reasonably on the record that no predicate acts were committed,
but nevertheless decide that the respondent violated RICO, the
court, on motion, must intervene to conform the result to the ex-
pectation of the parties. The reason for the error is irrelevant.
The parties bargained for the faithful application of RICO.
Elevating party intent above considerations of finality and
efficiency harmonizes with the legislative intent behind the
FAA. The House committee report, in urging passage of the bill
destined to become the FAA, explained the purpose of the legis-
lation: "Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract,
and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting par-
ties live up the agreement . . . . An arbitration agreement is
418. But see Hayford H, supra note 191, at 742-43 (suggesting that, "as a matter of
contract law," arbitration agreements do not contemplate judicial correction of legal er-
rors of arbitrators).
419. 201 F.2d at 445.
420. No. 96-7042, 1997 U.S. App. LEXS 2223, *71 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1997).
126 [Vol. 45
REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
placed upon the same footing as other contracts, where it be-
longs."421 The Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd acknowledged the primacy of party intent in federal arbi-
tration policy when it announced: "The preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements
into which the parties had entered... "422
As the Second Circuit appears to have recognized in Wilko,
the FAA provides a basis for vacating erroneous awards arising
from statutory claims.423 Section 10(a)(4) requires that the dis-
trict court vacate an award "where the arbitrators exceeded
their powers." When arbitrators disregard or misapply chosen
law, they have exceeded their powers by failing to resolve the
dispute according to the conditions set forth in the arbitration
agreement.424 This approach obviates the need to amend the
FAA to permit substantive review of awards. Nevertheless, Con-
gress might amend the FAA profitably by limiting judicial re-
view to the district court on a motion to vacate the award. Such
a rule, eliminating subsequent appeals, would reconcile party in-
tent with the need for efficiency.42 5 To facilitate review, arbitra-
tion associations might amend their rules in two respects. When
the disputing parties designate controlling law, either by sub-
mitting a statutory claim to arbitration or by incorporating a
choice-of-law clause into their agreement, arbitrators should
render a written opinion briefly explaining their reasoning. Un-
less the parties express the contrary intention, a verbatim re-
cord of the hearing should be kept.426
Conforming the scope of review to the intent of the parties
affords a beneficial by-product. It satisfies the public policy con-
cerns of those who challenge the social utility of arbitration. Ple-
nary judicial review safeguards the statutory rights of the prin-
cipal parties. Arguments of the evasion of legal duties evaporate.
Similarly, plenary judicial review of arbitration awards protects
421. HR REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
422. 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). The Supreme Court repeated this pronouncement in
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26.
423. 201 F.2d at 445.
424. See Stipanowich I, supra note 7, at 486 n.339 (suggesting that the parties can
circumvent the limited standard of FAA-prescribed review by binding arbitrators to par-
ticular law thereby conferring on the courts review power under the "exceeding their au-
thority" standard).
425. See Comisky & Comisky, supra note 403, at 504-07 (proposing elimination of
pre-arbitration motions from the FAA and the limitation to a single instance of judicial
review).
426. SRO rules require a verbatim record of evidentiary hearings. See SICA CODE, §
24 (1996); NASD CODE 10326; NYSE RuLEs, Rule 623.
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the rights of third parties to the same extent as appellate re-
view of any lower court judgment. Finally, legal norms will not
erode when the district courts enforce them on motion.
Pre-dispute arbitration agreements sometimes incorporate
choice-of-law clauses. Such clauses crop up routinely in form
customer account agreements used in the securities industry.427
The analysis necessary to determine the scope of judicial review
when parties adopt a choice-of-law clause mirrors that for statu-
tory claims. Parties, agreeing to be governed by designated state
law, intend the arbitrators to apply that law and apply it cor-
rectly. If the arbitrators disregard chosen law or misinterpret it,
they frustrate the intent of the parties. Plenary judicial review,
while satisfying party intent, also vindicates public policy.
The parties to an arbitration agreement, however, may ex-
pressly reject plenary review. They may do so when submitting
a statutory or common law claim for arbitration. Like other con-
tractual arrangements, absent unconscionability or illegality,
such an opt-out provision should be honored. Enforcement of
such a provision results in exactly the same narrow standard of
review as current arbitration law provides for all awards. In the
case of an agreement limiting review, however, the rejection of
judicial oversight flows from the agreement. Under current prac-
tice, arbitration law imposes limited review in spite of the
agreement.
By honoring the intent of the parties to forego judicial re-
view, public policy arguments against arbitration again become
a concern. The three most poignant areas of concern are: (1) the
relinquishment of rights otherwise guaranteed by substantive
law, (2) harm that may befall unrepresented third parties, and
(3) the impairment of societal values. On balance, however,
these concerns, though significant, should not override party
intent.
As long as neither party coerced the other into the arbitra-
tion agreement, the law should permit the parties to relinquish
substantive rights. Even fundamental constitutional rights, such
as due process42 and jury trial,4 9 are waivable. A waiver of sub-
427. Cane, supra note 26, at 158; Franklin D. Ormsten, Punitive Damages in Secur-
ities Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1993, at 1, 31.
428. Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 US. 694, 703 (1982) (stating
that the requirement of personal jurisdiction in civil suits is a due process right and as
other due process rights may be waived); D.H. Overmyer v. Frick Co., 405 US. 174, 186
(1972) (holding that due process may be waived contractually).
429. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (noting that the right to
a jury trial is waived in arbitration); Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 US. 263, 278-
79 (1932) (recognizing the constitutionality of the waiver of jury trial in arbitration).
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stantive rights and the adjunct waiver of review for legal error,
when negotiated fairly, are an acceptable manifestation of free-
dom of contract.
Erroneous arbitration awards may permit continuing injury
to unrepresented third parties, particularly in the antitrust
arena where decisions may have unintended consequences. Few
arbitrations, however, decide issues so momentous that unto-
ward harm will befall the masses. Furthermore, third parties
can protect their interests by bringing suit on their own behalf.
If suit is not feasible, they may seek the assistance of appropri-
ate state and federal agencies. For example, interested parties
may notify the Federal Trade Commission of illegal monopolistic
or price-fixing schemes. One would hope for vigorous enforce-
ment. Finally, the parties to the controversy may settle their
dispute at any time. They carry no obligation to press their
claims for the welfare of others. They should similarly be ac-
corded the option of arbitrating.
Arbitration does not threaten societal values. If it did, the
countless number of arbitrations over the centuries, particularly
in recent decades, would have eradicated our values long ago.
Litigation thrives in our contentious culture. When one endures
the slightest harm, his first thought is to sue, not arbitrate. For-
mer Chief Justice Warren Burger has bemoaned the "mass neu-
rosis that leads many people to think courts were created to
solve all the problems of mankind."30 If litigation preserves val-
ues, one may anticipate that values will flourish in the coming
millennia.
The courts, however, should retain the present limited stan-
dard of review for violations of public policy.43 1 An award that di-
rects a party to perform an illegal act should not withstand judi-
cial scrutiny. Nor should the court confirm an award
jeopardizing public health or safety. This standard of review
should be applied parsimoniously. The court should be wary of
substituting its judgment for that of the arbitrators.
C. Political Philosophy: A Rationale
Heightened judicial oversight of arbitration awards finds
support in the philosophical underpinnings of contract law. Lib-
erty and property are man's most fundamental rights.432 The
430. Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration To Achieve Justice, 40 ARB. J. 3, 5 (1985).
431. See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the public policy ground of review).
432. John Locke theorized that "all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of per-
fect Freedom, to order their actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons, as
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right to enter into contracts springs from the ownership of prop-
erty because without contracts the very concept of property be-
comes meaningless.4 3 If one cannot dispose of his' property as he
sees fit, the property is not his.43 Besides exercising fundamen-
tal rights to property, when parties enter into a contract they
bind their individual wills to a common purpose, usually a com-
mercial activity.43 5 A contract, therefore, is an expression of both
individual autonomy and cooperation.
Arbitration agreements, like all contracts, derive their legit-
imacy from the exercise of property rights. 3 6 Although the aim
of such agreements is efficient and just dispute resolution, they
serve an additional, if unintended, purpose. They diminish the
reach of government to supervise and control dispute resolution
through the process of in-court adjudication. 3 7 By carving out
spheres of "private government," 38 parties establish their own
they see fit. . . . JOHN LOcHE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNrENT. AN ESSAY CON.
CERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, reprinted in
LOCKE'S Two THEORIES OF GOvERNmENT § 4, at 287 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed.
1698).
433. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1715 (1976) (suggesting that "[tlhe rationale for contract is deriva-
tive from that of property... [because] [o]ne who breaches deprives the promisee in a
sense no less real than the thief").
434. Property rights are worthless unless the owner may dispose of his property
without governmental interference. JoHN LOCKE, supra note 432, § 194, at 413. Other-
wise "all free and voluntary Contracts cease, and are void, in the World... and all the
Grants and Promises of man in power, are but Mockery and Collusion. Id.
435. Immanuel Kant, whose philosophy stressed individual autonomy, defined "jus-
tice" as the conjoining of free wills. He said: "Justice is therefore the aggregate of those
conditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another
in accordance with a universal law of freedom." IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSiCAL ELE-
MENTS OF JusTIcE 34 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797). See T.K SEUNG, KANT'S PLATONIC
RVOLUTION IN MORAL AND POLITICAL PmLOSOPHY 131-33 (1994) (discussing Kant's con-
ception of property as it relates to freedom of contract).
436. Morgan, supra note 21, at 1069 (stating that "the legitimacy of arbitral pro-
ceedings flows directly from a vision of private autonomy as the conceptual basis of con-
tract law"). Morgan concludes that disputes of public concern, which involve distributive
rather than corrective justice, should not be arbitrable. Id. at 1075.
437. One author scorns the idealization of freedom of contract:
Contractualism in the law, that is, the view that in an ideally desirable system
of law all obligation would arise only out of the will of the individual con-
tracting freely, rests not only on the will theory of contract but also on the po-
litical doctrine that all restraint is evil and that the government is best which
governs least.
Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 558 (1933). This author
rejects the notion that "free contract assures the greatest amount of liberty for all," be-
cause some restraint is necessary to achieve an orderly, functioning society. Id. at 559-
61.
438. See Kronstein H, supra note 5, at 36 (using the term "private government" to
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tribunal, and shape their own decisionmaking process. They do
not appear in court and thus do not participate in the state's le-
gal institution. Rather than following the directions of a judge, a
state official, they entrust the dispute to private citizens, the ar-
bitrators of their choice.4 9 Complex procedural and evidentiary
rules, sometimes an unwanted imposition of the state on liti-
gants, do not bind them. Required to render a fair and reasona-
ble award, the arbitrators may be freed of state-created substan-
tive rules of decision if the parties so desire.
This check on governmental power flows from the private
exercise of rights, rather than from other branches of govern-
ment. Arbitration, therefore, represents a significant and per-
haps unique mechanism for stemming the influence of the state.
Many complain of pervasive governmental intrusion: the exces-
sive regulation of business, the deprivation of rights. As long as
an arbitration agreement is freely negotiated,U° arbitration pro-
vides an exemplary method for removing at least some disputes
from the grasp of encroaching government.
Advocates of the public policy defense will react with mixed
emotions to the proposal that party intent determine the scope
of review. They will approve of the proposal when the parties
provide explicitly or implicitly for expanded judicial oversight.
They will disapprove of the proposal when parties explicitly or
implicitly preclude review. In the latter case they will argue that
state control of dispute resolution protects society. Their fears,
however, may be exaggerated, particularly since awards di-
recting illegal acts or endangering public health or safety would
remain unenforceable. Given this limitation, the benefits of hon-
oring party intent outweigh the risks. Upholding party intent
encourages cooperation, however uneasy, between adversaries.
Driven by mutual interest, they exercise their autonomy jointly
disparage arbitration).
439. See DAvID HUME, A TREATISE OF HumAN NATURE 531 (2d ed. 1978) (1st ed.
1888) (arguing that arbitration permits sensible compromise solutions make it not per-
mitted by civil law). See generally JONATHAN HARRISON, HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 149
(1981) (discussing Hume's view of arbitration).
440. The enforceability of contract assumes that the will of the parties was exer-
cised freely. Agreements are unenforceable when coerced. See Frostifresh Corp. v. Reyoso,
281 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (N.Y. App. Term 1967) (finding unconscionable that an installment
contract in English for the sale of a refrigerator to Spanish-speaking buyers at a radi-
cally inflated price). See generally ARTHUR I CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONrRACTS § 128, at 188
(1 Vol. ed. 1952) (discussing unconscionability). See supra note 165 and accompanying
text. Limitations on unconscionable agreements do not curtail freedom of contract, be-




to submit disputes to the forum of their choice. Perhaps most
significantly, honoring party intent sets boundaries for state ad-
judicative power.
VI. ANTICIPATED OBmCTIoNs AND RESPONSES TO THEM
Both supporters and opponents of arbitration may object to
expanded review, even when dictated by party intent. They have
two principal arguments. The first posits that the very attrib-
utes that make arbitration efficient render it incompatible with
justice." Tinkering with the scope of review is futile because
the fundamentally flawed process cannot be rescued. To save it
would require converting it into a watered down version of liti-
gation. The second argument holds that finality is the critical el-
ement of arbitration." 2 Expanding review would induce a flood
of appeals compromising the finality of awards. As a result, the
process would lose its efficiency and would no longer be advan-
tageous. This argument, like the deficient process argument,
warns that arbitration might degenerate into a litigation-like
quagmire.
A. The Defective Process Argument
Conceding that expanded review would improve the process,
opponents of arbitration charge, nevertheless, that improvement
would be minimal because inadequacy plagues arbitration from
commencement to appeal. The catalogue of supposed deficiencies
lists nearly every element of the process. These critics argue
that broadened review would not salvage arbitration from its in-
herent defects. Analysis of arbitral procedures refutes their criti-
cism. Aspects of arbitration, other than the limited scope of re-
view, do not substantially hamper, and often enhance, the
quality of justice achieved. In addition, the parties may tailor
the process to accommodate their needs.4-3 In small matters they
may dispense with procedures that they might adopt in matters
where the stakes are higher.
Critics complain that relaxed notice requirements fail to
provide adversaries with sufficient detail of claims and de-
fenses.4" There are several responses. Modern arbitration rules
441. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 24.
442. See Varela, supra note 210, at 65.
443. See AAA RULEs, Rule 1 (1996) ("The parties, by written agreement, may vary
the procedures set forth in these rules.").
444. See Delgado et al., supra note 154, at 1371 (arguing that formal pleading rules
help ferret out duplicative, harassing and meritless claims); Schwartz, supra note 6, at
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require ample notice to apprise adversaries of the nature of the
claim. 45 Although more formal and requiring more detail, lib-
eral pleading practice, except in special cases involving fraud for
instance, requires only skeletal allegations. Defenses may pro-
vide no specificity at all.4" Lawyers craft formal pleadings to
conceal harmful facts, and where advantageous they evade
pleading requirements and seek to confuse their adversaries." 7
Rather than a' source of valuable information, pleadings often
furnish an excuse for motions to dismiss, which, in turn, may
spawn appeals. Cost and delay force parties to abandon merito-
rious claims.
Many argue that limited arbitral discovery impedes prepa-
ration and fair settlement, which depends on learning the
strengths and weaknesses of your adversary's case.'4 Modern
arbitration rules, however, encourage arbitrators to permit some
discovery without licensing endless expeditions into boundless
and fruitless terrain.449 Arbitrators set time limits for relevant
disclosure and squelch skirmishes destined in litigation to lead
to discovery motions and interlocutory appeals.
Rules of evidence do not apply in arbitration,50 a simplifica-
tion one might applaud. Yet some believe that following techni-
cal evidentiary rules enhances the hearing process. 51 Arbitra-
tion rules, however, direct arbitrators to admit relevant and
material evidenceA 2 Arbitrators may at times afford the parties
14 (noting that formal pleading requirements assist parties in preparing their cases).
445. AAA rules provide that the claimant shall provide the other party with "a
statement setting forth the nature of the dispute, the amount involved, if any, [and] the
remedy sought"). AAA RULEs, Rule 6. See also SICA CODE §§ 2(a) & 13(a) & (b); NASD
CODE 10302(b) & 10314(a); NYSE RULEs, Rule 601(b) & 612(a).
446. FED. R CIV. P. 8(c).
447. See Farley, supra note 15, at 108 (charging that lawyers evade pleading re-
quirements by asserting "generalized, imprecise (and often erroneous) allegations");
Newman, supra note 7, at 1650 (arguing that liberal pleading standards in litigation
perpetuate dubious cases).
448. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 14-15 (conceding that parties to a long-standing
relationship may not need discovery, and that, in any event, discovery abuse causes ex-
pense and delay).
449. See AAA RuLEs, Rule 10; SICA CODE § 20(d)(1); NASD CODE 10321(b)(1);
NYSE RULEs, Rule 619(d)(1). See Newman, supra note 7, at 1651 (arguing that massive
discovery is unnecessary to the just resolution of disputes).
450. AAA RuLEs, Rule 31; SICA CODE § 21; NASD CODE 10323; NYSE RULES, Rule
620.
451. See Delgado et al., supra note 154, at 1374 (arguing that formal rules of evi-
dence reduce prejudice); Schwartz, supra note 6, at 15-16 (suggesting the irony that lim-
iting discovery chokes the flow of relevant information, while abandoning rules of evi-
dence allows the admission of suspect information).
452. AAA rules provide: MTe parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and ma-
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more leeway than would judges-satisfying the parties' sense of
fairness-but arbitrators are unimpressed, as any sensible per-
son would be, with far-flung digressions. Hearsay rules aim at
eliminating unreliable statements, but these sometimes
hypertechnical rules are not sacred. Some hearsay may be pro-
bative. Experienced arbitrators, selected by the parties, may be
trusted to make reasonable judgments.45 3
Complaints that arbitration tolerates witness dishonesty
overlook the rules of prominent arbitration associations. 5 4 These
rules either require testimony under oath, or provide for
oathtaking at the behest of the arbitrator or any party to the
dispute.455 Although judges, unlike arbitrators, have the power
to punish perjurers, 4 6 the vague specter of civil or criminal pen-
alties, so rarely imposed, probably does not deter lying.
Opponents of arbitration attack the processes by which arbi-
trators are qualified and selected, and question arbitrator integ-
rity.457 They stress that arbitrators are not held to the same for-
mal ethical standards as judges and fear that self-interest
motivates arbitral decisions.458 This criticism ignores arbitration
association safeguards. To protect their reputations and to pre-
serve the integrity of the process, associations demand imparti-
ality from their arbitrators. Qualifying to become an arbitrator
at the AAA or an SRO is a laborious process.4 9 When an associ-
terial to the dispute and shall produce such evidence as the arbitrator may deem neces-
sary to an understanding and determination of the dispute." AAA RuLEs, Rule 31. SRO
rules provide: 'Mhe arbitrators shall determine the materiality and relevance of any evi-
dence proffered and shall not be bound by rules governing the admissibility of evidence."
SICA CODE § 21; NASD CODE 10323; NYSE RULES, Rule 620.
453. AAA rules provide: 'The arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of
witnesses by affidavit, but shall give it only such weight as the arbitrator deems it enti-
tled to after consideration of any objection made to its admission." AAA RuLEs, Rule 32.
454. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 16. See generally Newman, supra note 7, at
1651 (arguing that live testimony is unnecessary in most cases, which could be resolved
based on the lawyers' oral argument).
455. AAA rules provide: 'The arbitrator may require witnesses to testify under oath
admini tered by any duly qualified person and, if it is required by law or requested by
any party, shall do so. AAA RULES, Rule 27. See also SICA CODE § 25; NASD CODE
10327; NYSE RULES, Rule 624.
456. See Schwartz supra note 6, at 16 (asserting that the deterrent effect of judge-
imposed punishment is absent in arbitration).
457. Id. at 16-17 (faulting the AAA for not providing parties with even more back-
ground information than it does about prospective arbitrators, but not acknowledging
that parties have no input into the selection of what judge will determine their case).
458. Id.
459. Applicants must provide recommendations and detailed information about their
background, education and experience. They must then attend a lengthy training ses-
sion. If parties complain justly about an arbitrator's performance, the association will re-
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ation appoints an arbitrator to a case, association rules require
disclosure even of a remote appearance of a conflict of inter-
est.4 0 Cloaked with judicial immunity and immense power and
prestige, judges are often appointed or elected to lengthy terms
and are subject to temptations of their own. Many judges are
dedicated public servants; many arbitrators perform admirably.
Neither group is more susceptible to corruption than the other.
None of the simplified procedures of arbitration, other than
those associated with the limited scope of review, frustrate jus-
tice. To the contrary, streamlined pleading, pre-hearing, and
hearing procedures, contribute to the attainment of a just out-
come. The economy of arbitration deters excessive expense and
delay from forcing an unfair settlement or abandonment of valid
claims and defenses.
B. The Critical Element Argument
Some proponents of arbitration may dislike broadened re-
view when dictated by party intent. They might argue that arbi-
tration owes its superiority over litigation to savings in time
and expense. Such savings result substantially from the finality
of arbitration awards, that is, their nonreviewability. Expanding
the scope of review, according to this view, would destroy final-
ity. Motions to vacate and subsequent appeals would flood the
courts and vacaturs based on expanded review would unleash
even more motions and appeals. Requiring written opinions and
verbatim records would heap even more inefficiency onto the
process.4 1 Complexity would have crept into the proceedings; ar-
bitration would bear an ominously close resemblance to its rival
system: litigation.
Such worries are misplaced. First, parties are always free in
their agreement to forego review. Second, the floodgates are
open already. The current narrow scope of review has not dis-
move him and disqualify him from further assignments. NASD Training Session Admin-
istered by Thomas F. Wynn, M, Assistant Director of Arbitration, NASD (June 28, 1995)
(inculcating prospective arbitrators with a commitment to fairness and disclosure even
of apparent rather than real conflicts of interest). Recently, the NASD expanded its
training materials. See, e.g., ARITRATOR TRAINNG: PANEL MEMBER PARTICIPANT'S GUIDE
(Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers 1996).
460. See AAA RULES, Rule 19 (establishing procedure for disclosing "any bias or any
financial or personal interest"); SICA CODE §§ 11 & 12 (establishing elaborate disclosure
and disqualification procedures); NASD CODE 10312 & 10313; NYSE RULES, Rules 610 &
611 (same).
461. See Katsoris II, supra note 27, at 291 (noting that SICA rejected expanding the
scope of review to preserve the simplicity and speed of arbitration).
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couraged aggressive litigators from attacking awards. 462 One
commentator argues that the manifest disregard standard im-
pairs finality by encouraging challenges to awards. 463 Yet arbi-
tration survives. Although motions under the current regime
succeed rarely, the review process itself, more than the result of
the appeal, consumes time and money. If hopeful parties compel
the courts to expend judicial resources on appeals from arbitral
awards, judges should not have to confirm errors that they could
just as easily correct.464 By vacating erroneous awards, judges
will strengthen confidence in arbitration; people will be more in-
clined to arbitrate and cases will be diverted from the courts.
The frequency of judicial review of awards has not sapped
arbitration of its efficiency. The system works despite pervasive
motions and appeals because nonreviewability is relatively in-
consequential to arbitrations efficiency. People turn to arbitra-
tion to avail themselves of the streamlined practices which
shape its character from the beginning of the process through
the hearing: simplified pleadings, limited discovery and motion
practice, relaxed evidentiary standards, and overall speed and
informality. Plenary review at the district court would not alter
these advantageous procedures; subsequent review is unneces-
462. See Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S. Abrahams, The Trouble With Arbitration,
1985 LrITG. J. 30, 32 (1985) (commenting that lawyers routinely seek review of adverse
awards and that the lack of a record and unexplained decisions cost more than appeals
from court judgments); Phillips, supra note 398, at 609 (remarking on how common mo-
tions to vacate from arbitral awards were, even in 1934). Unfortunately, neither the
AAA nor the NASD keep records of what percentage of awards are challenged. Brady In-
terview, supra note 28; Letter from Susie M. Dippel, Quality Assurance Analyst, NASD,
to Kenneth . Davis, Assistant Professor of Legal & Ethical Studies, Fordham Univer-
sity Graduate School of Business Administration 1 (Sept. 4, 1996) (on file with author).
463. Varela, supra note 201, at 65 (arguing that the manifest disregard standard in-
creases attacks on arbitration awards because (1) it is not clearly defined, and (2) parties
will seize on any standard of substantive review to escape adverse determinations).
464. Assessing attorneys' fees and other sanctions might curb frivolous challenges to
arbitration awards. Generally, courts have denied requests for the imposition of such
penalties. French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 909 (9th
Cir. 1985); Koch Oil, SAL v. Transocean Gulf Oil Co., 751 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1985);
Kurt Orban Co. v. Angeles Metal Sys., 573 E2d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 1978). In some recent
cases, however, courts have awarded costs and attorneys' fees where the challenge was
frivolous. Flexible Manu. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Products corp., 86 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir.
1996) (imposing sanctions against appellant, including respondents expenses incurred as
a result of the appeal and damages resulting from the delay in collecting the award);
Widell v. Wolf, 43 F.2d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 1995) (ordering party, deemed to have pur-
sued frivolous challenge to award, to show cause why it should not have to pay adver-
sary's legal fees and expenses); Rostad and Rostad Corp. v. Investment Management &
Research, Inc., 923 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1991) (awarding attorneys' fees and double
costs arising from proceedings in district court and the circuit court of appeals).
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say to satisfy the parties' expectations. Arbitration would retain
its benefits, while the scope of review would conform to the par-
ties' intent.
Compulsory written opinions and verbatim recording of evi-
dentiary hearings would not compromise the informality of arbi-
tration.465 Even today stenographic recording, which causes only
modest expense, is required in securities arbitration.466 In the
overall scheme of dispute resolution, having to write an opinion
would take little time and would add little cost.467 Beyond facili- -
tating review, mandatory opinions would provide a bonus, fos-
tering clarity of thought. The quality of awards would improve.
CONCLUSION
Litigation has evolved into an unwieldy institution. Parties
arbitrate because they want their disputes resolved quickly and
inexpensively. Though some charge that arbitration breeds in-
justice, the burgeoning popularity of the tribunal should quiet
detractors who brand arbitration as an inferior process. Arbitra-
tion will continue to flourish because litigation will continue to
frustrate.468 Success, however, does not foreclose improvement.
The current limited scope of judicial review of awards at-
tempts, with dubious success, to enhance efficiency by erecting a
barrier between the arbitral forum and the courts. Imposing this
standard of review, however, may defy the intent of the parties.
Because arbitration is contractual, the agreement determines
the process. All arbitration agreements, expressly or impliedly,
establish a contractual expectation of what the scope of judicial
review should be. The courts should honor these expectations.
When parties arbitrate a statutory claim or a state law
claim under a choice-of-law clause, they express their intent
that the arbitrators apply correctly the designated law. If the ar-
bitrators fail to reach the correct decision under designated law,
they have thwarted the intention of the parties. The district
465. See Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 462, at 32 (contending that the absence of
records and written opinions detracts from arbitration's efficiency by hindering effective
review).
466. UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, Rule 24 (1996) (providing also that any party
or the arbitrator may arrange for transcription of the record).
467. Katzler, supra note 42, at 184-85 (suggesting that, since arbitrators ordinarily
discuss openly their decisions, requiring a brief statement of findings and conclusions
would not burden them).




courts can vindicate party intent by entertaining a single unap-
pealable motion to correct such awards for legal error.
Critics attack arbitration because it is a lawless process
which injures unrepresented third parties and denigrates social
norms. Expanded review, as proposed, reconciles party intent
with public policy. It empowers the courts to protect public pol-
icy while upholding the arbitration agreement.
Party intent, however, does not always coincide with public
policy concerns. The two diverge when parties arbitrate state
law claims without designating governing law. This conflict is
typically minor, however, since most state common law claims
do not implicate strong public policy. The clash is more signifi-
cant when the parties expressly preclude review of awards
resolving federal statutory claims. In such cases, party intent
should control. Most arbitrations, even of statutory claims, affect
only the disputing parties who, by agreement, have waived re-
view. Sometimes arbitration will affect third parties indirectly.
Any antitrust decision has economic consequences, sometimes
predictable but often unforeseen. Affected third parties, how-
ever, like all citizens, must protect their own interests. They
may bring suit, agree to arbitrate, or engage in negotiations.
They may turn to federal regulators for help. The obligation to
protect their rights should not fall to other private individuals.
Disputing parties may settle their differences without analyzing
the settlement for its potential social and economic impact. The
same should hold for arbitration.
The proposed standard of review is consistent with federal
arbitration policy which promotes the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA empowers courts to va-
cate awards when the arbitrators have "exceeded their powers."
When arbitrators misapply federal statutory law, they fail to
satisfy their duty under the arbitration agreement. They argua-
bly exceed their powers. The FAA, without amendment, there-
fore justifies implementation of the proposed standard of review.
Federal arbitration policy reflects Congress's displeasure
with the courts' legacy of antagonism toward arbitration. By en-
acting the FAA, Congress endorsed this efficient process of alter-
native dispute resolution. Though arbitration now flourishes, lit-
igants still flock to the courthouse. Overburdened judges
welcome use of the alternative forum that they once repudiated.
Arbitration does not merely lighten the burden of judges. It
is a cooperative, though adversarial, effort which achieves self-
government. Foreseeing the possibility of conflict, parties recog-
nize a mutual interest in agreeing to submit future disputes to
a private forum. They shape the process to fit their needs. If
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conflict should arise, the agreement determines their rights. The
state has institutionalized dispute resolution. It has constructed
courthouses, installed judges, and created substantive and pro-
cedural law. In exercising freedom of contract, parties to an arbi-
tration agreement set boundaries for state control over their af-
fairs. They displace governmental power with self-
determination.

